Suchergebnisse

Citation indices are regularly used to inform critical decisions about promotion, tenure, and the allocation of billions of research dollars. Nevertheless, most indices (e.g., the h-index) are motivated by intuition and rules of thumb, resulting in undesirable conclusions. In contrast, five natural properties lead us to a unique new index, the Euclidean index, that avoids several shortcomings of the h-index and its successors. The Euclidean index is simply the Euclidean length of an individual's citation list. Two empirical tests suggest that the Euclidean index outperforms the h-index in practice. (JEL A14, C43)

Abstract
We propose a model of product reviews in which some are genuine and some are fake in order to shed light on the value of information provided on platforms like TripAdvisor, Yelp, etc. In every period, a review is posted which is either genuine or fake. We characterise the equilibrium of the dynamic model and prove that it is unique. In equilibrium, valuable learning takes place in every period. Fake reviews, however, do slow down the learning process. It is established that any attempt by the platform to manipulate the reviews is counterproductive.

An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups yield the same outcome. (JEL C72, D82, D83, K41)