Suchergebnisse

This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on macroeconomic stabilization in closed and open economies. We present a stylized theoretical framework, illustrating its main properties with the help of an intuitive graphical apparatus. Among the issues we discuss are optimal monetary policy and the welfare gains from macroeconomic stabilization, the international transmission of real and monetary shocks and the role of exchange rate pass-through, and the design of optimal exchange rate regimes and monetary coordination among interdependent economies

This paper provides a baseline general-equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms that set prices one period in advance. Strict adherence to inward-looking policy objectives such as the stabilization of domestic output cannot be optimal when firms' markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such policies induce excessive volatility in exchange rates and foreign sales revenue, leading exporters to set higher prices in response to higher profit risk. In general, optimal rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower import prices. Monetary rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in an nonmonotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through.