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IN ENGLISH: Environmental economics and ecological economics became established scientific fields as a result of the growth and the success of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Using the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge and the general theory of scientific/intellectual movements, this article compares four pairs of scholars (two pairs of scholars appropriated for these fields and fields' founders during the emergence and establishment of the fields). The article depicts how their institutional, ideological and scientific backgrounds contributed to the divergence of these fields. Practitioners of environmental economics and ecological economics were influenced by different strands of the environmental movement. Environmental economics has epistemological and institutional links with environmentalism and ecological economics with ecologism. Different types of interdisciplinarity were used in these fields—a bridge building type of interdisciplinarity in the case of environmental economics and a restructuring and integrative in the case of ecological economics. --- IN CROATIAN: Ekonomika okoliša i ekološka ekonomija postale su etablirana znanstvena polja kao rezultat rasta i uspjeha ekološkog pokreta u 1960.-im u 1970.-im. Koristeći strogi program sociologije znanja i generalnu teoriju znanstvenih/intelektualnih pokreta, ovaj članak uspoređuje četiri para znanstvenika (dva para znanstvenika aproprirana od ovih polja i osnivače polja tijekom nastanka i utemeljenja oba polja). Članak opisuje kako su njihovi institucionalni, ideološki i znanstveni backgroundi doprinijeli divergenciji ovih polja. Na utemeljitelje ekonomike okoliša i ekološke ekonomije utjecale su različite struje ekološkog pokreta. Ekonomika okoliša ima epistemološke i institucionalne veze s environmentalizmom, a ekološka ekonomija s ekologizmom. Različiti tipovi interdisciplinarnosti su korišteni u ovim poljima - u slučaju ekonomike okoliša premošćujući tip interdisciplinarnosti, a u slučaju ekološke ekonomije ...

IN ENGLISH: Historical grievances of different political groups in the EU contributed to the rising opposition to "Brussels". This opposition is often framed through memories that contest the official EU narrative of the peaceful and prosperous continental integration that was able to overcome the destructions of the two world wars and the Cold War divisions. Based on the analysis of the development of some of the most prominent Eurosceptic parties (le Front National, die Alternative für Deutschland, Syriza, Podemos, Fidesz, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), it is argued that recent EU crises and especially their interpretations have been influenced by the legacies of some of the most important periods of twentieth-century European history. The legacy of the Second World War and its aftermath in two founding member states (France, Germany), the legacy of right-wing dictatorships in two Southern European member states (Greece, Spain) and the legacy of communist dictatorships in two Central and Eastern European member states (Hungary, Poland) still shape narratives and stances towards European integration. --- IN CROATIAN: Osjećaj povijesnih nepravdi kod različitih političkih grupa u EU doprinijeli su rastućem protivljenju Bruxellesu. To protivljenje se često iskazuje upotrebom sjećanja koja dovode u pitanje službeni EU narativ o mirnom i prosperitetnom kontinentu koji je uspio prevladati dva svjetska rata i hladnoratovske podjele. Na osnovi analize razvoja nekoliko najprominentnijih euroskeptičnih stranaka (le Front National, die Alternative für Deutschland, Syriza, Podemos, Fidesz, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), tvrdi se da su na nedavne EU krize i posebno na njihove interpretacije utjecale ostavštine nekih od najznačajnijih razdoblja europske povijesti u 20. stoljeću. Ostavština Drugog svjetskog rata i njegove posljedice u dvije države osnivačice (Francuska, Italija), ostavština desničarskih diktatura u dvije zemlje Južne Europe (Grčka, Španjolska) i ostavština komunističkih diktatura u dvije zemlje Srednje i Istočne Europe (Mađarska, Poljska) još uvijek oblikuju narative i pozicioniranje prema europskoj integraciji.

IN ENGLISH: The gradual abandoning of the 'socialism in one country' doctrine during the post-war period and the intensive transformation of European social democracy in the 1990s pushed social democratic politicians and intellectuals into the front line of advocates of a unified and powerful Europe. They contributed to the inclusion of social democratic and environmentalist values in the EU's official narrative. The success of European integration and George W. Bush's presidency created the narrative of the Promethean role of Europe. Scholars with a social democratic or environmentalist background created this narrative and it was also shaped by authors' national contexts. --- IN CROATIAN: Postupno napuštanje doktrine "socijalizma u jednoj zemlji" nakon Drugog svjetskog rata i intenzivna transformacija europske socijaldemokracije u 1990-ima gurnula je socijaldemokratske političare i intelektualce na prvu liniju zagovornika ujedinjene i moćne Europe. Oni su doprinijeli uključenju socijaldemokratskih i environmentalističkih vrijednosti u službeni narativ EU-a. Uspjeh europske integracije i predsjednikovanje Georgea W. Busha stvorili su narativ prometejske uloge Europe. Znanstvenici socijaldemokratskog i environmentalističkog usmjerenja kreirali su taj narativ, a on je također bio oblikovan i nacionalnim kontekstima u kojima su ti autori djelovali.

The idea of Europe was radically transformed after the accomplishment of the idea of European unification. The European Union (EU) and Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century were defined by a broad common ideology that consists of ideologies such as antinationalism, social democracy, pacificism and environmentalism. These ideologies are presented by pro-EU scholars and politicians as ideologies rooted in European history and parts of European identity and as being mostly absent in the American policies. The emergence of EU ideology is traced in the relaunch of European integration in the mid-1980s and in Delors' conflict with Thatcher. It is argued that the emergence of EU ideology is the result of two long-term historical developments: the deepening and enlargement of European integration ; and the changing relations between the USA and Europe. It is concluded that the emergence of EU ideology resembles the emergence of nationalism and national ideologies.

Ovaj rad predstavlja komparaciju vrijednosnih orijentacija hrvatskog društva i njegovu (javnu) sliku spoznajnih mogućnosti i društvene uloge znanosti u rješavanju društvenih i svekolikih drugih problema i izazova čovjekove egzistencije. Temelji se na iskazima ispitanika koji su predstavljali reprezentativni uzorak punoljetnoga hrvatskog stanovništva (2.220), anketiran 2004. godine. Metodološko uporište za izbor čestica vezanih uz percepciju znanosti bila su istraživanja američke agencije za znanost (National Science Foundation) o društvenim učincima znanosti, te britansko-bugarska studija o spoznajnoj naravi znanosti. Skale vrijednosnih orijentacija konstruirane su na temelju faktoriziranih čestica iz upitnika primarnom komponentnom analizom s varimax rotacijom. Dobivena slika znanosti u najširoj hrvatskoj javnosti bila je satkana od triju međusobno prožetih i istovremeno suprotstavljenih viđenja znanosti. Suživot optimističkog, skeptičnog i konzervativnog pogleda na znanost promatrali smo u okrilju društvenog vrijednosnog sustava u kojemu su visoko kotirale dvije tradicionalne vrednote: etatizam i patriotizam ; nešto niže - vrednote ekonomskog i političkog liberalizma, a najniže, vrednote etnocentrizma, patrijarhalizma i autoritarizma. U sučeljavanju općega vrijednosnog sustava s vrijednosnim prosuđivanjima znanosti prepoznati su nešto dublji korijeni znanstvenog konzervativizma u tradicionalnim ili retradicionaliziranim vrednotama, dok je prevladavajući optimistički stav prema znanosti ostao vrijednosno mnogo neodređeniji. On se nešto značajnije vezivao tek uz vrednote liberalizma. (IN ENGLISH: This article shows the comparison of value orientations in the Croatian society and the public image of cognitive potential and social role of science in solving social and other problems and challenges of human existence. It is based on attitudes of a sample of 2,220 respondents who represent adult (18+) Croatian population and who were surveyed in 2004. Items used for measuring the perception of social impact of science were based on the National Science Foundation questionnaire and items used for measuring cognitive potential of science were based on one British-Bulgarian study. Value orientation scales were constructed based on factors which were the result of the principal component analysis using varimax rotation. In the public image of science in Croatia, three correlated and at the same time conflicting perceptions of science were intertwined. The co-existence of optimistic, sceptical and conservative view of science was examined in the social system of values in which two traditional patterns were highly valued - etatism and patriotism, slightly less valued was economic and political liberalism and the least valued were ethnocentrism, patriarchalism and authoritarianism. Correlations between general value patterns and perceptions of science showed that scientific conservatism had deeper roots in traditional or retraditionalised values, while the prevailing optimistic attitude towards science was less determined by value patterns. It was correlated to a greater extent only with liberal values.)

Drawing on Sekulić, Massey and Hodson's seminal article 'Who were the‎ Yugoslavs?', this paper compares the share and determinants of identifying as‎ Yugoslavs during socialism with the panorama of primary European identification.‎ Eurobarometer surveys containing data on European identification are‎ utilized to that end. The study takes in consideration social and political contexts ‎that shaped supranational identification in particular Yugoslav socialist‎ republics and EU member states. Our findings show low levels of Europeans‎ and Yugoslavs in both polities. The results also show that nationally specific‎ contexts affect both the prevalence of European identification and its determinants.‎ There are considerable differences in the level of European identification‎ among EU countries, and statistical analyses of the Belgian, French and‎ German cases further showed that different factors shape it. Of all the variables,‎ non-exclusive nationalities have been the strongest predictors of supranational ‎identification in both Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU.‎

IN CROATIAN: U ovom se radu analiziraju geopolitičke orijentacije stranaka i birača na temelju stranačkih programa pet najrelevantnijih stranaka (HDZ, SDP, Možemo!, Most i Domovinski pokret) i anketnog istraživanja provedenog u listopadu i studenom 2021. godine na nacionalnom probabilističkom uzorku (N=1 200). Analizirane stranke, kao i većina građana ne dovode u pitanje Hrvatsku pripadnost Zapadu. No, među strankama postoje razlike prvenstveno u tome kako bi EU trebala izgledati. Birači nekih stranaka to prepoznaju, pa se tako kod birača Mosta i Domovinskog pokreta može govoriti o većoj sklonosti viziji Viktora Orbána o Europi nacija. Birači Možemo! su, pak, orijentirani prema zemljama jezgre EU-a i liberalnim vođama, poput Macrona. --- IN ENGLISH: This paper analyzes geopolitical orientations of Croatian political parties and voters based on party manifestos of the five most relevant parties (HDZ, SDP, We Can!, The Bridge, and the Homeland Movement) and on survey research conducted in October and November 2021 on a national probabilistic sample (N= 1200). The analyzed parties, as well as most of the citizens, do not question Croatian belonging to the West. However, there are differences among parties, chiefly in regards to how the EU should look like. Voters of some parties recognize this, and so a greater tendency towards Viktor Orbán's vision of a Europe of nations can be noticed among voters of The Bridge and the Homeland Movement. Voters of We Can! are, on the other hand, oriented towards core EU countries and liberal leaders, such as Macron.

IN ENGLISH: This article compares the politics of history and positions on the EU of six ruling populist leaders and their parties (Fidesz, PiS, SDS, GERB, ANO and OĽaNO) from Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states. Through the comparison of leaders' biographies and longitudinal analysis of party electoral manifestos an overlap between two types of CEE populism and two types of mnemonic actors in the region is found. Radical right-wing populist parties (Fidesz, PiS and SDS) are more oriented towards national histories, memory wars against ex-communists and critical events for losing or gaining their national sovereignty (mnemonic warriors). Centrist populist parties (GERB, ANO and OĽaNO) largely ignore that kind of narrative and focus on anti-corruption or promises of managing the state more effectively (mnemonic abnegators). Radical right-wing populist parties are also more likely to challenge the Brussels elites by using examples from their national histories. Emphasis on national traumas, anti- communism and their leaders' vision of politics labelled here as combat tasks politics seems to be contributing to their Euroscepticism. Combat tasks politics, i.e. seeing politics as a constant battle against political enemies, underpins the Eurosceptic narratives of Kaczyński, Orbán and Janša-former dissidents who were politically socialised while challenging militarised communist regimes. --- IN CROATIAN: Članak uspoređuje politike povijesti i stavove o EU šest vladajućih populističkih stranaka iz Srednje i Istočne Europe (Fidesz, PiS, SDS, GERB, ANO i OĽaNO). Usporedbom biografija čelnika i longitudinalnom analizom stranačkih izbornih manifesta otkriva se preklapanje između dva tipa populizma i dva tipa mnemoničkih aktera u regiji. Radikalno desne populističke stranke (Fidesz, PiS i SDS) više su orijentirane na nacionalne povijesti, ratove sjećanja protiv bivših komunista i kritične događaje za gubitak ili stjecanje nacionalnog suvereniteta (mnemonički ratnici). Centrističke populističke stranke (GERB, ANO i OĽaNO) uglavnom zanemaruju takve narative i usredotočuju se na borbu protiv korupcije ili obećanja učinkovitijeg upravljanja državom (odbacitelji sjećanja). Radikalno desne populističke stranke također u većoj mjeri oponiraju briselskim elitama koristeći primjere iz svoje nacionalne povijesti. Čini se da naglasak na nacionalnim traumama, antikomunizam i vizija politike njihovih vođa (ovdje označena kao politika borbenih zadataka) određuje njihov euroskepticizam. Politika borbenih zadataka, tj. gledanje na politiku kao stalnu bitku protiv političkih neprijatelja, određuje euroskeptične narative Kaczyńskog, Orbána i Janše - bivših disidenata koji su prošli političku socijalizaciju dok su se suprotstavljali militariziranim komunističkim režimima.