Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction -- Part I. The "Party Period" Before the Crisis -- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate -- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics -- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece -- Part II Greece's Free Fall 2010–2013 -- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered -- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -- Part III. Looking Ahead -- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth? -- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change -- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into the Above. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece -- Part IV. How Populism (2015–2017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential -- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy -- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments -- 12. Conclusions -- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 13. How "More Europe" Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece -- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy -- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing -- 16. Greece's Comparative Advantage as China's Backdoor to Europe -- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece's Tax Regulations -- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families -- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 20. Final Remarks.

Two Greek economic analysts explain the Greek financial crisis—from beginning to end. The first section of Greece: From Exit to Recovery? explores the lead up to to Greece's adoption of the euro. Authors Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos believe that the ensuing challenges were foreseeable. In fact, the authors posit that it was Greece's difficultly in dealing with those challenges that sparked the euro crisis. Section II analyzes discrete sectors of the economy, paying special attention to labor and finance—and the mistakes creditors made in focusing on reducing Greek incomes—rather than increasing competitiveness on non-labor costs. Section III investigates why Greek companies spend relatively little on research and development.? The authors' analysis indicates that policy decisions largely determine R&D performance in the private sector, and they advance a number of specific policy proposals to improve the situation.

The need for 'more Europe' stands out today in an international environment that is contaminated by populism, authoritarianism and demagogy. Consequently, when confronting political radicalism, the domains that the EU should henceforth concentrate on in a positive way must be specified, explaining practically and with pragmatism the reasons for 'more Europe'. In particular, the EU must deliver concrete benefits that citizens can see in their daily lives, but, at the same time, it has to give them more democratic control over their representation in EU bodies and in the way EU law is shaped and implemented. To accept such progress, the EU must first recognise the critical flaws in its current economic and political architecture, before proceeding to adopt policies that will adequately restore the dynamism of the European dream, leading to a more efficient and just EU. More democracy will help gather support, and ensure renewed progress towards a closer Union in which the single market is meaningfully deepened.

The current complicated economic situation in Greece - and the rising political uncertainty that once again accompanies it - has important repercussions for growth, incomes, employment and the banking system in both the short and long term. The new Greek government is trying to perform a balancing act that will on the one hand satisfy its electorate and the more extreme fractions within the Syriza party and on the other hand offer a number of key concessions to the country's European partners. It is thus imperative to carefully select which concessions the EU should make towards the new government.