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Judges often give statutes strained interpretations. What makes an interpretation strained? What, if anything, justifies a strained interpretation? Is there always a point past which an interpretation would be too strained, or are there some interpretations which judges are entitled to adopt, whatever a statute says? I claim to answer all of these questions. Using the formula about conditional probability known as Bayes' theorem, I offer a precise definition of a strained interpretation, and identify two reasons for strained interpretations. I claim that the case for strained interpretations is often stronger than is realised, and illustrate that claim with a novel defence of the House of Lords' decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission. Finally, I suggest that even if a legislature is sovereign, there may be meanings which a legislature is unable to enact into law. Thus, there may be limits on even a sovereign legislature's powers.

Administrative officials are permitted to have policies as to the exercise of their discretionary powers, but those policies must be flexible, not rigid. The "flexibility rule", as I call it here, is nearly a century old. Over time, it has become part of the furniture of judicial review: often used, rarely examined. That neglect has led to confusion, on display in recent cases. In this article I try to put the flexibility rule back on a sound footing. I argue, first, that the flexibility rule requires authorities to treat policies merely as rules of thumb. Second, the primary justification for the flexibility rule is neither legislative intent (as courts have said), nor the avoidance of error (as commentators tend to assume); it is the value of participation. Third, and as a result, the flexibility rule ought to apply to policies governing the use of prerogative and other non-statutory powers, as well as to policies governing the use of statutory powers.

[p. 2] ; columns 4–5 ; 4 ¾ col. in. ; A letter giving military information, news on the California emigrants and the Indians, and prices of provisions in Salt Lake City.

Cover -- The Little Rock Crisis -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Preface -- Overview of the Chapters -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: A Meeting of Histories -- Scholarship on Little Rock -- Defining a Desegregation City -- Methodology -- Of Personal Significance by D. LaRouth Perry -- Part I: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests in the Little Rock Era of School Integration -- Institutions -- Mores -- Chapter 1: Perceptions: Black and White Views on Race Relations -- Little Rock's White Community -- Little Rock's African American Community -- The Business Community Reacts to the School Closing -- Chapter 2: A Life of Courage: Mrs. Daisy Bates's Motivations and Leadership -- Chapter 3: Sacrifice: Profiles of the Little Rock Nine -- Preliminary Note by D. LaRouth Perry -- Models for Analysis -- The Nine, Collectively -- Minnijean Brown Trickey -- Elizabeth Eckford -- Ernest G. Green -- Thelma Mothershed -- Melba Pattillo -- Gloria Ray -- Terrence Roberts -- Jefferson Thomas -- Carlotta Walls -- Epilogue by D. LaRouth Perry -- Chapter 4: Duty to Re-election: Governor Orval Faubus and Political Racism -- Faubus: The Masterful Panderer -- Situational Demagoguery -- Epilogue by D. LaRouth Perry -- Chapter 5: Acquiescence: School Leadership Reluctance on Brown -- The Board of Education at Little Rock -- Superintendent Virgil T. Blossom -- Chapter 6: Redemption of (Their) History: Voices of Active Segregationists -- Escalation Theory -- Elected Officials -- Individuals -- Amis Guthridge, Lawyer -- Bruce Bennett, Arkansas Attorney General -- Curt Copeland, Publisher of Arkansas Faith -- Rev. Wesley Pruden of the Broadmoor Baptist Church -- Dr. Dale Alford, Ophthalmologist -- Jimmy Karam, Clothing Store Operator -- Summary of Individual Self-appointed Leadership -- Institutional Supporters -- Mobs -- The First Mob -- The Second Mob -- The Third Mob.

This paper draws the attention of impact-curious sociolegal researchers to the potential of participatory research strategies; and proposes that the effectiveness of those strategies can be enhanced by the introduction of 'designerly ways'. It explores and evidences this proposition through the multi-country Facing All the Facts project which aimed to support and accelerate the process of making hate crime conceptually and empirically visible in Europe. The paper concludes that by pursuing the designerly strategy of making experiences, perceptions and expectations around hate crime reporting and recording visible and tangible in artefacts (formal graphics and collaborative prototypes), the project activities generated structured-yet-free spaces in which publics/stakeholders could more effectively participate in practical, critical and imaginative discussion about how things are, and how they might be; and that this has improved the relevance and rigour of the research, and its ability to generate meaningful change ('impact').