Success-Driven Distribution of Public Goods Promotes Cooperation but Preserves Defection
In: Physical Review E 84 (2011) 037102
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In: Physical Review E 84 (2011) 037102
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In: New Journal of Physics 13 (2011) 123027
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In: Sosyoloji dergisi: Journal of sociology, Band 0, Heft 0, S. 0-0
ISSN: 2667-6931
In: Physical Review E 84 (2011) 047102
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In: PLoS ONE 5 (2010) e15117
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In: Sosyoloji dergisi: Journal of sociology, Band 0, Heft 0, S. 0-0
ISSN: 2667-6931
In: Physical Review X 4 (2014) 041036
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In: Journal of Economic Literature, Forthcoming
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In: Capraro V, Di Paolo R, Perc M, Pizziol V. 2024 Language-based game theory in the age of artificial intelligence. J. R. Soc. Interface 21: 20230720. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2023.0720
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In: Zhang , C , Zhang , J , Xie , G , Wang , L & Perc , M 2011 , ' Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game ' , PLoS ONE , vol. 6 , no. 10 , 26724 . https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0026724 ; ISSN:1932-6203
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
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In: PNAS nexus, Band 3, Heft 2
ISSN: 2752-6542
Abstract
Collective action and group formation are fundamental behaviors among both organisms cooperating to maximize their fitness and people forming socioeconomic organizations. Researchers have extensively explored social interaction structures via game theory and homophilic linkages, such as kin selection and scalar stress, to understand emergent cooperation in complex systems. However, we still lack a general theory capable of predicting how agents benefit from heterogeneous preferences, joint information, or skill complementarities in statistical environments. Here, we derive general statistical dynamics for the origin of cooperation based on the management of resources and pooled information. Specifically, we show how groups that optimally combine complementary agent knowledge about resources in statistical environments maximize their growth rate. We show that these advantages are quantified by the information synergy embedded in the conditional probability of environmental states given agents' signals, such that groups with a greater diversity of signals maximize their collective information. It follows that, when constraints are placed on group formation, agents must intelligently select with whom they cooperate to maximize the synergy available to their own signal. Our results show how the general properties of information underlie the optimal collective formation and dynamics of groups of heterogeneous agents across social and biological phenomena.
In: Physics Reports 687, 1-51 (2017)
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The introduction of COVID-19 vaccination passes (VPs) by many countries coincided with the Delta variant fast becoming dominant across Europe. A thorough assessment of their impact on epidemic dynamics is still lacking. Here, we propose the VAPSIRS model that considers possibly lower restrictions for the VP holders than for the rest of the population, imperfect vaccination effectiveness against infection, rates of (re-)vaccination and waning immunity, fraction of never-vaccinated, and the increased transmissibility of the Delta variant. Some predicted epidemic scenarios for realistic parameter values yield new COVID-19 infection waves within two years, and high daily case numbers in the endemic state, even without introducing VPs and granting more freedom to their holders. Still, suitable adaptive policies can avoid unfavorable outcomes. While VP holders could initially be allowed more freedom, the lack of full vaccine effectiveness and increased transmissibility will require accelerated (re-)vaccination, wide-spread immunity surveillance, and/or minimal long-term common restrictions. ; peer-reviewed
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In: Journal of Statistical Physics 158 (2015) 735-781
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In the summer of 2021, European governments removed most NPIs after experiencing prolonged second and third waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Most countries failed to achieve immunization rates high enough to avoid resurgence of the virus. Public health strategies for autumn and winter 2021 have ranged from countries aiming at low incidence by re-introducing NPIs to accepting high incidence levels. However, such high incidence strategies almost certainly lead to the very consequences that they seek to avoid: restrictions that harm people and economies. At high incidence, the important pandemic containment measure test-trace-isolate-support becomes inefficient. At that point, the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its numerous harmful consequences can likely only be controlled through restrictions. We argue that all European countries need to pursue a low incidence strategy in a coordinated manner. Such an endeavour can only be successful if it is built on open communication and trust. Copyright (C) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. ; Funding Agencies|European UnionEuropean Commission [101016233]; Max Planck SocietyMax Planck SocietyFoundation CELLEX; "Netzwerk Universitatsmedizin" (NUM) project egePan [01KX2021]; Digital Society research program - Ministry of Culture and Science of the German State of North Rhine-Westphalia; University of Malta; Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) as part of the COVID-19 Fast-Track research project Cov-Screen [COVID-19/2020- 1/14715687]; European Research Council (ERC) under the European UnionEuropean Research Council (ERC) [863664]; Slovenian Research AgencySlovenian Research Agency - Slovenia [P1-0403, J1-2457]; University of Crete; Maastricht University; European CommissionEuropean CommissionEuropean Commission Joint Research Centre; UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)UK Research & Innovation (UKRI)Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [ES/T014164/1]; UK Medical Research Council (MRC)UK Research & Innovation (UKRI)Medical Research Council UK ...
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