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"Managers who are looking to gain a better understanding of today's industrial environment will appreciate this text. It offers a comprehensive examination of the field. Empirical applications are integrated throughout the chapters to provide relevant examples. Discussions are included on price discrimination as it relates to monopolies and product varieties. Basic models of imperfect competition are presented. Entry deterrents and price fixing are also examined in more detail. Managers will then learn how to apply this information as they build a successful organization"--
In: The Economic Journal, Band 100, Heft 399, S. 195
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 37
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 90, Heft 3, S. 719-732
SSRN
In: IJIO-D-22-00328
SSRN
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 1204-1223
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract. Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41
In: The journal of business, Band 75, Heft 3, S. 535-552
ISSN: 1537-5374
In: Economica, Band 68, Heft 272, S. 489-504
ISSN: 1468-0335
We examine two–sided competition in a duopoly market for differentiated products. Downstream, the two firms compete in prices. Upstream, they compete in bidding to hire talent input and there is one unique superstar. The outcome depends on the downstream effect of only one firm employing the superstar. When this intensifies downstream competition, both firms are worse off than they would be if no superstar talent were available. When the hiring of the superstar softens downstream competition, both firms benefit, but a 'winner's curse' emerges in which the firm winning the superstar talent earns less profit than its rival.
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 265
ISSN: 1911-9917
In: Canadian public policy: a journal for the discussion of social and economic policy in Canada = Analyse de politiques, Band 15, S. 265-284
ISSN: 0317-0861
In: Canadian public policy: a journal for the discussion of social and economic policy in Canada = Analyse de politiques, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 265-284
ISSN: 0317-0861
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 8, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
We analyze the interaction between entrepreneurs who open new markets and established, `fast second' firms to develop them. We use a spatially differentiated model in which early entry is traditionally excessive. However, the anticipated later entry by the `fast second' brand can potentially reverse this result. We show that conditions that make for the most initial competitive market are precisely those that result in the least optimal amount of initial entry and in which entrepreneurial entry is typically well below the efficient level. We also show that asymmetric oligopoly is a natural market equilibrium.
In: Research in economics: Ricerche economiche, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 752-765
ISSN: 1090-9451