The origins of uncontested adjudication -- Uncontested proceedings on federal dockets in the early Republic -- Probate and domestic relations proceedings -- The nineteenth-century perspective on federal judicial power -- The judicial response to the administrative state -- The progressive response to Lochner : limiting justiciability -- The new adverse-party rule confronts judicial practice -- Uncontested adjudication and the modern case-or-controversy rule -- Evaluating defenses of a requirement of adverse interests -- Uncontested adjudication and standing to sue -- A practical guide to uncontested adjudication -- Toward a constructive constitutional history.
The origins of uncontested adjudication -- Uncontested proceedings on federal dockets in the early Republic -- Probate and domestic relations proceedings -- The nineteenth-century perspective on federal judicial power -- The judicial response to the administrative state -- The progressive response to Lochner : limiting justiciability -- The new adverse-party rule confronts judicial practice -- Uncontested adjudication and the modern case-or-controversy rule -- Evaluating defenses of a requirement of adverse interests -- Uncontested adjudication and standing to sue -- A practical guide to uncontested adjudication -- Toward a constructive constitutional history.
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Government accountability in the nineteenth century -- Bivens and government accountability in the twentieth century -- Human rights and War on Terror litigation -- Evaluating the effectiveness of Bivens litigation -- Evaluating justifications for judicial silence -- Congressional ratification of the bivens action -- Applying Bivens to conduct outside of the United States -- Overcoming qualified immunity -- Common-law solutions to judge-made problems
'Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror' examines the judicial response to human rights claims arising from the Bush Administration's war on terror. Despite widespread agreement that the Administration's program of extraordinary rendition, prolonged detention, and 'enhanced' interrogation was torture by another name, not a single federal appellate court has confirmed an award of damages to the program's victims. The silence of the federal courts leaves victims without redress and the constitutional limits on government action undefined
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Historically-minded scholars and jurists invariably turn to English law and precedents in attempting to recapture the legal world of the framers. Blackstone's famous Commentaries on the Laws of England offers a convenient reference for moderns looking backwards. Yet the generation that framed the Constitution often relied on other sources, including Scottish law and legal institutions. Indeed, the Scottish judicial system provided an important, but overlooked, model for the framing of Article III. Unlike the English system of overlapping jurisdiction, the Scottish judiciary featured a hierarchical, appellate-style judiciary, with one supreme court sitting at the top and an array of inferior courts of original jurisdiction down below. What's more, the Scottish judiciary operated within a constitutional framework -- the so-called Acts of Union that combined England and Scotland into Great Britain in 1707 -- that protected the role of the supreme court from legislative re-modeling. This Article explores the influence of the Scottish judiciary on the language and structure of Article III. Scotland provided a model for a single "supream" court and multiple inferior courts, and it defined inferior courts as subordinate to, and subject to the supervisory oversight of, the sole supreme court. Moreover, the Acts of Union entrenched this hierarchical judicial system by limiting Parliament to "regulations" for the better administration of justice. Practice under this precursor to Article III's Exceptions and Regulations Clause establishes that a supreme court's supervisory authority over inferior courts would survive restrictions on its as-of-right appellate jurisdiction. The Scottish model thus provides important historical support for the scholarly claim that unity, supremacy, and inferiority in Article III operate as textual and structural limits on Congress's jurisdiction-stripping authority.
