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Hutchens (1986, Journal of Labor Economics 4(4), pp. 439-457) argues that deferred compensation schemes impose fixed-costs to firms and, therefore, they employ older workers but prefer to hire younger workers. This paper shows that deferred compensation can be a recruitment barrier even without these fixed-costs, because adjustments of wage-tenure profiles for older new entrants can lead to adverse incentive effects from a fairness perspective. A personnel data set and a linked employeremployee data set reveal that wage-tenure profiles of white-collar workers are indeed adjusted according to entry age but that firms still hire few older workers.

In recent years layoffs have increasingly become the focus of public attention. So far, however , there has been no representative study for Germany of how far and under what conditions layoffs are accepted by the population - in other words by people who are not immediately affected. Principles of ditributive justice, rules of procedural justice, attribution theory, and psychological contract theory form the framework of the analysis.On this basis, hypothenuses are generated, which are tested empirically in a telephone survey conducted among East and West Germany in 2004 (n=3039).Key findings are: - By relinquishing their own bonus payment, the management of a firm can increase the acceptance of layoffs. - Generous compensation payments for those made redundant are preceived to be fairer than wage cuts to avoid layoffs. Wage cuts are not even preferred to layoffswhere no measure are taken to soften the blow of job loss. - Opt-out clauses ("tarifvertragliche Öffnungsklauseln") to undercut collective bargaining agreements are preceived to be fairer than outsourcing especially when women are outsourced. - There is a negative impact of layoffs on workers ́motivation and on the cooperation between co-workers as well as between the workforce and management. - Union members preceive layoffs as less fair and survivors sanctions as more fair than non-union members.

The paper analyzes the determinants of part-time employment, mini- and midi-jobs in Germany. Theory implies that all three employment types could be used as instruments of flexibility to react flexibly to demand shocks. But the empirical analysis shows that only mini- and midi-jobs are signifikant correlated with the demand shock and that they are used as working time flexibility instead of a peripheral workforce. A restraint for working hours reductions are quasi-fixed employment costs so that firms with higher share of qualified employees in their workforce make less use of such a reduction. Overall the empirical findings suggest that working time preferences of the employees are a key factor. Furthermore, mini- and midi-jobs are used more likely and intense if there are no representations of employees interests.

ABSTRACTThe author uses six years of large‐scale panel survey data for Germany to analyse the nexus between commuting distance from the place of residence to the workplace and quantity of sleep. Pooled and individual fixed‐effects regressions indicate that workers with longer commuting distance sleep significantly less per night during the workweek, but not less during the weekend. A one kilometer longer commuting distance is on average correlated with 0.0035 (pooled) and 0.0011 (fixed‐effects) hours less sleep per night during the workweek. As commuting seems to affect sleep quantity, it might negatively affect health and time allocation for other leisure activities.

ABSTRACTThe author analyses the nexus between unfair wage perceptions of workers and the frequency of the negative emotion of anger. For this purpose, German household panel data for the years 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 are used. Angry feelings in the last four weeks have occurred significantly more frequently for workers who perceive their wage as unfair, whereas the own absolute hourly wage is not significantly correlated with the frequency of having felt angry. The results further indicate that workers have felt more often angry if working hours are larger; but the economic significance seems rather small compared to unfair wage perceptions.

AbstractThis paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure of management compensation and on the incentive effects of fixed base salaries and bonus payments. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed with special emphasis on the highest achievable bonuses under a Management‐by‐Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. The main finding of panel negative binomial regressions is that higher achievable bonus payments are correlated with fewer absent working days, which supports the incentive effect of performance pay for managers. The fixed base salary component is, however, not significantly correlated with managers' work absence.

Linked employer–employee data from the German Federal Statistical Office are used to estimate differences in gender wage gaps and gender gaps in holding leadership positions between establishments with male‐ and female‐dominated workforces. Main findings are: (i) the gender wage gap for workers in non‐leadership positions is smaller in establishments with male‐ and female‐dominated workforces than in establishments with a more equal gender composition of the workforce, (ii) the gender wage gap for workers in leadership positions is smallest in male‐ and largest in female‐dominated establishments, and (iii) the gender position gap is smallest in male‐ and largest in female‐dominated establishments.

This empirical research note focuses on the question of whether German works councils are sand or grease in the management of human resources and if the effects differ between three different works council–management relationship types. For this purpose, the author uses survey data from more than 11,000 German firms. The main result is that the effects of works councils on expected HRM (human resource management) problems in German firms are heterogeneous with respect to different aspects of HRM and to differences in works council–management relations. The findings are consistent with rent-protection, rent-sharing and voice functions of works councils.

Unsatisfied employees are likely to quit their current job if they have a better outside option. Worker codetermination and union bargaining might increase employees' utility and make quits unnecessary. The article offers econometric evidence from a large-scale German establishment data set supporting the view that works councils, firm-level and industry-level union bargained collective agreements reduce the number of quits. Moreover, a strong interaction effect between both institutions exists. The results are robust for different subsamples and econometric methods.