Wasting or saving time? How government and opposition parties use time during legislative debates. Evidence from the Italian case
In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 439-464
ISSN: 1743-9337
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In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 439-464
ISSN: 1743-9337
In: Contemporary Italian politics, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 301-303
ISSN: 2324-8831
In: Italian Political Science Review: Rivista italiana di scienza politica, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 225-252
ISSN: 0048-8402
In: West European politics, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 164-191
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 711-725
ISSN: 1460-3683
Gender quotas are generally regarded as the foremost measure for the promotion of gender equality in politics. While quotas and their impact vary across countries, a strong quota system is defined as including blocked electoral lists, large district magnitude, strong non-compliance sanctions, and rank-order rules like gender alternation in the candidate lists. Yet, also in the presence of strong quota rules, parties might attempt strategies aimed at mitigating their gender-balancing effect. By taking Italy as a case study, in this article we investigate whether and how parties competing in the 2018 elections were able to adapt their gender gatekeeping strategy to the new quota law. Our finding suggests that Italian parties relied on another characteristic of the electoral system—namely, the possibility of multiple candidacies—to successfully hinder women candidates' chances of election. Accordingly, we highlight that a wider set of electoral system characteristics should be taken into account in the design of a (strong) quota law.
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 149-162
ISSN: 1460-3683
Outside the US, the crucial question of how well politicians represent the preferences of voters is usually investigated at the party level. Reversing this perspective, we examine representation in Europe from the point of view of individual candidates running in national parliamentary elections. This is especially insightful in a period that seems characterized by a decline in parties' representational capacities and an increasing personalization of politics. We analyze representation by considering the incongruence between candidates' left–right positions and the average placement of their party voters. By combining candidate survey data with mass survey data on voters, we assess how ideological incongruence varies according to predictors measured at the levels of candidates, parties, and party systems. The results highlight a systematic association between a partisan style of representation and candidates' proximity to voters, as well as the interactions between representational roles and factors such as the anti-establishment nature of parties and ideological polarization in the party system.
In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 578-605
ISSN: 1743-9337
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 771-800
ISSN: 1939-9162
By extending existing theories of legislative speech making, this study explores the importance of parliamentary rules governing floor debates for government and opposition parties. An original data set including speeches of members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies between 2001 and 2006 is used to test two hypotheses under different institutional scenarios, that is, rules either restricting or granting open access to the floor. Parliamentary rules are found to affect allocation of speaking time within both governing and opposition parties. Governing parties' leaders exploit their agenda control to a higher degree when allocating speaking time. Under restrictive rules, government party leaders control their MPs by essentially limiting the number of speeches and allocating them to frontbenchers. Restrictive rules give opposition party leaders an important chance to select MPs who are closer to their own position.
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 771-800
ISSN: 0362-9805
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 687-714
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: Italian politics: a review ; a publication of the Istituto Cattaneo, Band 28, Heft 1
ISSN: 2326-7259
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 687-714
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 687-714
ISSN: 1475-6765
Scholars interested in legislative processes pay relatively little attention to the changes made to bills in parliamentary democracies. On the one hand, comparative research has often described parliamentary institutions as ineffectual vis-a-vis cabinets throughout the lawmaking process; on the other hand, for a long time the rational choice literature has focused more on the formal rules regulating amendatory activity than on amendatory activity itself. Hence, very few studies have tried to explain how much government bills are altered in parliament and why. This article investigates the changes made to governmental legislation in Italy. Taking the modifications occurring during the legislative process as the dependent variable, a number of explanatory hypotheses derived from both existing scholarship and original arguments are discussed and tested. This also allows the identification of some usually unobserved aspects of the decision-making process within the cabinet. The findings can also be relevant for comparative research since Italy has been characterised during the period under scrutiny (1987-2006) by two distinct electoral systems, two extremely different party systems (pivotal and alternational), governments with various ideological orientations and range, and both partisan and technical ministers. Adapted from the source document.
In: Studi e ricerche
In: Italian Political Science Review: IPSR = Rivista italiana di scienza politica : RISP, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 83-100
ISSN: 2057-4908
AbstractThe formation of the 'yellow-green' government that took office in Italy after the general election held on 4 March 2018 looked puzzling to many commentators as the two coalition partners – the Five Star Movement and the League – appeared to be quite distant on the left–right continuum. In this article, we argue that despite being widely used in the literature, a unidimensional representation of parties' policy positions on the encompassing left–right scale is inadequate to explain the process of coalition governments' formation. We focus first on coalition outcomes in Italy in the period 2001–18. Our statistical analysis including, among other variables, parties' policy distance on the left–right dimension performs rather well until 2013 but fails to predict the coalition outcome in 2018. To solve the puzzle, we propose a two-dimensional spatial account of the Conte I government formation in which the first dimension coincides with the economic left–right and the second one is related to immigration, the European Union issues and social conservatism. We show that the coalition outcome ceases to be poorly understandable once parties' policy positions are measured along these two dimensions, rather than on the general left–right continuum.