A case of confusing probability and confirmation
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 184, Heft 1, S. 101-107
ISSN: 1573-0964
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 184, Heft 1, S. 101-107
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences
This book contains a selection of papers from the workshop Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy held in October 2019 in Tilburg, the Netherlands. It is the first volume devoted to the role of women in early analytic philosophy. It discusses the ideas of ten female philosophers and covers a period of over a hundred years, beginning with the contribution to the Significs Movement by Victoria, Lady Welby in the second half of the nineteenth century, and ending with Ruth Barcan Marcus's celebrated version of quantified modal logic after the Second World War. The book makes clear that women contributed substantially to the development of analytic philosophy in all areas of philosophy, from logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science, to ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. It illustrates that although women's voices were no different from men's as regards their scope and versatility, they had a much harder time being heard. The book is aimed at historians of philosophy and scholars in gender studies
In: Synthese Library
This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons are typically probabilistic in character, it develops and defends a new solution that challenges venerable philosophical intuitions and explains why they were mistakenly held. Key to the new solution is the phenomenon of fading foundations, according to which distant reasons are less important than those that are nearby. The phenomenon takes the sting out of Agrippa's Trilemma; moreover, since the theory that describes it is general and abstract, it is readily applicable outside epistemology, notably to debates on infinite regresses in metaphysics. The book is a potential game-changer and a must for any advanced student or researcher in the field.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 3-4, S. 8335-8354
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractEells and Sober proved in 1983 that screening off is a sufficient condition for the transitivity of probabilistic causality, and in 2003 Shogenji noted that the same goes for probabilistic support. We start this paper by conjecturing that Hans Reichenbach may have been aware of this fact. Then we consider the work of Suppes and Roche, who demonstrated in 1986 and 2012 respectively that screening off can be generalized, while still being sufficient for transitivity. We point out an interesting difference between Reichenbach's screening off and the generalized version, which we illustrate with an example about haemophilia among the descendants of Queen Victoria. Finally, we embark on a further generalization: we develop a still weaker condition, one that can be made as weak as one wishes.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 1-2, S. 4195-4216
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractWe use the method of fixed points to describe a form of probabilistic truth approximation which we illustrate by means of three examples. We then contrast this form of probabilistic truth approximation with another, more familiar kind, where no fixed points are used. In probabilistic truth approximation with fixed points the events are dependent on one another, but in the second kind they are independent. The first form exhibits a phenomenon that we call 'fading origins', the second one is subject to a phenomenon known as 'the washing out of the prior'. We explain that the two phenomena may seem very similar, but are in fact quite different.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 10, S. 4637-4637
ISSN: 1573-0964
The original article has been corrected. Erroneously, a comma and a space were added in line 164 to 500, 500, and the authors would like readers to know that this should instead read 500,500.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 8, S. 3305-3323
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractInA Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something that reduces to nothing, but it is something other than what, according to many, Hume had in mind. Thus two views emerge of what exactly it is that reduces. We surmise that Hume failed to distinguish the two, because he lacked the formal means to differentiate between a rendering of his argument that is in accordance with the probability calculus, and one that is not.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 195, Heft 9, S. 3735-3735
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 4, S. 627-628
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 181, Heft 1, S. 113-124
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 153, Heft 2, S. 187-197
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 184, Heft 1, S. 1-1
ISSN: 1573-0964