Suchergebnisse

Contents -- About the Author -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Toward a Population History: A Basis for Comparisons -- Chapter 2. Immigrant Wages Then and Now -- Chapter 3. Second-Generation Schooling -- Chapter 4. Second-Generation Economic Outcomes -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- Notes -- References -- Index

Title Page -- Contents -- Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction / Joel Perlmann and Mary C. Waters -- Part I. What Do We Know From Counting Multiracials? -- Chapter 1. Racial Identities in 2000: The Response to the Multiple-Race Response Option / Reynolds Farley -- Chapter 2. Does It Matter How We Measure? Racial Classification and the Characteristics of Multiracial Youth / David R. Harris -- Chapter 3. Mixed Race and Ethnicity in California / Sonya M. Tafoya -- Part II. How Much Will It Matter?

This paper discusses support for, and opposition to, racial classification of European immigrants among high-level researchers at both the United States Immigration Commission of 1907 - 11 (the Dillingham Commission) and the Census Bureau during those same years. A critical distinction must be made between the Commission members - political appointees who mostly supported some form of restriction at the time of their appointment - and the top research staff, whose views were remarkably wide ranging. Moreover, even staff members committed to a racialized outlook - such as Daniel Folkmar, author of the Commission's infamous Dictionary of Races and Peoples - deserve a closer look than historians have given them; for example, Folkmar and his superior on the staff had requested commentary from Franz Boas, who was then emerging as the most prestigious academic critic of racial theories (theories that assume group differences in behavior arise from biological endowments). Another feature of the narrative concerns the surprising number of staff who transferred from the Commission to the Census Bureau to work on the 1910 Census. Debates continued at the Bureau as well, this time over how to present the results of the new mother tongue question, which had been introduced to the Census questionnaire in response to pressure for a European race question. Indeed, Folkmar was also the chief author of the Census Bureau report on the mother-tongue data.

The old ways in which surveys of Jews handled marginal cases no longer make sense, and the number of cases involved is no longer small. I examine in detail the public-use samples of the two recent national surveys of Americans of recent Jewish originthe National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS)and also explore the implications for the American Jewish Committee annual surveys of Jewish political opinion. When Jews are defined by the question What is your religion, if any?" the effect is not primarily to eliminate secular or culturally oriented Jews. However, large majorities of the children of intermarriage will fail to reply Jewish." Accordingly, the paper turns to two competing procedures for treating respondents of recent Jewish origin who do not report themselves to be Jewish by religion. The core Jewish population includes respondents who answer that they have no religion. I find this procedure problematic because the meaning of the no religion" response has also changed: it no longer captures people with close connections to the Jewish world who deny the religious connection out of principle. Yet two out of three are the products of intermarriage. I tentatively suggest an alternative principle: self-identity. Americans of recent Jewish origin who are not Jews by religion should be asked (as they were in the 200001 the NJPS) whether they consider themselves Jewish for any reason. Those that reply in the affirmative should be counted as Jews. The paper examines the proportions of people affected by limiting surveys of American Jews to Jews by religion, and the results of using one or another procedure for deciding who else is a Jew. As an example, some demographic outcomes are tabulated using different definitions, as are responses to the question How close do you feel to Israel?"

This working paper takes up three related themes. In section 1, I briefly describe the issues relevant to surveying American Jews and highlight the importance of authoritative national surveys; in section 2, I note that these surveys have not included much exploration of American Jewish divisions over Israeli and American Middle East policy. In section 3, I propose the rudiments of a sample design that would meet the traditional needs of the national survey as well as the political opinion poll. This design is based on a rotating national panel of respondents, somewhat like the U.S. government's Current Population Survey. At the same time, data from earlier panels can be combined to increase sample size for the study of sociocultural issues that are less immediate in nature. Readers who are primarily interested in the issue of polling political opinion about Israeli and American Middle East policy may wish to read only sections 2 and 3. Those primarily interested in the proposal for a national survey based on a rotating panel may wish to read only section 3.

American Jewish opinion about the Arab-Israel conflict matters for both American and Israeli politics as well as for American Jewish life. This paper undertakes an analysis of that opinion based on American Jewish Committee (AJC) annual polls. Recently, the AJC made the individual-level datasets for the 200005 period available to researchers. The paper focuses on opinion about the future of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), because survey questions on that topic are relatively straightforward. Standard background variables (religious, cultural, political, and demographic) are all seen to be modestly related to opinion about the West Bank (in simple crosstabulations and multivariate analysis). However, with the exception of Orthodoxy, no factor is dramatically connected to particular opinions. Also, despite evidence of a positive association between age and emotional attachment to Israel, age is also positively associated with a willingness to accept proposed West Bank changes. Finally, a generalized concern about security seems to account for some of the diversity of opinion about the West Bank unexplained by the standard background variables.