Search results
Filter
8 results
Sort by:
Targeted Killings: Does Drone Warfare Violate International Law?
In: JPIA: Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 22, p. 68-87
Targeted Killings: Does Drone Warfare Violate International Law?
In: Journal of public and international affairs: JPIA, Volume 22
Targeted Killings: Does Drone Warfare Violate International Law?
In: JPIA: Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 22
The Domestic Impact of International Standards
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 64, Issue 3, p. 600-608
ISSN: 1468-2478
Abstract
Regulation is no longer purely a domestic affair. International standards now exist across a broad range of regulatory arenas, touching on issues that may be central to domestic values, such as the regulation of health, safety, and the environment. Although a number of studies have looked at the domestic impact of globalization more generally, few scholars have evaluated the effects of international standards, specifically. This paper investigates that issue, with an empirical focus on agrochemicals. Using original data on changes to US agrochemical regulations between 1996 and 2015, I evaluate whether and how domestic rules have changed in response to international standards. Contrary to common fears, I find little evidence that international standards primarily act as a ceiling, thereby undermining domestic regulations. Instead, international standards seem to serve as focal points, pulling nations toward leniency as well as toward stringency. These findings not only contribute to the broader literature on the domestic effects of globalization, but they also allay concerns that international standards could act as a regulatory cap, encouraging nations to sacrifice caution for economic gain.
For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors
In: American journal of political science, Volume 64, Issue 2, p. 293-308
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractScience is central to the regulation of risk. But who provides the science on which risk regulations are based? Through an in‐depth empirical analysis of domestic health and safety standards, this article shows how private actors use scientific information to acquire preferential outcomes. I develop a formal model delineating conditions under which firms will seek stricter standards on their own products, and I reveal how companies can acquire these outcomes through the strategic provision of information. To test the theory, I track changes to U.S. agrochemical standards over a two‐decade period. I also introduce firm‐level petition data and historical evidence to test the mechanism directly. My findings provide new insight into the strategies companies use to benefit from regulations, while also forcing us to reevaluate what it means for regulations to be based on science.
Covert confiscation: how governments differ in their strategies of expropriation
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Volume 56, Issue 1, p. 3-35
ISSN: 1552-3829
World Affairs Online
Covert Confiscation: How Governments Differ in Their Strategies of Expropriation
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Volume 56, Issue 1, p. 3-35
ISSN: 1552-3829
A substantial literature concludes that democratic-type institutions curb governments' propensity to expropriate foreign direct investment. However, little attention has been paid to the strategies of expropriation regimes employ. We theorize that more politically constrained regimes will utilize expropriation methods that help them overcome institutional impediments. Using data on expropriations in developing countries between 1960 and 2014, we show that rather than rely on the most direct and overt forms of expropriation, constrained regimes tend to use more indirect and covert methods, such as forced sale or contract renegotiation, tools which can be harder to identify, easier to justify, and frequently face lower legislative approval hurdles. Indeed, while more politically constrained regimes are less likely to overtly expropriate foreign investment than less constrained regimes, they are nearly as likely to do so covertly, introducing new questions about the extent to which institutional constraints really translate into improved protections for foreign investors.