Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Combining attention to the dynamics of collaborative relationships with standard project management techniques, this article describes and reflects on the approach taken by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) in the delivery of a Home Office Police Innovation Fund research project. The research project, with several work streams, focused on the development of the evidence base to inform the design and implementation of the College of Policing's new Police Education Qualifications Framework graduate entry programme for police officers. The article comments on managing a complex collaboration comprising MOPAC, three academic research teams, Police Now and the College of Policing, and discusses the relationship between the project and the evolving policy environment. In conclusion, the article makes some observations about the value of a tri-partite collaboration between policy, practice, and research and the insights gained through this experience, which may offer guidance in the future management of collaborative projects.

Family life has been radically transformed over the past three decades. Half of all households are unmarried, while only a quarter of all married households have kids. A third of the nation's births are to unwed mothers, and a third of America's married men earn less than their wives. With half of all women cohabitating before they turn thirty and gay and lesbian couples settling down with increasing visibility, there couldn't be a better time for a book that tracks new conceptions of marriage and family as they are being formed.The editors of this volume explore the motivation to marry and th

Abstract
The standard altruism model within the family predicts that transfers will be inversely related to the recipient's income. Thus, parents will implicitly insure children against bad luck. This insurance may cause children to take undesirable risks. Anticipating this moral hazard, parents may alter their transfers. Using an artefactual field experiment, we show that parents use transfers to compensate for differences between their teenage children when incomes are independent of children's actions. However, when a potential incentive problem is introduced, parents generally move away from compensating transfers. In addition, we find that the teenage children are more likely to take unfair bets when their behavior is not detectable by their parents.