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AbstractThe paper studies tax evasion in an evolutionary setting. In addition to standard variables such as the fine individuals may have to pay if found guilty or the probability of being audited, agents' inclination to engage in tax evasion may also be affected by social interactions. Moreover, expected payoffs may include reputational costs or rewards awarded by society after an individual is audited. The paper shows how (i) social norms may play a very important role in defining the long‐run evolution of tax evasion and, consequently, that (ii) policymakers should consider reforms that would increase social awareness and information rather than more (financially and politically) expensive traditional auditing instruments; in addition, (iii) fiscal/auditing policies should be carefully tailored to the particular economic and social setting in place in a country.

The paper studies tax evasion in an evolutionary setting. In addition to standard variables such as the fine individuals may have to pay if found guilty or the probability of being audited, agents' inclination to engage in tax evasion may also be affected by social interactions. Moreover, expected payoffs may include reputational costs or rewards awarded by society after an individual is audited. The paper shows how (i) social norms may play a very important role in defining the long-run evolution of tax evasion and, consequently, that (ii) policymakers should consider reforms that would increase social awareness and information rather than more (financially and politically) expensive traditional auditing instruments; in addition, (iii) fiscal/auditing policies should be carefully tailored to the particular economic and social setting in place in a country. ; Web of Science ; 89 ; 4 ; 405 ; 385

The paper studies duopolistic competition when firms face fixed quality‐dependent costs of production and one of the two firms targets (at least in the long run) welfare maximization. We show that mixed oligopoly is in general socially desirable compared with a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, the nationalization of one of the firms seems to be a more efficient regulatory instrument than the adoption of minimum quality standard or subsidization of the high‐quality provider.

AbstractThis article looks at the influence of minimum quality standards in a two‐region partial‐equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation and trade. Three alternative standard‐setting arrangements are considered: full harmonization, national treatment and mutual recognition. The analysis integrates the choice of a particular standard‐setting alternative by governments into the model. The article provides a set of sufficient conditions for which mutual recognition emerges as one regulatory alternative that always improves welfare in both regions. Mutual recognition, being the default procedure if governments do not reach a unanimous decision, is the only possible equilibrium of the game.

Abstract
We study an oligopolistic market in which consumers located around the perimeter of a Salop circle buy either from firms around this perimeter (providing horizontally differentiated goods) or from a firm located at the centre of the circle (providing a homogeneous good). An entry-pricing game is studied. The market equilibria and social optima indicate various possible market failures, including cases in which the market is served only by perimeter firms whilst central provision would be socially optimal (in this sense, more extreme than the standard Salop excessive product differentiation). Moreover, for some parameters, the standard Salop result might be reversed.