Suchergebnisse

En 2009, la pétition « Quand la nuit meurt en silence » alertait les pouvoirs publics sur la mort de la fête parisienne. Pourtant, après 2015, son « renouveau » est sur toutes les lèvres. Mais que recouvrent ces discours ? Quels liens unissent renaissance de la fête parisienne et avènement des politiques de la nuit ? L'augmentation de lieux dédiés aux musiques électroniques, l'évolution du format des événements, du rapport à la musique (artistique versus fonctionnel) et la transformation de leur géographie, au-delà des beaux quartiers, expliquent le discours sur la « renaissance » de la fête. Néanmoins, celle-ci se comprend aussi à l'aune du développement et de la diversification des politiques de la nuit, entre cadrages urbains, sécuritaires et culturels. Ces politiques appuient les transformations marchandes et culturelles du secteur, et légitiment la fête tout en asseyant son rôle dans l'ordonnancement de l'espace public et urbain de la capitale.

International audience ; International mega-events are crucial issues for security policies. An increasing number of digital devices designed for the security of urban spaces are tested during these events, from facial recognition to anti-drone systems. This paper shows how the Rugby (masculine) World Cup in 2023, and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024, can contribute to the development of digital security devices in France, by favoring their technical advancement, but also legal and economic transformations enabling their use. ; Les grands événements internationaux sont de plus en plus les lieux de déploiement des politiques et des technologies de sécurité numérique, allant de la reconnaissance faciale aux systèmes antidrones. Myrtille Picaud montre comment la Coupe du monde masculine de rugby de 2023 et les Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024, deux grands événements accueillis en France, sont susceptibles d'accélérer leur développement, à la fois sur la plan technique, mais aussi juridique et économique.

International audience ; International mega-events are crucial issues for security policies. An increasing number of digital devices designed for the security of urban spaces are tested during these events, from facial recognition to anti-drone systems. This paper shows how the Rugby (masculine) World Cup in 2023, and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024, can contribute to the development of digital security devices in France, by favoring their technical advancement, but also legal and economic transformations enabling their use. ; Les grands événements internationaux sont de plus en plus les lieux de déploiement des politiques et des technologies de sécurité numérique, allant de la reconnaissance faciale aux systèmes antidrones. Myrtille Picaud montre comment la Coupe du monde masculine de rugby de 2023 et les Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024, deux grands événements accueillis en France, sont susceptibles d'accélérer leur développement, à la fois sur la plan technique, mais aussi juridique et économique.

International audience ; International mega-events are crucial issues for security policies. An increasing number of digital devices designed for the security of urban spaces are tested during these events, from facial recognition to anti-drone systems. This paper shows how the Rugby (masculine) World Cup in 2023, and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024, can contribute to the development of digital security devices in France, by favoring their technical advancement, but also legal and economic transformations enabling their use. ; Les grands événements internationaux sont de plus en plus les lieux de déploiement des politiques et des technologies de sécurité numérique, allant de la reconnaissance faciale aux systèmes antidrones. Myrtille Picaud montre comment la Coupe du monde masculine de rugby de 2023 et les Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024, deux grands événements accueillis en France, sont susceptibles d'accélérer leur développement, à la fois sur la plan technique, mais aussi juridique et économique.

International audience ; International mega-events are crucial issues for security policies. An increasing number of digital devices designed for the security of urban spaces are tested during these events, from facial recognition to anti-drone systems. This paper shows how the Rugby (masculine) World Cup in 2023, and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024, can contribute to the development of digital security devices in France, by favoring their technical advancement, but also legal and economic transformations enabling their use. ; Les grands événements internationaux sont de plus en plus les lieux de déploiement des politiques et des technologies de sécurité numérique, allant de la reconnaissance faciale aux systèmes antidrones. Myrtille Picaud montre comment la Coupe du monde masculine de rugby de 2023 et les Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024, deux grands événements accueillis en France, sont susceptibles d'accélérer leur développement, à la fois sur la plan technique, mais aussi juridique et économique.

Cet article examine l'indemnisation des forces de l'ordre par les organisateurs d'événements musicaux, en particulier de festivals, en France. La gestion de l'ordre public y est marquée par la prééminence de l'État, ainsi que de la police nationale et la gendarmerie. L'indemnisation des services de ces dernières témoigne du pouvoir discrétionnaire du préfet, représentant de l'État, dans l'établissement (ou non) de la facturation, laquelle fait l'objet de fortes résistances de la part des organisateurs de festivals. En variant les dispositifs de sécurité ainsi que les montants de l'indemnisation, les préfets influent sur les relations entre forces de l'ordre et administrés. Dans le cas de l'indemnisation des forces de l'ordre par les organisateurs d'événements musicaux, sur qui s'exerce ce pouvoir discrétionnaire, et avec quels effets ? Et que révèle la mise en oeuvre de « droits », mais aussi de « passe-droits » par l'autorité préfectorale au sujet des relations entre État, police et société ? Une enquête qualitative, combinant entretiens, observations et sources documentaires variées, permet de répondre à ces questions. L'examen du recours différencié à l'indemnisation des forces de l'ordre par les préfets témoigne de la centralité des caractéristiques des territoires concernés, ainsi que des représentations préfectorales des événements musicaux et de leurs publics, prises en compte dans la définition du dispositif de sûreté. De surcroît, la définition des territoires professionnels et du monopole de l'État dans l'exercice de la violence légitime freine la concertation entre organisateurs et préfets sur la mise en oeuvre des dispositifs de sûreté.

International audience ; This paper examines the way military and civilian police bill their services to musical event organisers, particularly festivals, in France. In this country, the State holds a preeminent position in the managing of public order, with military and civilian police. The compensation of their services testifies to the discretionary power of the prefect, who represents the State, in establishing the invoice (or avoiding to). By varying the number of police forces and the amount of the compensation, prefects influence the relationship between law enforcement and the people they serve. This billing is strongly opposed by festival organisers. In the case of the billing of police services during music events, on who is this discretionary power used and with what effects? And what does the strict implementation of the billing, or on the contrary, the allocation of special favours by the prefects reveal of the relationships between the State, the police and society? These questions are answered by drawing on qualitative material, combining interviews, ethnographic data and diverse documentary sources. The analysis of the differential use of the billing sheds light on the role that the territories' characteristics, as well as the prefectural representations of musical events and their audiences play in the definition of the security measures. In addition, the way professional territories are defined and the State's monopoly in the exercise of legitimate violence hinders dialogue between organizers and prefects on the implementation of security measures. ; Cet article examine l'indemnisation des forces de l'ordre par les organisateurs d'événements musicaux, en particulier de festivals, en France. La gestion de l'ordre public y est marquée par la prééminence de l'État, ainsi que de la police nationale et la gendarmerie. L'indemnisation des services de ces dernières témoigne du pouvoir discrétionnaire du préfet, représentant de l'État, dans l'établissement (ou non) de la facturation, laquelle fait ...

Initially developed by tech firms at the end of the 2000s, "smart city" projects are now being carried out by more diversified firms in many cities. There is a large body of literature defining the term "smart city" and attempting to identify what urban model(s) it represents. Recent work has also focused on how digital devices for urban spaces are really implemented, pointing to localized variations. I suggest that the expansion of "smart city" projects is best understood as the construction of a market. I thus focus on its investment by eight major French firms. First, I study the differentiation of their "smart city" sociotechnical devices, along with their main sector of activity: construction, energy, tech, aeronautics and defense. The diversity in these firms' approaches is as much linked to their core business sector as it is to their internal digital transformation policies, as well as to their research and development policies. Next, I examine how these digital devices for urban spaces are thought of by company representatives, who portray them as a form of performance-based management at the local level, thus transforming the place of private firms in urban government. This performance-based management is operationalized in three ways in the firms' "smart cities" offer: the pooling of local authorities' services in a bid to rationalize the way they function; discourses on the production of new services for "citizens" to further greater transparency in public action; and economic and legal "innovations" for urban management. These three dimensions are also the conditions that make it possible to build a "smart city" market in France. The latter is therefore part of the more general economic and political changes that are currently affecting urban governments. ; Initialement développés par des entreprises des NTIC à la fin des années 2000, des projets de "smart city" se retrouvent aujourd'hui portés par des entreprises plus diversifiées dans de nombreuses collectivités. Une importante littérature s'attache à définir le terme "smart city" et à en identifier le ou les modèles. Des travaux récents se sont penchés sur la mise en œuvre de dispositifs numériques pour l'espace urbain, témoignant des variations localisées de celle-ci. Je propose ici d'envisager l'expansion des projets de "smart cities" sous l'angle de la construction d'un marché, en se focalisant sur son investissement par huit grands groupes français. J'étudie d'abord la différenciation de l'offre "smart city" de ces groupes, actifs dans les domaines de la construction, de l'énergie, des NTIC, ou encore de l'aéronautique et de la défense. La diversité d'approche de ces entreprises est aussi bien liée au secteur d'activité premier du groupe, qu'à leurs politiques de transformation numérique en interne, ainsi que de recherche et développement. Ensuite, j'examine comment ces dispositifs numériques pour l'espace urbain sont pensés par les représentants d'entreprises comme une forme de gouvernement par la performance à l'échelle des collectivités territoriales, qui reconfigure la place des entreprises dans la gestion urbaine. Ce gouvernement par la performance s'opérationnalise de trois façons dans l'offre privée de "smart cities" : la mutualisation des services des collectivités dans une logique de rationalisation de leur fonctionnement ; des discours sur la production de nouveaux services à destination des "citoyens" dans une transparence accrue de l'action publique ; des "innovations" économiques et juridiques pour la gestion urbaine. Ces trois dimensions sont aussi des conditions de possibilité de construction du marché des "smart cities" en France. Ce dernier s'inscrit donc dans les mutations économiques et politiques plus générales qui affectent aujourd'hui les gouvernements urbains.

Initially developed by tech firms at the end of the 2000s, "smart city" projects are now being carried out by more diversified firms in many cities. There is a large body of literature defining the term "smart city" and attempting to identify what urban model(s) it represents. Recent work has also focused on how digital devices for urban spaces are really implemented, pointing to localized variations. I suggest that the expansion of "smart city" projects is best understood as the construction of a market. I thus focus on its investment by eight major French firms. First, I study the differentiation of their "smart city" sociotechnical devices, along with their main sector of activity: construction, energy, tech, aeronautics and defense. The diversity in these firms' approaches is as much linked to their core business sector as it is to their internal digital transformation policies, as well as to their research and development policies. Next, I examine how these digital devices for urban spaces are thought of by company representatives, who portray them as a form of performance-based management at the local level, thus transforming the place of private firms in urban government. This performance-based management is operationalized in three ways in the firms' "smart cities" offer: the pooling of local authorities' services in a bid to rationalize the way they function; discourses on the production of new services for "citizens" to further greater transparency in public action; and economic and legal "innovations" for urban management. These three dimensions are also the conditions that make it possible to build a "smart city" market in France. The latter is therefore part of the more general economic and political changes that are currently affecting urban governments. ; Initialement développés par des entreprises des NTIC à la fin des années 2000, des projets de "smart city" se retrouvent aujourd'hui portés par des entreprises plus diversifiées dans de nombreuses collectivités. Une importante littérature ...

Initially developed by tech firms at the end of the 2000s, "smart city" projects are now being carried out by more diversified firms in many cities. There is a large body of literature defining the term "smart city" and attempting to identify what urban model(s) it represents. Recent work has also focused on how digital devices for urban spaces are really implemented, pointing to localized variations. I suggest that the expansion of "smart city" projects is best understood as the construction of a market. I thus focus on its investment by eight major French firms. First, I study the differentiation of their "smart city" sociotechnical devices, along with their main sector of activity: construction, energy, tech, aeronautics and defense. The diversity in these firms' approaches is as much linked to their core business sector as it is to their internal digital transformation policies, as well as to their research and development policies. Next, I examine how these digital devices for urban spaces are thought of by company representatives, who portray them as a form of performance-based management at the local level, thus transforming the place of private firms in urban government. This performance-based management is operationalized in three ways in the firms' "smart cities" offer: the pooling of local authorities' services in a bid to rationalize the way they function; discourses on the production of new services for "citizens" to further greater transparency in public action; and economic and legal "innovations" for urban management. These three dimensions are also the conditions that make it possible to build a "smart city" market in France. The latter is therefore part of the more general economic and political changes that are currently affecting urban governments. ; Initialement développés par des entreprises des NTIC à la fin des années 2000, des projets de "smart city" se retrouvent aujourd'hui portés par des entreprises plus diversifiées dans de nombreuses collectivités. Une importante littérature ...

International audience ; This paper examines the way military and civilian police bill their services to musical event organisers, particularly festivals, in France. In this country, the State holds a preeminent position in the managing of public order, with military and civilian police. The compensation of their services testifies to the discretionary power of the prefect, who represents the State, in establishing the invoice (or avoiding to). By varying the number of police forces and the amount of the compensation, prefects influence the relationship between law enforcement and the people they serve. This billing is strongly opposed by festival organisers. In the case of the billing of police services during music events, on who is this discretionary power used and with what effects? And what does the strict implementation of the billing, or on the contrary, the allocation of special favours by the prefects reveal of the relationships between the State, the police and society? These questions are answered by drawing on qualitative material, combining interviews, ethnographic data and diverse documentary sources. The analysis of the differential use of the billing sheds light on the role that the territories' characteristics, as well as the prefectural representations of musical events and their audiences play in the definition of the security measures. In addition, the way professional territories are defined and the State's monopoly in the exercise of legitimate violence hinders dialogue between organizers and prefects on the implementation of security measures. ; Cet article examine l'indemnisation des forces de l'ordre par les organisateurs d'événements musicaux, en particulier de festivals, en France. La gestion de l'ordre public y est marquée par la prééminence de l'État, ainsi que de la police nationale et la gendarmerie. L'indemnisation des services de ces dernières témoigne du pouvoir discrétionnaire du préfet, représentant de l'État, dans l'établissement (ou non) de la facturation, laquelle fait ...

Initially developed by tech firms at the end of the 2000s, "smart city" projects are now being carried out by more diversified firms in many cities. There is a large body of literature defining the term "smart city" and attempting to identify what urban model(s) it represents. Recent work has also focused on how digital devices for urban spaces are really implemented, pointing to localized variations. I suggest that the expansion of "smart city" projects is best understood as the construction of a market. I thus focus on its investment by eight major French firms. First, I study the differentiation of their "smart city" sociotechnical devices, along with their main sector of activity: construction, energy, tech, aeronautics and defense. The diversity in these firms' approaches is as much linked to their core business sector as it is to their internal digital transformation policies, as well as to their research and development policies. Next, I examine how these digital devices for urban spaces are thought of by company representatives, who portray them as a form of performance-based management at the local level, thus transforming the place of private firms in urban government. This performance-based management is operationalized in three ways in the firms' "smart cities" offer: the pooling of local authorities' services in a bid to rationalize the way they function; discourses on the production of new services for "citizens" to further greater transparency in public action; and economic and legal "innovations" for urban management. These three dimensions are also the conditions that make it possible to build a "smart city" market in France. The latter is therefore part of the more general economic and political changes that are currently affecting urban governments. ; Initialement développés par des entreprises des NTIC à la fin des années 2000, des projets de "smart city" se retrouvent aujourd'hui portés par des entreprises plus diversifiées dans de nombreuses collectivités. Une importante littérature ...