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Public trust in government depends largely on the belief that institutions are fair and respond to the will of the governed. We expand on past research on the relationship between public opinion and state courts by studying how selection methods for both state and local courts influence popular attitudes about the judicial branch. Employing individual-level survey data on the responsiveness and fairness of state supreme courts and local trial courts, we find that respondents in states using elections to choose judges for state courts believe the judicial system is fairer. Further, the use of non-partisan elections for local trial courts has a positive effect on public evaluations of judicial fairness. However, views on judicial responsiveness are unaffected by means of selection at either the state or local level. Thus, nonpartisan or even partisan judicial elections do not have a negative effect on our measures of trust; indeed, when elections do have an effect, it is a positive one.

Public trust in government depends largely on the belief that institutions are fair and respond to the will of the governed. We expand on past research on the relationship between public opinion and state courts by studying how selection methods for both state and local courts influence popular attitudes about the judicial branch. Employing individual-level survey data on the responsiveness and fairness of state supreme courts and local trial courts, we find that respondents in states using elections to choose judges for state courts believe the judicial system is fairer. Further, the use of non-partisan elections for local trial courts has a positive effect on public evaluations of judicial fairness. However, views on judicial responsiveness are unaffected by means of selection at either the state or local level. Thus, nonpartisan or even partisan judicial elections do not have a negative effect on our measures of trust; indeed, when elections do have an effect, it is a positive one. Adapted from the source document.