Suchergebnisse

David Greenblum, From the Heroism of the Spirit to the Sanctification of Power: Power and Heroism in Religious Zionism between 1948 and 1968 (Tel Aviv: Open University, 2016).
Uri S. Cohen, The Security Style and the Hebrew Culture of War (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2017).
Dan Arev, Dying to Watch: War, Memory, and Television in Israel 1967–1991 (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2017).
Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, Tel Aviv Was Also Once an Arab Village: The Normalization of the Territories in Israeli Discourse, 1967 (Cambridge, MA: Israel Academic Press, 2017).
Nitza Ben-Dov, The Life of War: On the Military, Revenge, Loss, and War Consciousness in Israeli Prose (Jerusalem: Schocken Books, 2016).
Haya Milo, Songs Through the Barrel of the Gun: Israeli Soldiers' Folk Songs (Tel Aviv: Open University, 2017).

Over the last decade, the gap between the military and political elites in Israel has increased and eventually peaked in 2019, when a group of senior officers who had just retired from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) formed a new party - led by three former chiefs of staff - and called for the replacement of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government. This gap has developed because Israel's previous governments have represented a new kind of polarising, right-wing politics beyond what is considered a shared national common sense. The military, on the other hand, is striv­ing to maintain the character it has acquired as a 'Nation in Arms' by reflecting the entire society of Israel and acting according to its professional ethos and national statist values. The stated goal of the officers entering politics was to defend those values against perceivably partisan and polarising governmental politics. The composition of a future government is thus both: A competition over principled values of the state, but also a determination about the steps regarding the military and political leadership in Israel, as well as the military's relations with society at large.

In the summer of 2005 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) carried out one of its largest military campaigns in many years. Fifty thousand soldiers were sent to confront an adversary numbering ten thousand. But unlike the past, the adversary was not an external enemy. It was a section of the Israeli population. Only once before had an Israeli government ordered soldiers to bring Israeli citizens to heel. That was in 1951, three years after the establishment of the state, when the IDF broke a seamen's strike in the port of Haifa. The traumatic effect of this step on the young society was so profound that no subsequent government ventured to use the military in internal disputes among Jews. Never—until the summer of 2005.

Cover title. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 60-62). ; Mode of access: Internet.

During the week following the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1996, the Israeli media were confronted with a liminal situation created by the unprecedented political violence. Among the problems that emerged were potential social disintegration and anomie. One of the major factors in re-establishing social integration was the reconstruction of Rabin's biography by the media as the collective biography, so that it represented the collective identity of Israeli society. A content analysis of the Rabin myth created during this event shows the practices used by the hegemonic interpretative communities to reinvent society, and the ramifications of excluding the voices of others from the process of national deliberation on the media.