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White evangelicals have struggled to understand or enter into modern conversations on race and racism, because their inherited and imagined world has not prepared them for this moment. American Southerners, in particular, carry additional obstacles to such conversations, because their regional identity is woven together with the values and histories of white evangelicalism. In Know Your Place, Justin Phillips examines the three community loyalties (white, southern, and evangelical) that shaped his racial imagination. Phillips examines how each community creates blind spots that overlap with the others, insulating the individual from alternative narratives, making it difficult to conceive of a world different than the dominant white evangelical world of the South. When their world is challenged or rejected outright, it can feel like nothing short of the end of the world. Blending together personal experiences with ethics and pastoral sensibilities, Phillips traces for white, southern evangelicals a line running from the past through the present, to help his beloved communities see how their loyalties--their stories, histories, and beliefs--have harmed their neighbors. In order to truly love, repair, and reconcile brokenness, you first have to know your place

In 2017, Facebook's news feed algorithm began weighting emoji reactions (e.g., love and angry) as five times more valuable than the like button. Such a change is theoretically intriguing because existing research largely suggests that women tend to use emojis more than men on social media. Within the context of political campaigns, prior work has revealed a host of other "gender gaps," from documenting men's and women's differing tolerance for negative campaigns, to examining variations in online political participation and—more broadly—charting gendered imbalances in party demographic support. To date, however, no study has looked to investigate this potential gender emoji gap within the online political environment. This paper explores just such a gap, combining data across three US election cycles (2016–2020), over thirty million individual observations, and thousands of (federal and state) candidates. The data shows that women exhibited a greater preference for emoji reactions than men in response to posts from the 2016 presidential election candidates. Party, and candidate negativity, also appeared to moderate this effect. Likely due to this (moderated) gender gap, Democratic candidates continued to see a much higher proportion of emoji reactions to their posts, than Republicans in 2018, and 2020. In turn, the results offer clear evidence of a persistent emoji gender gap in US political campaigns on Facebook. Such findings strengthen our theoretical understanding of political communication and behavior online, and prompt important questions going forward for future research.

AbstractDo men and women respond differently to negative political communication? Only a limited collection of studies into the effects of negative campaigns have investigated this research question, and the conflicting results produced from such studies have prevented the development of a widely accepted answer. As campaigns transition to new media environments, further problems arise, as any potential gender gap may be magnified on the new political communication battlefield of social media. The present article contributes to this sparsely investigated area through an empirical study of men's and women's reactions on Facebook to US presidential candidate attacks during two general election campaigns (2012 and 2016) and two primaries (2016 Democratic and Republican). Across nearly 400 million reactions and 40 million unique users, women demonstrate lower receptivity to candidate attacks than men. Two potential explanatory factors for the gap are examined, but neither fully captures the magnitude of the differences observed. Conceptualizing the gender gap composition in terms of differential receptivity most accurately explains these findings and potentially resolves the competing explanations for the gap within the existing literature.

AbstractBy placing lawmaking power directly in the hands of citizens, Progressive movement reformers hoped to undercut the ability of political parties to pursue their policy objectives. This article tests the expectations of reformers by examining whether direct democracy alters the ability of partisan legislative majorities and governors to shape the size of the U.S. state public sector. Using a large dataset, I estimate the determinants of state tax effort and compare across jurisdictions the effects of variables that measure the partisan control of government. The results demonstrate that while the partisanship of elected officials is an important predictor of tax effort in pure representative jurisdictions, the relationship between party and policy disappears among initiative states. This analysis not only adds to our understanding of U.S. state budgeting, but also suggests the widespread adoption of direct democracy as a possible explanation for the weak party effects observed in studies of state fiscal policy.

By placing lawmaking power directly in the hands of citizens, Progressive movement reformers hoped to undercut the ability of political parties to pursue their policy objectives. This article tests the expectations of reformers by examining whether direct democracy alters the ability of partisan legislative majorities and governors to shape the size of the U.S. state public sector. Using a large dataset, I estimate the determinants of state tax effort and compare across jurisdictions the effects of variables that measure the partisan control of government. The results demonstrate that while the partisanship of elected officials is an important predictor of tax effort in pure representative jurisdictions, the relationship between party and policy disappears among initiative states. This analysis not only adds to our understanding of U.S. state budgeting, but also suggests the widespread adoption of direct democracy as a possible explanation for the weak party effects observed in studies of state fiscal policy. Adapted from the source document.

"To assess whether American governors can effectively govern, the authors draw on strategic models, interviews with governors, and new datasets to show that that governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but that what they're bargaining over - the budget or policy bills - shapes both how they play the game and how often they win"--Provided by publisher

AbstractThe regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a valuable tool for identifying causal effects with observational data. However, applying the traditional electoral RDD to the study of divided government is challenging. Because assignment to treatment in this case is the result of elections to multiple institutions, there is no obvious single forcing variable. Here, we use simulations in which we apply shocks to real-world election results in order to generate two measures of the likelihood of divided government, both of which can be used for causal analysis. The first captures the electoral distance to divided government and can easily be utilized in conjunction with the standard sharp RDD toolkit. The second is a simulated probability of divided government. This measure does not easily fit into a sharp RDD framework, so we develop a probability restricted design (PRD) which relies upon the underlying logic of an RDD. This design incorporates common regression techniques but limits the sample to those observations for which assignment to treatment approaches "as-if random." To illustrate both of our approaches, we reevaluate the link between divided government and the size of budget deficits.