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"In a seminal contribution, Romer and Romer (2010) (RR henceforth) estimate GDP tax multipliers of up to -3 after 3 years. These results have been criticized as implausibly large. For instance, Favero and Giavazzi (2010) (FG henceforth) argue RR's specification cannot be interpreted as a proper (truncated) moving average representation of the output process. They show that when the system is estimated in its VAR form, or its correct truncated MA representation, a unit realization of the RR shock has much smaller effects on GDP than in RR, typically about - .5 percentage points of GDP. I argue that on theoretical grounds the discretionary component of taxation should be allowed to have different effects than the automatic response of tax revenues to macroeconomic variables; existing approaches, including FG's, that do not allow for this difference, exhibit impulse responses that are biased towards 0. I show that the correct impulse responses to a RR tax shock are about half-way between the large effects estimated by RR and the much smaller effects estimated by FG: typically, a one percentage point of GDP increase in taxes leads to a decline in GDP by about 1.5 percentage points after 3 years. I also create two new datasets of tax shocks, one based on receipts and the other on liabilities; in these datasets, I distinguish between different types of taxes (personal, corporate, indirect, and social security) and their subcomponents"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Most economists would agree that a hike in the federal funds rate will cause some slowdown in growth and inflation, and that the bulk of the empirical evidence is consistent with this statement. But perfectly reasonable economists can and do disagree even on the basic effects of a shock to government spending on goods and services: neoclassical models predict that private consumption and the real wage will fall, while some neo-keyenesian models predict the opposite. This paper discusses alternative time series methodologies to identify government spending shocks and to estimate their effects. Applying these methodologies to data from the US and three other OECD countries provides little evidence in favor of the neoclassical predictions. Using the US input-output tables, the paper then turns to industry-level evidence around two major military buildups to shed light on the effects of government spending shocks.

Abstract
Does the accumulation of large Target imbalances threaten the viability of the monetary union? Several German and central European scholars have responded in the affirmative: in the case of a disorderly break-up, debtor countries might have an incentive to default on their Target balances, and this would represent a real loss to Target creditors. Most academics have rejected this argument: in their view, a Target default would be only a paper loss to creditors. I propose a simple and unified framework to study the working of the Target system in response to different shocks. I then argue that the German criticism of the Target system is not so unfounded after all, and should be taken seriously. The underlying problem is the co-existence of separate central banks within the Eurozone; if one wants to preserve this feature, no alternative to the current Target system and its problems seems to be realistically available. In particular, comparisons with the Interdistrict Settlement Account of the US Federal Reserve system are misleading.

SUMMARY
The Greek crisis was the deepest in post-war Europe. Public spending on health, that had grown extremely fast in the first decade of the 2000s, was cut by almost 40% between 2010 and 2016, also an unparalleled figure in post-war Europe. Although some of the cuts were mitigated by a system of clawback on the private pharmaceutical industry and by increased household out of pocket expenditure, the provision of health services was also greatly impacted by the spread of long-term unemployment, which in the employment-based Greek system left possibly millions of individuals without access to health services, until universal coverage was effectively restored in 2016. In this paper I aim at establishing the basic facts about the health crisis. Although care must be exercised in not presenting a simplistic, uniformly bleak picture, I show that several indicators point to a substantial deterioration in the health outcomes of the Greek population during the critical years of loss of universal coverage until 2016, in particular for the more vulnerable sectors of the population.