Social Insurance and the Marriage Market
In: Journal of political economy, Volume 128, Issue 1, p. 252-300
ISSN: 1537-534X
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In: Journal of political economy, Volume 128, Issue 1, p. 252-300
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Behavioural public policy: BPP, Volume 2, Issue 1, p. 78-106
ISSN: 2398-0648
AbstractLimits on consumer attention give firms incentives to manipulate prospective buyers' allocation of attention. This paper models such attention manipulation and shows that it limits the ability of disclosure regulation to improve consumer welfare. Competitive information supply from firms competing for attention can reduce consumers' knowledge by causing information overload. A single firm subjected to a disclosure mandate may deliberately induce such information overload to obfuscate financially relevant information or engage in product complexification to bound consumers' financial literacy. Thus, disclosure rules that would improve welfare for agents without attention limitations can prove ineffective for consumers with limited attention. Obfuscation suggests a role for rules that mandate not only the content, but also the format of disclosure; however, even rules that mandate 'easy-to-understand' formats can be ineffective against complexification, which may call for regulation of product design.
In: NBER Working Paper No. w23823
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In: IFN Working Paper No. 995
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w22207
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In: Journal of the European Economic Association
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We study human trafficking in a marriage market model of prostitution. When trafficking is based on coercion, trafficking victims constitute a non-zero share of supply in any unregulated prostitution market. We ask if regulation can eradicate trafficking and restore the outcome that would arise in an unregulated market without traffickers. All existing approaches - criminalization of prostitutes (the traditional model), licensed prostitution (the Dutch model), and criminalization of johns (the Swedish model) - fail to accomplish this goal, but we show that there exists an alternative regulatory model that does. Political support for regulation hinges on the level of gender income inequality.
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In: NYU Working Paper No. 2451/29609
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w25902
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13780
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In: American economic review, Volume 108, Issue 4-5, p. 1256-1263
ISSN: 1944-7981
Persson and Rossin-Slater (2018) find that prenatal exposure to family ruptures affects childhood and adult mental health, as well as infant physical health. We compare children whose relatives die within 280 days post-conception to children whose relatives die in the year after birth. Matsumoto correctly notes that defining the control group using actual birth dates can bias our estimates. Here, we redefine our control group using expected birth dates. The effects on mental health in childhood and adulthood are statistically indistinguishable from those in our original paper. The infant health impacts are attenuated, but statistically significant in our main specifications. (JEL I12, J12, J13)
In: NBER Working Paper No. w22229
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 12386
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w25618
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