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Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as "de-risking." We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.'s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies.

How can the government agencies responsible for enforcing economic sanctions enhance their effectiveness? This study explains how and why sanctions enforcement actions undertaken by sender governments can discourage their firms from trading with the states they sanction. Specifically, we examine how the penalties imposed against sanctions violators by the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) affect U.S. firms' trade with target states. We argue that because U.S. firms are responsive to the risk of being penalized and the disruptions that penalties create, U.S. trade with sanctioned states will be lower in the aftermath of OFAC enforcement actions. The penalties' frequency and severity will magnify those negative effects. We hypothesize that OFAC enforcement actions taken against both U.S. and foreign sanctions violators will negatively impact U.S. trade with targets. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that OFAC's sanctions enforcement actions decrease U.S. trade with sanctioned states in numerous ways.

Numerous studies suggest that democracies employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. In this article, we examine the conditioning role that the elasticity of import demand at the commodity level plays on the relationship between democracy and import barriers. Beginning with the assumption that democracies are more responsive than nondemocracies to the preferences of mass publics, we demonstrate that the value of free trade as a public good depends on the elasticity of import demand. When import demand for a given commodity is inelastic, trade barriers are more harmful to consumers; as such, democracies will employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. However, as import demand becomes more elastic, publics find it easier to adjust to higher prices; as a result, the difference in imposed trade barriers by regime type decreases. We find support for this argument in statistical analyses of crosssectional data covering 4,656 commodities imported by 73 countries Furthermore, we find that democracies raise higher trade barriers than nondemocracies on commodities for which import demand is very elastic.(International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

In this paper, we demonstrate that dependence on trade influences asymmetric crisis perception. Unilateral crisis perception is more likely to persist when the initiator of the crisis does not depend on trade with the target because in this case the target lacks capability to harm the initiator. Conversely, when the initiator is dependent on trade with the target, mutual crisis perception occurs sooner. Additionally, a state is more likely first to perceive a threat from another state-beginning a crisis as a target-when its trade dependence on that state is high. We find support for these expectations in survival time regressions and probit models spanning the period from 1919 to 2001. Adapted from the source document.

In this article, it is argued that horizontal intra-industry trade is associated with reduced conflict propensity within dyads. Horizontal intra-industry trade is characterized by participation in international markets for similar – in many cases, branded – commodities, resulting from economies of scale and consumer tastes for variety. Conversely, inter-industry trade in accordance with the Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin models, while providing valuable trade gains, in some instances provokes vulnerability to trade partners, such that its overall impact on dyadic conflict is ambiguous. Support for this expectation is found in empirical tests spanning from 1963 to 2001. Additionally, there is evidence that development is insufficient to preclude conflict when jointly developed dyads engage in no intra-industry trade.

In this article, it is argued that horizontal intra-industry trade is associated with reduced conflict propensity within dyads. Horizontal intra-industry trade is characterized by participation in international markets for similar - in many cases, branded - commodities, resulting from economies of scale and consumer tastes for variety. Conversely, inter-industry trade in accordance with the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models, while providing valuable trade gains, in some instances provokes vulnerability to trade partners, such that its overall impact on dyadic conflict is ambiguous. Support for this expectation is found in empirical tests spanning from 1963 to 2001. Additionally, there is evidence that development is insufficient to preclude conflict when jointly developed dyads engage in no intra-industry trade. (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)