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Carbone A., Quici L., Pica G. (2019), The age dynamics of vineyards: past trends affecting the future, Wine Economics and Policy, 8(2019), 38:48, (online 20 February 2019), doi.org/10.1016/j.wep.2019.02.004 https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2212977418300371?token=D805B9C2A47809563AB1C91571DE157444F67A25D1B3725931BC07408E352074C33365AA090D0CA68FEDBA2A0A958856 ABSTRACT The paper introduces a modified version of the demographic balance equation commonly used in human demography in the study of populations of permanent crops. The proposed methodology is then applied to analyzing the evolution of the Italian vineyard. In short, the study measures different factors that have had an impact on the extension of the Italian vineyard and on its age structure such as the reduced investments in new plantations; the massive early explant and also the extended life of the vineyards since they are kept in production well beyond the conventional limit of their economic life. Results show that the reduction of the area cultivated with grapes in Italy is due to different reasons, some of which relate to the past while others mirror more recent behaviors of vine growers. The methodology also allows the prediction of tendencies in the future. Three scenarios are built, based on different hypothesis about new investments and explantation rates that account for the wine EU CMO 2013–2030. Projections show, that in the next decades, both the extension of cultivated area and plant age will be deeply influenced by choices that had been made even decades before. Comparing the results obtained under the different hypothesis, helps to assess the range of possible impacts of the new policy framework. In an increasingly global and competitive market, the analysis proposed provides original insights on some future waves in the wine industry both to policy makers and stakeholders. This awareness is especially needed in order to put in place strategies aimed at avoiding supply-demand mismatches in a sector where supply moves slowly while ...

Abstract
We analyse theoretically and empirically the effects on young people's labour market outcomes of two specific labour market institutions and their interaction: employment protection legislation and active labour market policy. The paper examines recent policy reforms in Italy focussing on the impact of the 2012 Fornero reforms of employment protection legislation as well as the initial impact of the EU-wide Youth Guarantee scheme introduced in Italy in March 2014. The paper then examines how these two policy reforms interacted. The analysis first confirms the finding that the Fornero reform increased permanent hires particularly amongst the very youngest workers; it then goes on to find that the YG was indeed successful in increasing the hires of young people, although this operated through a statistically significant increase in female hires on temporary contracts. Third, it finds some evidence of a dampening effect of the YG on EPL reforms as predicted by theory.

We analyse theoretically and empirically the effects on young people's labour market outcomes of two specific labour market institutions and their interaction: employment protection legislation andactive labour market policy. The paper examines recent policy reforms in Italy focusing on the impact of the 2012 Fornero reforms of employment protection legislation as well as the initial impact of the EU-wide Youth Guarantee scheme introduced in Italy in March 2014. The paper then examines how these two policy reforms interacted. The analysis first confirms the finding that the Fornero reform increased permanent hires particularly amongst the very youngest workers; it then goes on to find that the YG was indeed successful in increasing the hires of young people, although this operated through a statistically significant increase in female hires on temporary contracts. Third, it finds some evidence of dampening effect of the YG on EPL reforms as predicted by theory.

Theory predicts that the wage effects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers' and firms' relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers' individual wages in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for firms below 15 employees and left firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Accounting for the endogeneity of the treatment status, we find that high-bargaining power workers (stayers, white collar and workers above 45) are almost left unaffected by the increase in EPL, while low-bargaining power workers (movers, blue collar and young workers) suffer a drop both in the wage level and its growth rate.

In a perfect labor market severance payments can have no real effects as they can be undone by a properly designed labor contract (Lazear 1990). We give empirical content to this proposition by estimating the effects of EPL on entry wages and on the tenure-wage profile in a quasi-experimental setting. We consider a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for firms below 15 employees, leaving firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Estimates which account for the endogeneity of the treatment status due to workers and firms sorting around the 15 employees threshold show no effect of the reform on entry wages and a decrease of the returns to tenure by around 20% in the first year and by 8% over the first two years. We interpret these findings as broadly consistent with Lazear's (1990) prediction that firms make workers prepay the severance cost.

In a perfect labor market severance payments can have no real effects as they can be undone by a properly designed labor contract (Lazear 1990). We give empirical content to this proposition by estimating the effects of EPL on entry wages and on the tenure-wage profile in a quasi-experimental setting. We consider a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for firms below 15 employees, leaving firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Estimates which account for the endogeneity of the treatment status due to workers and firms sorting around the 15 employees threshold show no effect of the reform on entry wages and a decrease of the returns to tenure by around 20% in the first year and by 8% over the first two years. We interpret these findings as broadly consistent with Lazear's (1990) prediction that firms make workers prepay the severance cost.