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This chapter reconnects modes of futures-making with the requirements of democracy byfocusing on the naturalization of nuclear weapons and their removal from the realm of de-mocratic choice at a particular point in time. The chapter revolves around the concept of'nuclear eternity' as a means of reducing public choices about the use of nuclearweapons. It critiques the idea that nuclear weapons have always been perceived as 'hereto stay' and reassesses the dominant narrative about the 1960s as an emancipatorydecade by arguing that the decade actually witnessed a significant shrinking of future po-litical possibilities. Finally, the chapter identifies three shapes of the future which pro-duce 'nuclear eternity'—an absent post-nuclear future, an inconsistent post-nuclearfuture, and a disconnected post-nuclear future—and illustrates them with historical exam-ples

This chapter reconnects modes of futures-making with the requirements of democracy byfocusing on the naturalization of nuclear weapons and their removal from the realm of de-mocratic choice at a particular point in time. The chapter revolves around the concept of'nuclear eternity' as a means of reducing public choices about the use of nuclearweapons. It critiques the idea that nuclear weapons have always been perceived as 'hereto stay' and reassesses the dominant narrative about the 1960s as an emancipatorydecade by arguing that the decade actually witnessed a significant shrinking of future po-litical possibilities. Finally, the chapter identifies three shapes of the future which pro-duce 'nuclear eternity'—an absent post-nuclear future, an inconsistent post-nuclearfuture, and a disconnected post-nuclear future—and illustrates them with historical exam-ples

AbstractThis contribution argues that the concept of protean power opens a space to think about the limits of control and knowledge about catastrophic possibilities such as nuclear war. To do so, it offers the first distinctive definition of nuclear luck, which has long been acknowledged by policy and military leaders but remains unaccounted for in scholarship. It further shows that the nuclear realm is defined by two key unknowables. However, it argues that protean power perpetuates a survivability bias which has characterized scholarship so far, before suggesting ways to overcome that bias and modify scholarly ethos to acknowledge such catastrophic possibilities.

This contribution argues that the concept of protean power opens a space to think aboutthe limits of control and knowledge about catastrophic possibilities such as nuclear war.To do so, it offers the first distinctive definition of nuclear luck, which has long beenacknowledged by policy and military leaders but remains unaccounted for in scholarship.It further shows that the nuclear realm is defined by two key unknowables. However,it argues that protean power perpetuates a survivability bias which has characterizedscholarship so far, before suggesting ways to overcome that bias and modify scholarlyethos to acknowledge such catastrophic possibilities.

This contribution argues that the concept of protean power opens a space to think aboutthe limits of control and knowledge about catastrophic possibilities such as nuclear war.To do so, it offers the first distinctive definition of nuclear luck, which has long beenacknowledged by policy and military leaders but remains unaccounted for in scholarship.It further shows that the nuclear realm is defined by two key unknowables. However,it argues that protean power perpetuates a survivability bias which has characterizedscholarship so far, before suggesting ways to overcome that bias and modify scholarlyethos to acknowledge such catastrophic possibilities.

AbstractOverconfidence in the controllability of nuclear weapons creates danger. The passing of the last elite witness of the most dangerous nuclear crisis, that is, the 'Cuban Missile Crisis', and the current Trump administration only make this more salient. In this context, this article reviews the scholarly literature about the limits of predictability and controllability of nuclear crises and investigates three failures of learning from them. Given that France displays in particularly acute form some of the sources of overconfidence in the controllability of nuclear crises that can been found in other nuclear armed states, this article offers the first study of the French experience and evolving interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis in comparative perspective, based on untapped primary material. In security studies, this article makes three contributions. First, the publication and interpretation of primary sources is a contribution in itself given the frequent misconceptions about nuclear dynamics due to theory-driven extrapolations. Second, it challenges a widespread assumption of automaticity linking a fear-induced deterrent effect and the presence of nuclear weapons. Third, empirically, this article studies part of a regime of valuation of nuclear weapons. It finally outlines a research agenda to take luck seriously in security studies.

The post-cold war generation of citizens is forgetting nuclear weapon-related dangers and becoming indifferent to the issue. At the same time, the absence of mass grassroots, anti-nuclear protest suggests tacit support for current nuclear weapon policies. These three common diagnoses are potentially contradictory and, more importantly, are only assumptions. This paper is the first systematic attempt at assessing the attitude of the under 30s generation of European Union (EU) citizens with regard to nuclear weapons. It is based on a poll of over 10 000 citizens across the 28 EU member countries. The paper finds that none of these assumptions holds. Except for the cases of near nuclear use, the lack of knowledge about nuclear danger is not that widespread; it only increases slowly and not uniformly. Similarly, the lack of popular engagement in the nuclear weapon debate does not mean support for existing policies. In this paper, the sentiment of support is assessed with a set of three criteria: the feeling of safety attained from nuclear weapons; satisfaction with policies taken in one's name; and acceptance of vulnerabilities arising from the possession of nuclear weapons. This paper finds that overall support in these areas is below 30 per cent in every country for which there was a representative sample of respondents. Neither do the youth express a lack of concern, but rather a strong feeling of inability to affect the outcome. This suggests the need for both a research agenda and a reform of EU educational policies aimed at this generation on nuclear weapons.

The post-cold war generation of citizens is forgetting nuclear weapon-related dangers and becoming indifferent to the issue. At the same time, the absence of mass grassroots, anti-nuclear protest suggests tacit support for current nuclear weapon policies. These three common diagnoses are potentially contradictory and, more importantly, are only assumptions. This paper is the first systematic attempt at assessing the attitude of the under 30s generation of European Union (EU) citizens with regard to nuclear weapons. It is based on a poll of over 10 000 citizens across the 28 EU member countries. The paper finds that none of these assumptions holds. Except for the cases of near nuclear use, the lack of knowledge about nuclear danger is not that widespread; it only increases slowly and not uniformly. Similarly, the lack of popular engagement in the nuclear weapon debate does not mean support for existing policies. In this paper, the sentiment of support is assessed with a set of three criteria: the feeling of safety attained from nuclear weapons; satisfaction with policies taken in one's name; and acceptance of vulnerabilities arising from the possession of nuclear weapons. This paper finds that overall support in these areas is below 30 per cent in every country for which there was a representative sample of respondents. Neither do the youth express a lack of concern, but rather a strong feeling of inability to affect the outcome. This suggests the need for both a research agenda and a reform of EU educational policies aimed at this generation on nuclear weapons.

Security studies scholarship on nuclear weapons is particularly prone to self-censorship. In this essay, I argue that this self-censorship is problematic. The vulnerability, secrecy, and limits to accountability created by nuclear weapons (Deudney 2007, 256–57; Born, Gill, and Hânggi 2010; Cohen 2010, 147) call for responsible scholarship vis-à-vis the general public. This need for renewed and expanded scholarly responsibility is especially pressing given current plans among nuclear-weapon states to "modernize" their nuclear arsenals, committing their citizens and children to live in nuclear-armed countries and, a fortiori, a nuclear armed world (Mecklin 2015). Despite this need, the existing reflexive literature in security studies—calling for greater scholarly responsibility (see Steele and Amoureux 2016; Waever 2015, 95–100)—has neither specifically focused on nuclear weapons nor explored the forms of self-censorship identified here as shaping a modality of responsibility. In making this case, I define self-censorship in nuclear weapons scholarship as unnecessary boundaries on scholarly discourse within security studies. In this article, I identify three forms of self-censorship: an epistemological self-censorship that denies the normative foundations of nuclear studies; a rhetorically induced form of censorship that leads scholars to stay away from radical reorderings of the world (e.g., world government or the abolition of nuclear weapons) because of the joint rhetorical effects of the tropes of non-proliferation and deterrence; and, finally, a "presentist imaginal" form of self-censorship that leads scholars to obfuscate the implicit bets they make on their considered possible futures and their constitutive effects on the "present" they analyze. I do not claim that these are the only forms of self-censorship. I also leave aside the non-discursive structures of knowledge production and the institutional and political constraints on nuclear studies. However, as I show in the concluding section, these three ...

Security studies scholarship on nuclear weapons is particularly prone to self-censorship. In this essay, I argue that this self-censorship is problematic. The vulnerability, secrecy, and limits to accountability created by nuclear weapons (Deudney 2007, 256–57; Born, Gill, and Hânggi 2010; Cohen 2010, 147) call for responsible scholarship vis-à-vis the general public. This need for renewed and expanded scholarly responsibility is especially pressing given current plans among nuclear-weapon states to "modernize" their nuclear arsenals, committing their citizens and children to live in nuclear-armed countries and, a fortiori, a nuclear armed world (Mecklin 2015). Despite this need, the existing reflexive literature in security studies—calling for greater scholarly responsibility (see Steele and Amoureux 2016; Waever 2015, 95–100)—has neither specifically focused on nuclear weapons nor explored the forms of self-censorship identified here as shaping a modality of responsibility. In making this case, I define self-censorship in nuclear weapons scholarship as unnecessary boundaries on scholarly discourse within security studies. In this article, I identify three forms of self-censorship: an epistemological self-censorship that denies the normative foundations of nuclear studies; a rhetorically induced form of censorship that leads scholars to stay away from radical reorderings of the world (e.g., world government or the abolition of nuclear weapons) because of the joint rhetorical effects of the tropes of non-proliferation and deterrence; and, finally, a "presentist imaginal" form of self-censorship that leads scholars to obfuscate the implicit bets they make on their considered possible futures and their constitutive effects on the "present" they analyze. I do not claim that these are the only forms of self-censorship. I also leave aside the non-discursive structures of knowledge production and the institutional and political constraints on nuclear studies. However, as I show in the concluding section, these three forms of self-censorship result in an

Cet article expose un programme de recherche transdisciplinaire qui retrace l'évolution des catégories fondamentales de la pensée stratégique liées à la présence d'armes nucléaires dans le monde. Il se saisit du paradoxe suivant dans l'histoire de la pensée nucléaire internationale : cette dernière regorge d'affirmations péremptoires de changements radicaux, mais les catégories intellectuelles que politiciens et penseurs stratégiques contemporains utilisent pour comprendre les défis d'hier, d'aujourd'hui mais aussi de demain, sont souvent antérieures à ces " révolutions ". Une approche historique permettra de saisir l'évolution du sens de ces catégories et soit de confirmer le paradoxe et d'en préciser le domaine d'application, s'il s'avère que le sens desdites catégories demeure essentiellement inchangé, soit de le dissoudre si leur sens évolue considérablement de façon à prendre en compte les révolutions successives qui le fondent. Ce projet vise à identifier l'étendue de la conversation sur les problèmes liés à la présence de technologie nucléaire dans le monde par-delà les cadres de l'historiographie classique. Il refuse a priori une limitation linguistique, disciplinaire, professionnelle, mais aussi les cadres pré-établis d'une histoire américano-centrée, bipolaire ou strictement nationale. Ce faisant, il entend remettre en question l'autorité des catégories nucléaires contemporaines dans la mesure où elle s'appuie pour une large part sur leur longévité. Soit cette longévité cache une flexibilité de ces catégories qui leur a permis de mieux rendre compte des différents changements radicaux qui ont eu lieu au fil du temps, et le paradoxe est réduit voire dissout, soit cette longévité cache une fixité du sens de ces catégories, de sorte que leur domaine de validité est affecté par certains de ces changements radicaux et le paradoxe demeure. Dans les deux cas, la longévité de ces catégories n'apparaît pas comme une raison suffisante pour leur octroyer l'autorité d'un vocabulaire et d'un cadre de pensée indépassables pour l'âge nucléaire.

This paper delineates a transdisciplinary research project tracing the evolution of fundamental categories of strategic thought and their relationship to the presence of nuclear weapons in the world. It tackles the following paradox of international nuclear history : on the one hand, "rupture talk" is widespread and with it several "revolutions" are evoked ; on the other hand, the concepts used by strategists and policymakers to analyse challenges of today and tomorrow have been crafted before those "revolutions". A historical approach will be attentive to the evolution of the meaning of those categories over time and in context. By doing so, it will either confirm the paradox and specify its limits of validity – if the meaning of those categories remains essentially unchanged – or dissolve it – if their meaning evolves enough to incorporate and make sense of the different above mentioned revolutions. At the same time, this project intends to identify the scope of the conversation about problems related to the presence of nuclear weapons in the world, beyond the boundaries of classical historiography. It a priori refuses and interrogates linguistic, disciplinary and professional boundaries. It equally questions US-centric, bipolar or national narratives of the "nuclear age". In doing so, it problematizes the authority of current nuclear categories, given that this authority largely derives from their longevity. Either this longevity hides a flexibility in the meaning of the concepts which allowed them to account for successive revolutions – then the realm of validity of the paradox is reduced – or this longevity actually hides a fundamental rigidity in the meaning of those categories, so that the paradox is at its fullest. Either way, the longevity of current categories loses the character of a sufficient reason to grant them the authority of an inescapable frame and vocabulary of the "nuclear age". ; Cet article expose un programme de recherche transdisciplinaire qui retrace l'évolution des catégories fondamentales de la pensée stratégique liées à la présence d'armes nucléaires dans le monde. Il se saisit du paradoxe suivant dans l'histoire de la pensée nucléaire internationale : cette dernière regorge d'affirmations péremptoires de changements radicaux, mais les catégories intellectuelles que politiciens et penseurs stratégiques contemporains utilisent pour comprendre les défis d'hier, d'aujourd'hui mais aussi de demain, sont souvent antérieures à ces "révolutions". Une approche historique permettra de saisir l'évolution du sens de ces catégories et soit de confirmer le paradoxe et d'en préciser le domaine d'application, s'il s'avère que le sens desdites catégories demeure essentiellement inchangé, soit de le dissoudre si leur sens évolue considérablement de façon à prendre en compte les révolutions successives qui le fondent. Ce projet vise à identifier l'étendue de la conversation sur les problèmes liés à la présence de technologie nucléaire dans le monde par-delà les cadres de l'historiographie classique. Il refuse a priori une limitation linguistique, disciplinaire, professionnelle, mais aussi les cadres pré-établis d'une histoire américano-centrée, bipolaire ou strictement nationale. Ce faisant, il entend remettre en question l'autorité des catégories nucléaires contemporaines dans la mesure où elle s'appuie pour une large part sur leur longévité. Soit cette longévité cache une flexibilité de ces catégories qui leur a permis de mieux rendre compte des différents changements radicaux qui ont eu lieu au fil du temps, et le paradoxe est réduit voire dissout, soit cette longévité cache une fixité du sens de ces catégories, de sorte que leur domaine de validité est affecté par certains de ces changements radicaux et le paradoxe demeure. Dans les deux cas, la longévité de ces catégories n'apparaît pas comme une raison suffisante pour leur octroyer l'autorité d'un vocabulaire et d'un cadre de pensée indépassables pour l'âge nucléaire.