Suchergebnisse

Policymakers in Sweden, as in most of the rest of the world, believe that we are responsible for the crimes we commit but not for our ill health. One reason for why we are excused for the latter, even in cases where our actions is the cause of our ill health, is because these actions are in turn ultimately caused by factors outside our control. If this is true for these actions, however, it seems that the same thing could be said with regard to our criminal behavior. In this paper I argue that this disparate position can be explained with reference to data from the field of experimental philosophy. In cases where individuals have done something we believe is morally wrong, then we tend to disregard from the fact that their behavior is ultimately caused by factors outside their control. In cases where individuals instead have done something morally neutral, then we instead tend heed to the fact that their actions is ultimately caused by factors outside their control. Since most of us believe that being sick is morally neutral & committing a crime is morally wrong, this can explain why policymakers tend to think that we are responsible for the one but not the other. Adapted from the source document.