Suchergebnisse
Filter
57 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
Quelles réformes du marché de l'électricité et quels financements pour atteindre la neutralité carbone ?
In: L' Europe en formation: revue d'études sur la construction européenne et le fédéralisme = journal of studies on European integration and federalism, Band 397, Heft 2, S. 69-86
ISSN: 2410-9231
Dans cet entretien, Jacques Percebois explique pourquoi le prix de gros de l'électricité est corrélé une grande partie du temps au prix du gaz négocié sur le marché international. La hausse vertigineuse du prix du gaz explique dès lors l'envolée des prix de l'électricité en 2022 en Europe. Des réformes du marché européen de l'électricité sont en cours pour limiter la volatilité des prix. On semble s'orienter vers le maintien d'un marché de gros encadré par un mécanisme de « contrats pour la différence » qui aurait pour avantage de limiter la rente inframarginale prélevée par certains opérateurs en cas de forte hausse des prix sur le marché spot.
Dépendance et vulnérabilité énergétiques
In: Questions internationales, Band 119-120, Heft 3, S. 59-65
Avant de porter un jugement sur le degré de dépendance énergétique de la France, il importe de bien distinguer dépendance et vulnérabilité. Il convient ensuite d'observer que, même dans un secteur où la production est largement nationale (l'électricité), des facteurs exogènes peuvent être générateurs de vulnérabilité. C'est le cas de la guerre en Ukraine, du fait de son impact sur le marché du gaz naturel, et par ricochet sur le prix de l'électricité. La décarbonation du mix énergétique français 1 , qui s'accompagnera de l'abandon progressif des importations d'énergies fossiles, ne va pas pour autant supprimer tout risque de dépendance envers l'étranger .
La mise en œuvre du Pacte vert pour l'Europe à l'horizon 2050 : ambitions et contraintes
In: Questions internationales, Band 112, Heft 2, S. 94-101
Feuille de route environnementale proposée par la Commission européenne en 2019, le Pacte vert pour l'Europe consiste en un ensemble d'initiatives visant à rendre l'Union européenne climatiquement neutre à l'horizon 2050. Des convergences mais aussi des divergences existent entre États membres dans la mise en œuvre de la transition énergétique commune. D'ores et déjà, ceux-ci doivent prévoir des investissements colossaux et affronter une nouvelle dépendance à l'égard de minerais ou de métaux indispensables à la transition et souvent importés .
Révolutions technologiques et énergie : quelles perspectives ?
In: Questions internationales, Band 91-92, Heft 3, S. 48-58
Les ruptures technologiques ont souvent engendré des évolutions majeures dans la structure du bilan énergétique. À l'inverse, les contraintes de la politique énergétique, en encourageant l'innovation, ont suscité des changements techniques importants . Parmi toutes les mutations technologiques observées ces dernières années dans le secteur de l'énergie, trois « révolutions technologiques » permettent de mesurer plus précisément l'impact des innovations sur l'évolution du mix énergétique mondial et donc, indirectement, sur les relations internationales : la révolution des hydrocarbures non conventionnels, celle de l'énergie photovoltaïque et celle du numérique .
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
The French Paradox ; The French Paradox: Competition, Nuclear Rent, and Price Regulation
International audience ; The European Commission wants to introduce more competition into the European electricity market. But the low nuclear electricity prices, currently enjoyed by the incumbent Electricité de France (EDF), prevent its competitors from breaking into the French market. To promote competition, either French-regulated price must rise to the level of the European market prices, dominated by more expensive fossil-fueled generation, or EDF's competitors must lower their prices to the French level. Usually, one would expect competition to lead to lower prices. In the case of the so-called "the French paradox," it has been decided that EDF must share a portion of the "nuclear rent" with its competitors to allow them greater markets share in domestic market. This solution, chosen by the French government and embodied in recently passed New Organization of the Electricity Market law, is further described in this chapter as well as a discussion of how the nuclear costs are accounted in the Regulated Access to Incumbent Nuclear Electricity scheme and what may be the future course of energy policy in France.
BASE
Le gaz non conventionnel, facteur d'indépendance énergétique ?
In: La revue internationale et stratégique: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Band 84, Heft 4, S. 69-76