Suchergebnisse

This paper analyses the ongoing transformations in the international monetary and financial system and the role played by the BRICS countries. It argues that while the changes the BRICS countries triggered have been marginal, because there was not a substantial change in the underlying power relations, these changes matter because they are forms of power. It looks into three areas where the group was relatively successful in challenging the system: (i) increasing their voice in major global economic forums (focusing on the IMF and the G20), (ii) creating new international financial institutions and (iii) influencing the IMF's new institutional view on capital flows. It then discusses the limits of the BRICS' monetary and financial power given their subordinated position in the currency hierarchy, China being the exception. Understanding the rise and limitations of the BRICS' monetary and financial power is important because they challenge the existing theoretical framework to advance if it wants to understand how emerging market and developing economies, and the groupings formed by them, act in order to uphold their interests in a system which is rigid, hierarchical and still dominated by advanced economies. ; Este artigo analisa as transformações em curso no sistema monetário e financeiro internacional (SMFI) desde a Crise Financeira Global de 2008 e o papel desempenhado pelos países do BRICS. O artigo argumenta que, embora as mudanças provocadas pelos países do BRICS tenham sido marginais, porque não ocorreu uma mudança substancial nas relações de poder subjacentes, estas mudanças importam porque são poder como um fim em si mesmo. São examinadas três áreas em que o grupo foi relativamente bem sucedido em desafiar o sistema: (i) aumentar sua voz nos principais fóruns econômicos globais (com foco no FMI e no G20), (ii) criar novas instituições financeiras internacionais; e (iii) influenciar a nova visão institucional do FMI sobre fluxos de capital. Em seguida, discute-se os limites do poder monetário e financeiro dos BRICS, dada sua posição subordinada no SMFI, com a exceção da China. Compreender a ascensão e os limites do poder monetário e financeiro dos BRICS é importante porque eles encorajam o arcabouço teórico existente a avançar, se quisermos entender como atores subordinados – como as economias emergentes e os grupos formados por eles (tal qual os BRICS) – podem conseguir aquilo que querem em um sistema rígido, hierárquico e ainda dominado pelas economias avançadas.

This article analyzes the impact of the recent international crisis on commercial relations between Brazil and the other BRICS countries (Russia, India, China and South Africa). The methodology consisted of the analysis of governments' and international organizations' documents and reports on international trade. To perform the analysis, firstly, an overview on the general characteristics of the economies of these four trading partners is presented, especially regarding the consequences of the international crisis in each of these economies. After that, the trade relations of the four countries with Brazil in the last decade are reviewed. Our results suggest that bilateral trade between Brazil and the other BRICS countries, which are not characterized as traditional trade partners, has been assuming an increasing importance.

This article analyzes the impact of the recent international crisis on commercial relations between Brazil and the other BRICS countries (Russia, India, China and South Africa). The methodology consisted of the analysis of governments' and international organizations' documents and reports on international trade. To perform the analysis, firstly, an overview on the general characteristics of the economies of these four trading partners is presented, especially regarding the consequences of the international crisis in each of these economies. After that, the trade relations of the four countries with Brazil in the last decade are reviewed. Our results suggest that bilateral trade between Brazil and the other BRICS countries, which are not characterized as traditional trade partners, has been assuming an increasing importance.

RESUMO Este artigo investiga os impactos da revolução digital no sistema monetário e financeiro internacional (SMFI), com ênfase nos efeitos gerados pelo lançamento da moeda digital da China, o e-CNY. Argumenta-se que, do ponto de vista de países emergentes e em desenvolvimento (PEED), as transformações da era digital implicam considerar os custos e os benefícios de se implementar as próprias moedas digitais de bancos centrais (CBDCs, na sigla em inglês), em um contexto no qual esta "nova forma" não altera substancialmente o caráter hierárquico e assimétrico do SMFI. A criação do e-CNY gera novas disjuntivas, como, por exemplo, a escolha entre desenvolver sistemas que sejam interoperáveis com o sistema chinês, ou não. Este aspecto carrega um forte componente político na atual conjuntura de questionamento do status quo em várias dimensões do sistema internacional. Para ilustrar este aspecto, o artigo traz evidências empíricas sobre a evolução nas interconexões entre a economia chinesa e os principais PEED em dimensões como convergência nos ciclos de negócios e nos ciclos financeiros. A maior integração com a China pode funcionar como um eventual fator de atração para os PEED que, assim, poderia gravitar mais em torno do e-CNY em um cenário de maior contestação da posição do dólar estadunidense.

Abstract The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) eroded the consensus around the benefits of capital mobility within mainstream economics. Against this background, this paper discusses to what extent the new mainstream position on capital flow management measures, based on the New Welfare Economics, expands the policy space of developing and emerging economies (DEEs). This paper argues that the new position can be classified as an embedded neoliberal one, given that it keeps liberalization as its ultimate goal, while nonetheless accepting to mitigate some of its harmful consequences. After comparing the capital account policies of China and Brazil, this paper concludes that the policy prescriptions of the New Welfare Economics do not lead to higher levels of national autonomy for DEEs and are likewise unable to curb financial instability in these countries.

The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) eroded the consensus around the benefits of capital mobility within mainstream economics. Against this background, this paper discusses to what extent the new mainstream position on capital flow management measures, based on the New Welfare Economics, expands the policy space of developing and emerging economies (DEEs). This paper argues that the new position can be classified as an embedded neoliberal one, given that it keeps liberalization as its ultimate goal, while nonetheless accepting to mitigate some of its harmful consequences. After comparing the capital account policies of China and Brazil, this paper concludes that the policy prescriptions of the New Welfare Economics do not lead to higher levels of national autonomy for DEEs and are likewise unable to curb financial instability in these countries.

Abstract The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) eroded the consensus around the benefits of capital mobility within mainstream economics. Against this background, this paper discusses to what extent the new mainstream position on capital flow management measures, based on the New Welfare Economics, expands the policy space of developing and emerging economies (DEEs). This paper argues that the new position can be classified as an embedded neoliberal one, given that it keeps liberalization as its ultimate goal, while nonetheless accepting to mitigate some of its harmful consequences. After comparing the capital account policies of China and Brazil, this paper concludes that the policy prescriptions of the New Welfare Economics do not lead to higher levels of national autonomy for DEEs and are likewise unable to curb financial instability in these countries.