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Este estudio se centra en tres paradojas políticas que caracterizan el sangriento cambio de régimen de 1989 en Rumania y el período de treinta años que transcurrió, es decir, 1989-2019. Estas tres paradojas políticas dicen lo siguiente: Paradoja # 1: La sangrienta revolución anticomunista de 1989 llevó al poder a los miembros de segundo y tercer rango de la élite del poder comunista y a varios tecnócratas que habían estado cerca de las estructuras de poder del difunto Partido Comunista Rumano (RCP); Paradoja # 2: El número de víctimas registradas después del colapso del régimen comunista el 22 de diciembre de 1989 supera el número de víctimas registradas durante el período del 16 al 22 de diciembre de 1989 en una proporción de aproximadamente 7 a 1; y Paradoja # 3: Aunque Rumania pasó por una de las transiciones más largas y dolorosas a la democracia en la Europa Centro-Oriental, el país no ha experimentado hasta ahora un retroceso autoritario después del año 2010 siguiendo el modelo centroeuropeo (especialmente los casos de Hungría y Polonia). El presente estudio aborda estas paradojas y explica por qué el colapso violento del régimen comunista en Rumania ha llevado al nacimiento de una cultura política de contestación, que provocó varias olas de movilización de abajo hacia arriba en favor de la consolidación democrática y, hasta ahora, obstaculizó el auge del autoritarismo en este país. ; de junio de 2020 / Aceptado: 15 de julio 2020 Abstract. This study focuses on three political paradoxes which characterize the bloody 1989 regime change in Romania and the thirty-year period which elapsed, that is, 1989–2019. These three political paradoxes read as follows: Paradox #1: The bloody anti-communist revolution of 1989 brought to power the second- and third-rank members of the communist power elite and a number of technocrats who had been close to the power structures of the defunct Romanian Communist Party (RCP); Paradox #2: The number of registered victims after the collapse of the communist regime on 22 December 1989 surpasses the number of registered victims during the period 16-22 December 1989 by a ratio of about 7 to 1; and Paradox #3: Although Romania went through one of the longest and most painful transitions to democracy in East-Central Europe (ECE), the country has not experienced so far an authoritarian backsliding after the year 2010 on the Central European model (especially the cases of Hungary and Poland). The present study addresses these paradoxes and explains why the violent collapse of the communist regime in Romania has led to the birth of a political culture of contestation, which prompted several waves of bottom=up mobilization in favor of democratic consolidation and, so far, hampered the rise of authoritarianism in this country.

This article focuses on a particular aspect related to the permeability of the borders of communist Romania during the period 1967–9, that is, the increase in the number of Western citizens visiting Romania, as well as in the number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West. The celebration by the communist regime in Bucharest of International Tourist Year 1967 marked the beginnings of a brief period of increased permeability of communist Romania's borders. During the same period, the communist authorities learned that a silent opposition to the regime existed as well. Many of those who opposed the regime did not dare to express their discontent publicly. Instead, they decided for the 'exit' option, and thus a growing number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West refused to return. Beginning in early 1969, the Securitate devised complex measures to control Western citizens travelling to Romania and to prevent Romanian citizens who travelled to the West from remaining abroad. This paper illustrates the discrepancy between Ceauşescu's foreign and domestic policy, and contributes to a better understanding of the 'political mind' of the Romanian communists during the power-consolidation phase of Ceauşescu's rule.

This study puts forward a frame of analysis of the Polish "negotiated revolution" of 1989, which initiated the revolutionary regime changes that took place in East- Central Europe (ECE) that year. The 1989 events in ECE had three particular features: they were non-utopian; they were not carried out in the name of a particular class; and they were non-violent (with the conspicuous exception of Romania). Considering these specific aspects, this author contends that the 1989 events can be termed "postmodern revolutions." In order to explain the Polish "negotiated revolution" of 1989, the present study employs an explanatory model previously applied to the bloody revolution of December 1989 in Romania, which takes into consideration both the domestic developments and the entangled histories of the Soviet bloc countries over the period 1945–89, as well as the issue of recent path dependence. The main assumption is that the collapse of communist rule in Poland and in the other five communist countries which experienced a regime change in 1989 was provoked by a complex interplay of structural, conjunctural and nation-specific factors.

When approaching the issue of Romanian national-communism, it is Nicolae Ceauşescu's flamboyant display of chauvinistic nationalism that comes immediately to mind. Thus, it may come as a surprise for many to learn that it was in fact Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the Stalinist leader of the Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) and Ceauşescu's predecessor, who initiated in the mid-1950s a return to the local traditions and subsequently to an ethnic understanding of the Romanian nation. True, under the reign of Ceauşescu, the communist regime engaged in sustained policies aimed at reinforcing the ethnic ties among the Romanian majority and assimilating the historic ethnic minorities. But, in the case of Romanian communism, a nationalistic turn had already been initiated during the year 1956, under the rule of Gheorghiu-Dej. At the same time, it took a rather long period, i.e. 1956–1968, for Romanian national-communism to mature.