Suchergebnisse

Transitional justice is typically perceived as a product of the third wave of democratisation, which came to the fore after the fall of the Iron Curtain, bringing along with it various mechanisms, from truth commissions and lustration procedures to national trials, leading to the creation of hybrid and international tribunals of global reach.1 Despite its obvious relevance, the aftermath of the Second World War is generally treated as a cursory prehistory in the transitional justice literature. With the exception of the Nuremberg trials, robust research on legal and extralegal ventures which characterised the first postwar decade remains largely disconnected from contemporary transitional justice concerns, and yet it offers a number of valuable lessons.2 Three recent publications which are the subject of this review are therefore a welcome intervention, highlighting the scope and depth, successes and fallacies of efforts to come to terms with the atrocious legacy of the Second World War in its immediate aftermath.

The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was created in London in August of 1992 as an instrument for the negotiations conducted by the United Nations and the European Community, represented by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen. Until the end of the year, they developed a detailed proposal to settle the Bosnian conflict, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The VOPP was presented to the leaders of the warring factions in Geneva during the first session of talks in January of 1993. On the basis of archive material, judicial records, published documents, and memoirs of the participants, this article aims to reconstruct the dramatic negotiation process, which consisted of several rounds. An analysis of the declared Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian positions during the negotiations, as well as the interactions among the delegations and relations within them, reveals that all the parties were had been deeply engaged in double dealing. The Croatian side was seemingly ready to sign the VOPP but was undermining it by launching a conflict in the field at the same time. The Serbian side was escalating as well, the Bosnian Serb leaders were not ready to accept the plan, despite the suggestions they had received from Belgrade. Sarajevo was procrastinating, hoping for a direct US involvement in the crisis following the inauguration of the new Clinton Administration. That administration did undermine the plan, which damaged the credibility of the international negotiators. In such circumstances, the plan had slim chances of succeeding. Although a ceasefire would have shortened the Bosnian war by almost three years and cut human losses by at least half, the main negotiators found a compromise solution to be unacceptable. As they defined and propagated maximalist goals, acceptance of a compromise was both damaging their grip on power and defying their worldview.

SUMMARY:
В статье рассматриваются сложные взаимоотношения истории и юридического суждения на примере историков, выступавших в качестве экспертов на заседаниях международного Трибунала по бывшей Югославии. Автор обращается к дискуссиям, затрагивающим неоднозначную проблематику включения историков в юридическую систему, чтобы выявить специфику их работы для данного конкретного Трибунала. При этом он указывает, что не только сложившаяся традиция влияет на восприятие аргументов историков в юридическом контексте, но и специфика (в том числе политическая) международного Трибунала по Югославии сказывается на свидетельствах исторических экспертов. В частности, сама процедура Трибунала стимулирует радикальное противостояние сторон и, соответственно, антагонистический характер свидетельств экспертов, выступающих на стороне защиты и обвинения. Этот антагонизм усиливается в результате пространственного, временного и качественного ограничения юрисдикции международного Трибунала. Эти ограничения препятствуют интериоризации установленных в нем фактов и суждений населением бывшей Югославии. Напряжение между глобальным взглядом на преступные аспекты недавнего прошлого Югославии и отрицанием этих аспектов на местном уровне достигает своего максимального проявления в противостоящих друг другу исторических нарративах, свидетельствующих о том, что международный судебный орган создать проще, чем устраивающий разные стороны вариант мировой истории.

Članak se bavi genezom, oblicima i perspektivama razvoja digitalne istorije, nove naučne discipline nastale primenom informacionih tehnologija u istraživanju prošlosti. Tokom poslednjih 25 godina, digitalna istorija se razvila u prepoznatljivu, mada ne i jasno definisanu disciplinu, koja transformiše istorijsku nauku. Razmatraju se promene koje digitalizacija donosi, od strukture istorijskih izvora, njihovog prikupljanja i obrade, do analize sadržaja, tehnike istorijskih istraživanja i predstavljanja njihovih rezultata. Dinamičan, ali i nejednak razvoj u ovoj oblasti ilustruje se nizom primera, uz nastojanje da se kritički sagledaju mogućnosti i ograničenja digitalne istorije, ali pre svega da se doprinese njenom ovladavanju.

Archaeological investigations on the site of Niševac (Timacum Maius) have been conducted over a period of eight successive years by the Institute for Balkan Studies in collaboration with the Centre for Tourism, Culture and Sports of Svrljig and the French Bordeaux-based Ausonius Institute. The 2014 campaign came up with nine Roman bricks stamped with inscriptions of the First Cohort of Cretans (Cohors I Cretum) built into the walls of a Roman bath. The inscriptions provide evi­dence for the character, chronology and history of the Roman settlement.

Mass violence—killings and other forms of violence that aim at exterminating large groups of people—is often called a tragedy. The trope can be found in testimonies of victimization, justifications of perpetration, journalistic, political, and academic language as well as in popular parlance. The article examines the divergent usages of the travelling trope of tragedy with particular emphasis on its role in forming justificatory discourse. The issue at stake is that the trope of tragedy does not remain confined to outright justifications such as juridical legitimization, moral vindication, political propaganda etc., but permeates condemnation and critique as well. The rationale of the analysis is that justifications of acts of mass violence that are negotiated in key areas of the cultural canon give a culturally specific, often identificatory, meaning to acts that are, from a critical perspective, mostly either considered senseless or comprehended in economic and sociopolitical terms. Yet it is largely owing to justificatory discourses that acts of mass violence do not remain single, exorbitant events, but have a lasting impact by shaping the linguistic and heuristic framework of their subsequent evaluation. When condemnation and critique adopt these terminologies and frameworks—such as the notion of purity underlying the term 'ethnic cleansing', or the ethnopolitical paradigm informing the concept of genocide—this effects an uneasy mimetic participation in transmitting justifications of mass violence. The trope of tragedy makes it possible to address the issue of mimetic participation by drawing attention to the audience as an indispensable element of the discourse.