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This article delves into multi-domain operations in the context of future warfighting. A multi-domain approach to operations is being progressively implemented in allied nations and within NATO, as well. It should also become a core interest for the Czech Republic, even if the sea and space domains do not represent the crucial area of potential operational engagement of the Army of the Czech Republic. The complexity of operations in a complex operating environment requires mutual interaction across all operational domains. The integration of the physical and virtual spheres of operations suggests that operations planning cannot be strictly oriented to individual operational domains. The interaction between operational domains must be perceived as a sine qua non for effective planning and conducting military operations. This is also a fundamental prerequisite for the successful activity of forces in a complex operating environment.

The article presents a summary of analytical outcomes aimed at mapping current NATO and EU approaches to capability planning and their impact on national planning processes, which were carried out by security and defence institutions. The outcomes point out the fact that significant number of NATO nations and EU member states are using approaches to capability planning which reflect specifically national strategic objectives. It is of note that no country has implemented procedures that could be considered as standardised in terms of a single planning process within NATO or the EU. On the other side, analyses point out the fact that NATO and EU planning processes can be hardly expected to be unified in the short term. Nevertheless, NATO and EU member countries should pay close attention to the outputs of their national planning processes in order to comply with the single set of capability requirements as implemented in the relevant NATO and EU planning processes.

Over the last few years, a need for reinforcing the NATO-EU mutual coherence has become increasingly apparent. The EU and NATO have recently initiated the steps to consolidate the strategic cooperation where a way ahead to converge NDPP and CSDP planning process was also underpinned. The recent introduction of new tools tailored to get more effective the CSDP process offers new opportunities for facilitating a convergence of EU and NATO planning approaches. Even if it is impossible to assume that the Alliance's and the Union's planning processes would become identical, the implementation of PESCO and other subsequent procedural tools has created a room for potential synchronization and harmonization of respective planning processes. The paper summarises findings on certain parts of both processes which could be brought closer, in terms of time and procedures, without affecting the autonomy of both organizations in any way.

The aim of the article is to broaden scientific discussion held within the defence and security community on methodological approach to scenario development process. The author brings an innovative look at the concept of modular task force development, which is considered, in his conception, as a result of interconnection between capability requirements arisen from scenario analysis process, and respective type of force units being a part of the current military structure. The author´s approach to task force generation process, illustrated by a case study, is a synthesis of best practices and findings derived from national as well as EU and NATO planning processes. The proposed concept of the task force generation might be perceived as an effective tool for supporting strategic decision-making process.

The article describes an approach to development of a national military capability requirements database and its relationship with reference units which will be finally used for assessing capabilities of existing force units. Outcomes from recently completed analyses lead to the conclusion that the single set of capability requirements as specified in the Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements, can be taken as a key stone for developing a national database of capability requirements. A due adaptation of this document to the Czech MOD allows getting a complex frame of capabilities which force units shall manage to achieve given operational tasks both in the context of a national or multinational task force group. Consequently such a database can be exploited for setting up a mechanism for capability assessment.

The aim of the article is to present a synthesis of findings from both analyses and their application while conceiving a proposal of methodology for military capability assessment of Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The proposed approach to capability assessment stems from principles of the NATO´s J-DARTS (Joint Defence Planning Analysis and Requirements Tool Set) and EU´s SAEP (Scrutinising, Assessing, Evaluating and Prioritising Process) when the main attention was focused on the phase of matching current capabilities of force units against capability requirements, follow-on identification of shortfalls and their prioritisation. The degree of priority should primarily qualify the level of operational risk stemming from potential engagement of force units in an operation.

The aim of the article is to bring out results of the comparative analysis of NATO and EU defence planning processes. The comparative analysis was focused on identification of those findings which are identical for both NATO and the EU and which might be also beneficial for optimising the national defence planning process within the Czech Ministry of Defence. From this perspective, the key analysis outcome is identification of similar phases which were found out while comparing respective NATO´s and EU´s planning tools, i.e. J-DARTS and SAEP Process. Even if NATO and the EU are using a different terminology and different approaches to achieve expected results, the substance of respective phases is almost identical. A course of action how to implement the analysis outcomes into the national defence planning process might be the subject of a follow on research.

The objective of this article is to answer the question to which extent a respective concentration on Alliance approaches is really indispensable. A substance of the answer is to be found in the outcomes of analysis made on defence planning processes of NATO nations and EU member states. This analysis indicates to which extent national planning processes correlate with principles of NDPP and EU capability development. The analysis outcomes point out a significant diversity of approaches to national defence planning processes, the fact which stems from different interests of their national security and defence policies and, at the same time, the outcomes substantiate that the centre of gravity of national approaches does not lean on implementing principles of NDPP but on achieving outputs of the NDPP.

The article brings outcomes from the critical analysis of interaction between planning by objectives and capability planning. The analysis is based on the assumption that the strategic decision-making process should be assisted by a systemic tool, enabling a financial assessment of capabilities, identified as a prerequisite for accomplishing politico-military ambitions. Taking into account the current planning system, as implemented within the Ministry of Defence, the planning by objectives might become this tool. However, for providing an efficient planning by objectives, it is necessary to derive relevant findings from the capability planning, which basically includes data on capability assessment, identified capability shortfalls and their prioritisation. Therefore, findings from capability planning process are a keystone for conceiving objectives for the area of capability development. Both capability planning and planning by objectives are to be seen as communicating conveyances, where a level of mutual interactions significantly influences effectiveness of defence performance management. The analysis is aimed at identification and description of discrepancies hampering an efficient interconnection between planning by objectives and capability planning and, as a conclusion, the analysis proposes a definition of the core problem which causes respective discrepancies.

At present, it can be seen a tangible progress in the NATO-EU common approach to deal with challenging security issues. Paradoxically, it has been economic recession in combination with growing danger of arising armed conflicts, specifically on the European continent territory, to start up the closer cooperation between NATO and the EU. Logically, the current security situation ended in conclusions that the complementarity between NATO and the EU became a real necessity and only interaction between the Alliance and Union's security and defence policies could bring required effects, while upholding global and local security stability. The article is available only in the Czech language. For more information please contact editors.

The authors' intention is to present findings to which they came while analysing the implementation process of the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), especially in the area of EU operations planning and development of capabilities required for achieving the EU level of ambition. Only issuing the EU Global Strategy in 2016 and its subsequent implementation process seems to be a momentum for specifying commitments stemming from PESCO. At present, there is a list of common binding commitments which 25 of 28 EU member states have signed to. This list includes specific commitments as for development of required capabilities needed for achieving expected objectives of CSDP operations. Nevertheless, a very critical point related to the current PESCO implementation process is whether the present level of EU member states integration allows fully completing all highly ambitious commitments as declared by political leaders.

The aim of the article is to recall the thoughts of war strategists on how to conduct military operations during the Cold War and to present the issue of operational maneuvering groups. Their use was a new conceptual framework of offensive operations led by the highly mobile military units of the Warsaw Pact in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on the analysis and comparison of historical sources, a set of information and knowledge from the field of military art is presented here as well as a more comprehensive view on the tactical, operational and strategic context of the offensive operations on the European battlefield. Their impacts were also essential in the way of training of troops and education of military officers in the former regime.