Suchergebnisse

This study critically reviews the new Gender Equality Index (GEI) proposed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) in 2013, arguing that the way in which it has been defined can be misleading for its potential users. The GEI is defined to ensure that good scores in the index are reflective of both low gender gaps and high levels of overall achievement. The study finds that the GEI values are largely driven by differences in overall achievement levels between countries rather than by gender differences within them, a disturbing issue that unduly penalizes low-income countries for factors that are not related to gender norms or discriminatory practices and which might lead to the elaboration of ill-targeted policies. In order to overcome this problem, we introduce a new version of the GEI that gets rid of its achievement component and which is much simpler to interpret.

This study critically reviews the new Gender Equality Index (GEI) proposed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) in 2013, arguing that the way in which it has been defined can be misleading for its potential users. The GEI is defined to ensure that good scores in the index are reflective of both low gender gaps and high levels of overall achievement. The study finds that the GEI values are largely driven by differences in overall achievement levels between countries rather than by gender differences within them, a disturbing issue that unduly penalizes low-income countries for factors that are not related to gender norms or discriminatory practices and which might lead to the elaboration of ill-targeted policies. In order to overcome this problem, we introduce a new version of the GEI that gets rid of its achievement component and which is much simpler to interpret.

This paper uses two classes of multidimensional indices to measure countries' evolution towards the achievement of United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Our results suggest that improvements in the different MDGs tend to be uncorrelated among them and, on average, countries are largely off-track in their way towards MDGs achievement. This evolution has been highly uneven across countries and dimensions. While population growth is negatively associated to countries' MDGs improvement, the latter is unrelated to countries' economic growth, therefore posing a great challenge for international development agencies and national governments who aim to promote simultaneous progress in the different MDGs. ; L'article utilitza dues classes d'indicadors multidimensionals per mesurar l'evolució dels països envers la consecució dels Objectius de Desenvolupament del Mil·lenni (ODM) de Nacions Unides. Els resultats suggereixen que les millores en els diferents ODMs tendeixen a no estar correlacionades i que, en promig, els països no estan ben encarrilats de cara a la consecució dels ODM. Aquesta evolució ha estat molt variada entre països i dimensions. Mentre que el creixement de la població està associat negativament a la millora dels països en els ODMs, aquest darrer no està relacionat amb el creixement econòmic dels països, fet que suposa un gran repte per a les agències de desenvolupament internacional i pels diferents governs nacionals que vulguin promoure un progrés simultani en els diferents ODMs. ; Este artículo utiliza dos clases de indicadores multidimensionales para medir la evolución de los países hacia la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) de Naciones Unidas. Los resultados sugieren que las mejoras en los diferentes ODMs tienden a no estar correlacionadas y que, en promedio, los países no están bien encarrilados de cara a la consecución de los ODM. Esta evolución ha sido muy variada entre países y dimensiones. Mientras que el crecimiento de la población está asociado negativamente a la mejora de los países en los ODMs, éste último no está relacionado con el crecimiento económico de los países, lo que supone un gran reto para las agencias de desarrollo internacional y para los distintos gobiernos nacionales que quieran promover un progreso simultáneo en los diferentes ODMs.

AbstractAssessments of countries' longevity and its variability around the globe often rely on life expectancy (LE) but tend not to differentiate between the years spent in "good" or "less‐than‐good" health. We explore how the evolution of the healthy and unhealthy components of LE has shaped the composition of LE within countries, and the extent of LE inequality between countries. Using data from the Global Burden of Disease Study, we document the joint evolution of "health‐adjusted life expectancy" (HALE) and "unhealthy life expectancy" (UHLE) for 204 countries and territories from 1990 to 2019, the age‐specific contributions to changes over time in HALE and UHLE, and the corresponding cause‐of‐death profiles. We also assess the contribution of HALE and UHLE to "international health inequality" (IHI; i.e., inequality in LE across world countries). Between 1990 and 2019, HALE and UHLE have increased in most world countries, thus lengthening longevity worldwide. Globally, HALE has increased from 58.1 years to 63.4 years, while UHLE has increased from 8.4 years to 9.4 years, but there is a great deal of variation across regions and countries. The fraction HALE/LE has declined in three out of four countries. Over time, IHI followed an inverted U shape, peaking around the year 2000 and declining from that year onwards. IHI levels and trends are mostly explained by trends in HALE. Our findings indicate that global health inequalities are undergoing profound transformations. While health inequalities between countries tend to decline, those within countries tend to increase. In addition, we observe a compositional shift in which the unhealthy component of LE is playing an increasingly important role in explaining (1) further increases in longevity among low‐mortality countries and (2) the extent of inequality in LE among world countries. Policies aiming at increasing LE and reducing its variability between countries should increase HALE among the world's least longevous countries.

AbstractThe Human Development Index is the world's most famous indicator of the level of development of societies. A disadvantage of this index is however that only national values are available, whereas within many countries huge subnational variation in development exists. We therefore have developed the Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI), which shows within‐country variation in human development across the globe. Covering more than 1,600 regions within 161 countries, the SHDI and its underlying dimension indices provide a 10 times higher resolution picture of human development than previously available. The newly observed within‐country variation is particularly strong in low‐ and middle‐developed countries. Education disparities explain most SHDI inequality within low‐developed countries, and standard of living differences are most important within the more highly developed ones. Strong convergence forces operating both across and within countries have compensated the inequality enhancing force of population growth. These changes will shape the twenty‐first century agenda of scientists and policy‐makers concerned with global distributive justice.

ABSTRACTThe measurement of socio‐economic gender inequality has not received much attention from the development literature despite its great relevance and important policy implications. In this article we present two new indices to measure gender inequalities that overcome some of the limitations inherent in the UNDP gender‐related indices and other indices presented in the literature. The proposed new indices are conducive to exploring the extent to which gender gaps favour women and/or men, and to showing the contribution of the different subcomponents to the overall levels of gender inequality. Using UNDP data, our calculations suggest that the levels of gender inequality are mostly explained by differences in the earned‐income subcomponent and that the average difference between women's and men's achievement levels has been reduced by 12 per cent during the period 1995–2005.

Recent studies suggest that intimate partner violence (IPV) against women in Europe is highest among some of the most gender egalitarian countries in the world, like Sweden, Finland and Denmark. This paper aims at disentangling the so-called Nordic Paradox. We have decomposed traditional IPV indicators into a 'previous partner' and 'current partner' components and presented new IPV indicators that are sensitive to the frequency of victimization. The new indicators are based on aggregated data from Agency for Fundamental Rights Survey on violence against women for the 28 EU Member States.The country rankings in terms of IPV levels change substantially when overall prevalence measures are substituted by their 'previous partner' and 'current partner' components and, especially, when considering the frequency of victimization. When comparing the traditional IPV prevalence ranking with the current partner violence repetition-sensitive indicator ranking, the Nordic countries fall several positions. Our findings suggest that the prevalence of IPV tends to be higher in more gender egalitarian countries because union formation and dissolution occur more often, but not because men are necessarily more violent against their partners.

Newly released census microdata reveal the nearly worldwide and substantial decline in educational hypergamy (women marrying men with higher educational attainment) across 56 countries from the 1970s to the 2000s. We examine the extent to which the observed decrease in hypergamy is connected to the worldwide rise in female educational attainment. Our results show that educational hypergamy is an enduring form of gender inequality in union formation across the countries examined but that it has been decreasing over the last few decades and in some countries has reversed in recent years. Overall, we find a strong association between hypergamy and gender differences in educational attainment. Societies in which the female educational advantage is greater tend to have lower levels of educational hypergamy. There is a tendency toward a joint increase in women's educational levels and a decrease in educational hypergamy. This article underlines the influence of women's educational opportunities on the increase in gender symmetry in assortative mating, which leads us to predict the end of educational hypergamy.