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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. Trade Composition and the Global Political Economy -- Chapter 2. Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Intra-Industry Trade -- Chapter 3. Cooperating to Compete: Intra-Industry Trade and the Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements -- Chapter 4. Trade Composition and the World Trade Organization: The Effect of Intra-Industry Trade on the Dispute Settlement Procedure -- Chapter 5. Beyond Liberalization and Development: Intra-Industry Trade and the Onset of Militarized Disputes -- Chapter 6. The Political Economy of International Affinity: How the Composition of Trade Influences Preference Similarity and Alliance -- Chapter 7. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Previous research has explored how US sanctions affect subsequent behavior by sanctioned states as well as third parties, with particular attention to whether states change the policies that led to US sanctions. In this paper, we argue that US sanctions also affect lobbying of the US government. States experiencing US sanctions over security and political issues will lobby the US government less than other states because this scenario suggests that lobbying is unlikely to influence US policies. States experiencing sanctions over economic issues, on the other hand, will lobby the US more as these targets would see a negotiated settlement as more feasible. We also maintain that third-party states that are similar to US sanction targets will lobby the US government more than dissimilar third parties, as lobbying in this scenario could be aimed at preempting future episodes of US sanctions—regardless of the issue that led to sanctions. We find support for our expectations in auto-regressive models spanning 1975–2005. Our findings suggest that sanctions in some cases lead states to find means other than policy concessions by which to satisfy US policy-makers.

In this paper, we reconcile divergent theories linking trade to conflict—opportunity costs and costly signaling on the one hand versus dependence and coercion on the other hand. We argue that variation in domestic political institutions and state capabilities can condition how international trade affects conflictual or cooperative political relationships. When institutions result in a more nationally representative constituency, trade has a relatively more negative association with conflict, whereas deviation from this institutional arrangement reduces the pacifying impact of trade. The presence of greater military capabilities incentivizes leaders to use trade as a lever to advance other state interests. As such, for more powerful states, trade is associated with relatively more conflict and cooperation. We find support for our expectations in statistical tests spanning 1994–2012.

Foreign policy often creates geographically concentrated domestic benefits. A prominent example is the tying of development aid to purchases from the donor country. This feature of aid highlights the utility in examining foreign policy as an instance of pork-barrel politics. Considering tied aid in terms of legislators' incentives to provide constituent benefits, we argue that people will support an increase in foreign aid spending more when it would promote local economic activity, while opposing aid cuts more when reduced local economic output would result. Crucially, we also expect that people will support their state's US senator more when informed that the senator attempted to secure (or retain) locally beneficial funds. We find support for our expectations in a novel survey experiment of US citizens. Our results suggest that legislators' electoral incentives, and consequential local spending, can help explain the adoption of foreign policies despite national-level public disapproval.

Foreign policy often creates geographically concentrated domestic benefits. A prominent example is the tying of development aid to purchases from the donor country. This feature of aid highlights the utility in examining foreign policy as an instance of pork-barrel politics. Considering tied aid in terms of legislators' incentives to provide constituent benefits, we argue that people will support an increase in foreign aid spending more when it would promote local economic activity, while opposing aid cuts more when reduced local economic output would result. Crucially, we also expect that people will support their state's US senator more when informed that the senator attempted to secure (or retain) locally beneficial funds. We find support for our expectations in a novel survey experiment of US citizens. Our results suggest that legislators' electoral incentives, and consequential local spending, can help explain the adoption of foreign policies despite national-level public disapproval.

Studies find that members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are less likely to be involved in militarized conflict. An expectation of continuing amicable trade relations is among the factors linking PTAs to peace. However, this role of PTAs is difficult to test due to the problem of observational equivalence; PTAs correlate with trade levels and liberalization, factors also linked to peace. In this article, we isolate the impact of PTAs on trade expectations by distinguishing between signed agreements and those in force. A focus on signed but not-yet-in-force PTAs allows us to assess the correlation between agreements and peace before other pacifying, and therefore potentially confounding, elements emerge. Statistical tests spanning 1957 to 2000 demonstrate that signed PTAs are pacifying, while in-force agreements have no statistically significant impact when controlling for other factors linked to peace. (International Interactions (London)/FUB)

Although much research has examined how third parties might affect the success of economic sanctions, scant research has considered the extent to which potential—rather than realized—alternate markets affect strategic behavior between sanctioning (sender) and target states prior to sanction use. We argue that the sender is more likely to threaten or impose sanctions against a potential target with higher trade dependence on the sender, but only under the condition that the target's ability to redirect lost trade to third parties is low. As the target's ability to redirect lost trade increases, the sender is less likely to use sanctions because it expects that the target could mitigate the intended costs of the coercion more easily. We capture potential alternate markets using a measure of the total economic capabilities held by the target's allies, finding support for our expectations in statistical tests using data on U.S. sanctions spanning 1950 to 2005. Our results affirm the importance of accounting for third parties and alternate markets as factors influencing the strategic behavior associated with the use of economic coercion.

While economic sanctions are commonly regarded as nonviolent coercive diplomacy, scholars show that senders—particularly democratic senders—are actually more likely to use military force against the targets of their sanctions. In this article, the authors extend this connection between sanctions and military action by arguing that countries targeted with third-party economic coercion are more likely to be targets of dyadic militarized violence from states not involved in the sanctions. The act of sanctioning, the authors argue, lowers the prohibitions to use violence against the sanctioned state by others. Empirical analysis of dyadic data from 1914 to 2000 shows that, within directed dyads, militarized interstate dispute (MID) initiation is more likely when the potential target of conflict is sanctioned by third-party states, particularly when the sanctioning state is a large democracy.

The normative transfer thesis posits that systematic discrimination, inequality, and repression are indicative of violent norms within states, which extend to the realm of foreign policy. In this article, the authors contend that the pacifying influence of similarity conditions the impact of physical integrity norms at the dyad level. Although mutual norms of domestic nonviolence are more pacifying than mutual disregard thereof, the authors argue that a wide disparity in norms is more aggravating than shared violent norms. This follows because similarity of abusive norms may preclude certain conflicts of interest from originating. The authors test this argument on data from 1981 to 2001, finding that conflict initiation is more likely when states have disparate levels of respect for physical integrity rights. The authors find evidence for a conditional norm transfer, as mutually respectful dyads are least likely to experience conflict; however, they also find evidence of a somewhat weaker peace between abusers.