Suchergebnisse

Résumé La promesse du candidat François Hollande d'ouvrir le mariage et l'adoption aux couples de même sexe était facile à tenir : associée au Parti socialiste aux yeux des électeurs, neutre d'un point de vue budgétaire, la mesure était aisée à faire adopter par une large majorité parlementaire. Mais le choix du pouvoir exécutif de privilégier le débat ouvert sur une réforme au périmètre flou a conduit à réactiver un conflit social profond et à redonner un certain souffle à l'opposition. Cet article s'intéresse donc aux frontières mouvantes de la capacité à tenir une promesse et aux conséquences du respect des promesses sur le champ politique.

Résumé Cet article explore les facteurs et les mécanismes qui interviennent dans la réalisation des promesses électorales – un aspect central du fonctionnement du gouvernement représentatif. Après un tour d'horizon de la littérature disponible, nous présentons le modèle conditionnel de respect des promesses qui structure ce numéro : une promesse électorale a d'autant plus de chances d'être tenue que le pouvoir exécutif est motivé à tenir parole et qu'il a la capacité pour le faire. Nous explicitons ensuite la manière dont chaque cas d'étude a été sélectionné pour évaluer la pertinence et les limites de ce modèle, puis nous présentons chacune des contributions, en mettant en évidence des pistes de lecture transversales. En combinant sociologie politique et sociologie de l'action publique, ce numéro améliore notre compréhension des logiques de motivations et de capacité qui conditionnent le respect, ou non, des promesses électorales. La capacité du pouvoir exécutif à tenir parole relève de dimensions institutionnelles, opérationnelles et politiques ; ses motivations s'avèrent, elles, largement déterminées par les caractéristiques des publics ciblés par les promesses électorales.

Résumé Cet article analyse la (non-)mise en œuvre d'un engagement électoral : fermer la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim dans la durée du mandat de François Hollande. Cette étude de cas permet d'affiner l'hypothèse centrale de ce numéro spécial, selon laquelle le respect des promesses dépendrait de la capacité et des motivations des dirigeants à tenir parole, et défend deux arguments centraux. Premièrement, la nature de la promesse et les conditions de sa formulation sont déterminantes pour cerner les logiques de sa réalisation. Deuxièmement, les acteurs politiques peuvent « faire varier » leur capacité à tenir promesse. Si le pouvoir exécutif s'est rapidement trouvé face à des contraintes sectorielles qu'il n'avait pas anticipées, il a su en faire usage pour justifier la reformulation et le report d'une promesse adoptée à contrecœur.

A key factor in modern democracies' legitimisation is the extent to which policies submitted for public approval before an election translate into material outcomes once a political party has won power. Current research finds no clear empirical evidence for partisanship in policy-making nor has any unified theory been offered or tested systematically. This article addresses that gap by offering a conditional approach to policy-making undertaken by parties in government. It suggests that partisan influence on policy depends on both office-holders' capacity for implementing policies evoked during their electoral campaigns and on governing parties' incentives to implement electoral promises. Data from French Agendas Project datasets is used to compare the contents of governing parties' pre-election manifestos with legislation passed in France between 1981 and 2012. Panel negative binomial regressions on electoral and legislative agendas support the expected outcome, namely that issues featuring in governing parties' electoral manifesto have had an impact on their subsequent legislative agendas, with the effect depending on both partisan capacities and incentives. Party programmes do matter in policy-making, albeit only under certain conditions.

A key factor in modern democracies' legitimisation is the extent to which policies submitted for public approval before an election translate into material outcomes once a political party has won power. Current research finds no clear empirical evidence for partisanship in policy-making nor has any unified theory been offered or tested systematically. This article addresses that gap by offering a conditional approach to policy-making undertaken by parties in government. It suggests that partisan influence on policy depends on both office-holders' capacity for implementing policies evoked during their electoral campaigns and on governing parties' incentives to implement electoral promises. Data from French Agendas Project datasets is used to compare the contents of governing parties' pre-election manifestos with legislation passed in France between 1981 and 2012. Panel negative binomial regressions on electoral and legislative agendas support the expected outcome, namely that issues featuring in governing parties' electoral manifesto have had an impact on their subsequent legislative agendas, with the effect depending on both partisan capacities and incentives. Party programmes do matter in policy-making, albeit only under certain conditions.

A key factor in modern democracies' legitimisation is the extent to which policies submitted for public approval before an election translate into material outcomes once a political party has won power. Current research finds no clear empirical evidence for partisanship in policy-making nor has any unified theory been offered or tested systematically. This article addresses that gap by offering a conditional approach to policy-making undertaken by parties in government. It suggests that partisan influence on policy depends on both office-holders' capacity for implementing policies evoked during their electoral campaigns and on governing parties' incentives to implement electoral promises. Data from French Agendas Project datasets is used to compare the contents of governing parties' pre-election manifestos with legislation passed in France between 1981 and 2012. Panel negative binomial regressions on electoral and legislative agendas support the expected outcome, namely that issues featuring in governing parties' electoral manifesto have had an impact on their subsequent legislative agendas, with the effect depending on both partisan capacities and incentives. Party programmes do matter in policy-making, albeit only under certain conditions.

A key factor in modern democracies' legitimisation is the extent to which policies submitted for public approval before an election translate into material outcomes once a political party has won power. Current research finds no clear empirical evidence for partisanship in policy-making nor has any unified theory been offered or tested systematically. This article addresses that gap by offering a conditional approach to policy-making undertaken by parties in government. It suggests that partisan influence on policy depends on both office-holders' capacity for implementing policies evoked during their electoral campaigns and on governing parties' incentives to implement electoral promises. Data from French Agendas Project datasets is used to compare the contents of governing parties' pre-election manifestos with legislation passed in France between 1981 and 2012. Panel negative binomial regressions on electoral and legislative agendas support the expected outcome, namely that issues featuring in governing parties' electoral manifesto have had an impact on their subsequent legislative agendas, with the effect depending on both partisan capacities and incentives. Party programmes do matter in policy-making, albeit only under certain conditions.