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China has enjoyed considerable economic growth in recent years in spite of an immature, albeit rapidly developing, legal system, a system whose nature, evolution and path of development have been poorly understood by scholars. Drawing on his legal and business experience in China as well as his academic background in the field, Peerenboom provides a detailed analysis of China's legal reforms. He argues that China is in transition from rule by law to a version of rule of law, though most likely not a liberal democratic version as found in economically advanced countries in the West. Maintaining that law plays a key role in China's economic growth, Peerenboom assesses reform proposals and makes his own recommendations. In addition to students and scholars of Chinese law, political science, sociology and economics, this will interest business professionals, policy advisors, and governmental and non-governmental agencies as well as comparative legal scholars and philosophers

China is often singled out as one of worst human rights violators in the world today. On the other hand, the Chinese government regularly issues reports chock-full of statistics showing considerable progress on a wide variety of fronts, and proudly claims that Chinese citizens enjoy more rights than ever before. While not denying that much remains to be done, the government maintains its critics are biased, human rights are being misused for political purposes, and China is being subject to a double standard. Many Chinese citizens feel the same way. The very fact that government leaders and Chinese citizens feel China is being held to double standards, whether or not it is true, has several negative consequences for human rights. Beijing has been reluctant to allow visits by inspectors from the U.N. or other countries, and has imposed restrictions on their visits. In response to the annual U.S. State Department report, China now issues its own critical report on the rights situation in the U.S. In addition, China has cancelled bilateral dialogues on human rights and programs on rule of law in response to the attempts to censure it in Geneva. The public's support for international reform efforts has also been weakened. Many citizens are suspicious about the motives of NGOs. Public opinion about America, seen as the leader of Western critics, has undergone a dramatic shift in the last twenty years, from wildly supportive to highly critical. Is China subject to a double standard? I argue based on comparative empirical studies of rights performance that it is, and offer several explanations why. Part I provides a brief overview of China's official policy on human rights and China's involvement in international human rights regime. Part II examines how China does relative to other countries, particularly other countries at its income level, in physical integrity rights, civil and political rights, social and economic rights; quality of governance; law and order and social stability; women's rights; and cultural or minority rights. While China scores well below the average in its lower middle income category on civil and political rights, it outperforms the average country in its income class on virtually all other indicators, supporting the claim that China is subject to a double standard. Part III considers several reasons why China seems to be held to a higher standard than other countries. Some critics argue the attention paid to China is warranted because, given China's huge population, addressing problems in China will benefit so many people. However, India has a population nearly as large as China. And yet, despite a human rights record that falls short of China's on most indicators, India has not received anywhere near as much critical scrutiny as China. A second, more likely explanation is that the international human rights community remains biased toward civil and political rights, the area in which China is the weakest. Third, and related, non-democratic countries are held to higher standards than democratic countries. Fourth, China is singled out because of its geopolitical importance. For some, China has assumed the role played by Russia during the Cold War – the evil empire that must be opposed at every turn. Fifth, China presents a normative challenge to the human rights regime. As suggested by the debate over Asian values, China is likely to take advantage of its growing economic and geopolitical influence to defend and advocate rights policies and normative vision of the world at odds with current rights policies based on secular liberalism even in the face of Western opposition. Sixth, much of the reporting on China by the general media and human rights monitors tends to focus on particular horrific cases of human rights violations that are not representative of the system as a whole. This creates a mistaken impression of how serious the problems are. On the other hand, the government's lack of transparency, combined with the egregious nature of some violations, leads people to suspect the worse, and fuels images of China as a repressive totalitarian state. Part IV concludes with a brief discussion of the benefits of avoiding a double standard.

In recent decades, Asia has emerged as one of the most contested sites for the increasingly powerful international human rights movement. Most notably, the heavily politicized Asian-values debate called into question the universal pretensions of the international human rights regime. More fundamentally, the experiences of Asian states over the last five decades challenged two widely held if somewhat inconsistent views: first, that democracy was the key to economic growth, or, reversing the causal direction, that economic growth would inevitably lead to political reforms, democratization and better protection of human rights. Many Asian states experienced their periods of rapid growth under authoritarian governments. Moreover, while some Asian states have made the transition to multiple-party, competitive-election democracy, others have not. Still others exist in a limbo state variously described as soft authoritarianism, semi-dictatorships, semi-democracy or nonliberal electoral democracy. Even those states that have most fully embraced democracy continue to interpret and implement human rights in ways that differ in important respects from some Western liberal democracies, thus calling into question the extent to which they should be described as liberal democracies. Past discussions about human rights and values in Asia have been hampered by the lack of reference to empirical studies to back up the strong theoretical, and in some cases polemical, claims being made on both sides about the differences or lack thereof in fundamental values. Numerous multiple-country quantitative studies have demonstrated significant regional effects with respect to democratization, labor rights, women's rights, personal integrity rights, freedom from government intrusions, rule of law and good governance, and cultural values that in turn affect rights performance. Although invaluable in locating Asian countries within a larger comparative context, the studies generally define Asia very broadly and deal with rights in a very general way. They generally do not measure the degree of variance in rights performance within Asia, or attempt to explain the variation within Asia or why Asia as a region might differ from other regions. In Part I, I provide an empirical overview of the performance of twelve Asian countries with respect to physical integrity rights, civil and political rights, social and economic rights and other indicia of quality of life including poverty, infant mortality, life expectancy, primary school enrollment, government expenditures on education, health and military, quality of governance measured in terms of regulatory effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, and law and order and social stability as reflected in crime rates and the number of drug users, suicides, divorces and young mothers. I also include several other countries from different parts of the world for comparison points. The empirical overview demonstrates a wide variation in Asia with respect to rights performance. At the same time, patterns emerge with respect to lower scores for civil and political freedoms among East Asian countries and higher scores for social and economic rights as well as good governance, law and order, and crime control and social stability. These patterns are consistent with aspects of the "Asian values" platform that emphasize the importance, if not the priority, of social and economic rights relative to civil and political rights. Similarly, the studies suggest that even in Asian democracies the liberal emphasis on the individual will often take a back seat to collective interests and social stability. However, the wide variation within Asia still requires an explanation. Accordingly, Part II examines several possible explanations for the wide variation among Asian countries. Clearly the story is complicated. A number of factors come into play, with some factors more important for different types of rights or playing a different role in different countries or at different times within a country. War, political regime type, the nature and level of development of legal institutions, population size, colonial history, religion and cultural factors all play a role. In several countries, ethnic diversity, religious tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or separatist movements have had a major impact on rights policies and performances. However, consistent with the empirical evidence globally, in the subtle and complex interplay of economics, politics, culture, law and institutions in determining rights performance, what matters most is wealth. While money may not be able to buy happiness, it does seem to buy a longer life, better education, more health care, and even civil and political rights. The implications are twofold. First, put bluntly if somewhat too simply, if you want better performance across a range of rights and indicators of human well-being, show me the money. Second, given the importance of wealth to rights performance, comparisons are best made between countries in the same income categories. Comparing a lower middle-income country like China to a rich country like the U.S. makes about as much sense as comparing a piano to a duck.

This article considers several explanations for the international human rights movement's sudden heightened attention to rule of law. The human rights movement has increasingly encountered conceptual, normative and political challenges. Perhaps, as de Mello suggested, rule of law will be a "fruitful principle to guide us toward agreement and results," and "a touchstone for us in spreading the culture of human rights." We still live in a world where widespread human rights violations are the norm rather than the exception. Rule of law is seen as directly integral to the implementation of rights. Rule of law may also be indirectly related to better rights protection in that rule of law is associated with economic development, which is related to better rights performance. Rule of law is integral to and necessary for democracy and good governance. Attempts to democratize without a functional legal system in place have resulted in social disorder. Rule of law is said to facilitate geopolitical stability and global peace. According to some, it may help prevent wars from occurring in the first place. It also provides guidelines for how war is carried out, and is central to the establishment of a rights-respecting post-conflict regime. Post 9-11 concerns over terrorism have also focused attention on rule of law. In addition, rule of law provides a rhetorical basis for challenging the world's sole reigning superpower. Taking each of these factors in turn, I critically analyze the relationship between rule of law and human rights. The relationship is complex and defies easy summary across such a broad range of issues. Nevertheless, a provisional summary that highlights some of the key findings and conclusions may be helpful. First, on the whole, rule of law is desirable. However, it is clearly no panacea for any of these problems. Second, rule of law is more useful in addressing some concerns than others. Appealing to rule of law will do little to resolve the conceptual and normative difficulties at the core of the human rights agenda. Third, the empirical evidence to support the assertion that rule of law leads to more rights and wellbeing is limited, and subject to doubts about causality. There is good reason to believe that wealth rather than rule of law is mainly responsible for better rights performance, although rule of law may also have some independent impact. Fourth, although rule of law and liberal democracy generally go hand in hand, they need not. Rule of law is possible in non-democratic states, and in democratic but non-liberal states. Rule of law may proceed, and is generally a precondition for, democratic consolidation. Fifth, we should not put too much faith in the ability of rule of law to prevent war, limit atrocities during war, or rein in a superpower bent on going its own way. Finally, rule of law is only one component of a just society. In some cases, the values served by rule of law will need to give way to other values. Invoking rule of law in most cases signals the beginning of normative and political debate, not the end of it.

In 1960, there were 101 middle-income countries. By 2008, only thirteen of these had become high-income countries. Why do so many middle-income countries fail to develop after a promising start, becoming mired in the so-called middle-income trap? This interdisciplinary volume addresses the special challenges that middle-income countries confront from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. It is the first volume that addresses law and development issues in middle-income countries from the perspective of political, administrative, and legal institutions and policies. The goal is to provide international development agencies and domestic policy makers with feasible recommendations to address the wide range of technically, politically, and socially complex issues that middle-income countries face.

Pushing back on globalization : an introduction to regulation in Asia / John Gillespie and Randall Peerenboom -- The role of state, non-state, and hybrid actors in localizing global scripts in East Asia / John Gillespie -- Pushing against globalization : toward an analytic template / Michael Dowdle -- Traditional knowledge in Asia : global agendas and local subjects / Christoph Antons -- Giving content and effect to competition rules : contrasting Australia and Japan / Brendan Sweeney -- Resistance, revision, and retrenchment in the transition to a competitive market economy in China / Randall Peerenboom -- Regulatory learning and its discontents in China : promise and tragedy at the State Food and Drug Administration / Dali L. Yang -- Unacknowledged legislators : business participation in lawmaking in Vietnam / John Gillespie and Bui Bich Thi Lien -- Pushing against globalization : the response from civil society groups in Thailand / Jakkrit Kuanpoth -- Globalization and Japanese regulation : a commercial dispute case study / Veronica L. Taylor -- Rehabilitating Korea's corporate insolvency regime, 1992-2007 / Soogeun Oh and Terence C. Halliday -- The people's prosperity? Indonesian constitutional interpretation, economic reform, and globalization / Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey -- Law reform and corporate governance in Malaysia / Aishah Bidin