Why do some countries get better WTO accession terms than others?
In: International organization, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 639-672
ISSN: 0020-8183
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In: International organization, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 639-672
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 618-646
ISSN: 0043-8871
A close look at the commitments of World Trade Organization (wto) members presents a striking paradox. Most states could raise their duties significantly before falling afoul of their wto obligations. Moreover, such "binding overhang" varies between countries: some could more than double the amount of trade protection they offer overnight, whereas others are tightly constrained. What accounts for this variation? The author argues that more flexibility is not always better: obtaining it and subsequently using it are both costly. Rather than maximize flexibility, states thus seek an optimal amount. If they have access to policy space through other means, such as currency devaluations and trade remedies, they will exercise restraint in seeking binding overhang. The same supply-side logic holds at the domestic level: governments strategically withhold binding overhang from industries that are able to rely on trade remedies, despite the fact that these tend to have the greatest political clout. (World Politics / SWP)
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 65-96
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 349-368
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 53, Heft 5, S. 774-793
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 257-279
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online