Suchergebnisse

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The main task involves an attempt to characterize a disordered law and concerns characterizing the most important aspects of the disorder.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND METHODS: The main task of the article are terminological and conceptual arrangements. Therefore, the method of linguistic analysis was used, adapting conceptions knew in ­theory and philosophy of law to the needs of the analysis of the concept of the disorder.
THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: Starting from the analysis of the main, known theories of law, concepts and ideas, various cases of disorder of the legal system are identified, both in the political, ethical and purely formal aspects.
RESEARCH RESULTS: The analysis allowed to identify and reconstruct certain specific types of disorder. Law, on many levels – from formal to merits of law – can be a source of moral and ideological chaos. Law may serve intentional destabilization of social life.
CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Traditionally law is associated with order and consistency rather than disorder and chaos. Nevertheless, the disorder and chaos can be seen as a real and factual part of the law.

The author endeavours to make a critical reflection on the concept of criminalization as formulated by Douglas Husak. D. Husak's views on criminal policy are presented in a wider philosophical context and juxtaposed with assumptions of basic critical trends in criminal law science. Also, some suggestions are formulated to supplement Husak's concept, who points out, above all, when punishment should not be applied. A supplement to Husak's idea is a somewhat perverse attempt to collect model situations, in which recognition of an act as a crime can be justified (which the author himself tried to avoid). In addition, the article attempts to combine the philosophy of law with criminal policy and indicates the need to take into consideration philosophical foundations of criminal law policy.

The justification of punishment is a difficult problem. The paper attempts to examine retributivism in the normative perspective and to penetrate the structure of the fundamental premises and theses of retributivism. Retributivism assumes that punishment is just, in the broad understanding of the term, while in reality punishment is not just; the model of retributive punishment is contrafactual, which is evident above all in the problem of punishing the innocent. A proper modification of retributivism's normative premises (i.e. how and why people ought to be punished, etc.) consists in seeing these premises not as unconditionally binding directives but as optimization rules, a kind of prima facie duty. These are mainly the ethical duties of the state considered from the point of view of criminal policy. In effect, it is possible to formulate a non-fundamentalist (non-idealistic) variant of retributivism - better corresponding to social reality. The core of the paper consists in outlining such a concept. The paper has been primarily inspired by the ideas of W.D. Ross and R. Alexy.

The justification of punishment is a difficult problem. The paper attempts to examine retributivism in the normative perspective and to penetrate the structure of the fundamental premises and theses of retributivism. Retributivism assumes that punishment is just, in the broad understanding of the term, while in reality punishment is not just; the model of retributive punishment is contrafactual, which is evident above all in the problem of punishing the innocent. A proper modification of retributivism's normative premises (i.e. how and why people ought to be punished, etc.) consists in seeing these premises not as unconditionally binding directives but as optimization rules, a kind of prima facie duty. These are mainly the ethical duties of the state considered from the point of view of criminal policy. In effect, it is possible to formulate a non-fundamentalist (non-idealistic) variant of retributivism - better corresponding to social reality. The core of the paper consists in outlining such a concept. The paper has been primarily inspired by the ideas of W.D. Ross and R. Alexy. ; Opravdavanje kazne je ozbiljan zadatak. U radu se istražuje i sagledava normativna perspektiva retributivizma u nastojanju da se prodre u strukturu osnovnih premisa i teza retributivizma. Retributivizam pretpostavlja da je kazna pravedna, u najširem smislu te reči, dok u realnosti kazna zapravo nije pravedna. Model retributivne kazne je suprotan činjenici pravednosti, što se pre svega ogleda u problemu kažnjavanja nevinih. Pravilna modifikacija normativnih premisa retributivizma (tj. kako i zašto ljude treba kažnjavati, itd.) počiva na tome da ove premise ne treba posmatrati kao bezuslovno obavezujuće zakonske pretpostavke već kao pravila optimizacije, kao neku vrstu prima facie dužnosti. To uglavnom podrazumeva etičke dužnosti države, posmatrane sa stanovišta kriminalne politike. Zapravo, moguće je formulisati nefunkcionalističku (ne-idealističku) varijantu retributivizma, koja bolje odgovara društvenoj stvarnosti. Suština rada ...

The paper attempts to examine a philosophy of punishment in the normative perspective and to penetrate the structure of the fundamental premises and theses of retributivism. Punishment concepts are discussed in relation to two contexts and types of expressions formulated in the philosophy of punishment – normative and descriptive. The former are a matter of axiology and normative models, whereas the latter constitute a description of existing systems of criminal responsibility. The considerations are centred on a retributive model. The model of retributivism involves normative premises and consists in seeing these premises not as unconditionally binding directives, but as optimization rules, a kind of prima facie duty. These are mainly the quasi-legal duties of the state considered from the point of view of criminal policy. Retributivism can be seen as a set of norms (rules) for constructing legal system. The core of the paper consists in outlining such a concept. The inspiration for it was provided above all by the ideas of the Polish legal theory, R. Dworkin, W. D. Ross and R. Alexy, and modern retributivists. ; U radu se pokušava analizirati filozofija kažnjavanja iz normativne perspektive te prodrijeti u strukturu temeljnih premisa i teza retributivizma. O konceptima kažnjavanja raspravlja se s obzirom na dva konteksta i tipa izražavanja koji su izgrađeni u filozofiji kažnjavanja – normativni i deskriptivni. Prvi pripadaju području aksiologije i normativnih modela, dok drugi opisuju postojeće sustave kaznene odgovornosti. Rasprava u radu pritom je usredotočena na retributivni model. Model retributivizma uključuje normativne premise te ih ne smatra bezuvjetno obvezujućim smjernicama nego pravilima optimizacije, na određeni način prima facie obvezom. To su u prvom redu kvazipravne obveze države promatrane sa stajališta kaznene politike. Retributivizam se može shvatiti kao skup normi (pravila) za izgradnju pravnog sustava. Jezgra je rada upravo razrada toga koncepta, pri čemu su inspiraciju za navedeni pristup dale teze iznesene u poljskoj teoriji prava te djela i ideje R. Dworkina, W. D. Rossa i R. Alexya, kao i modernih retributivista.