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Since the end of the Cold War, the belief that the international community has a responsibility to support negotiated solutions to civil wars has exercised an enduring influence on research and policy making. However, this belief has relatively recent roots. This article looks at how changing international norms have influenced the way academic researchers view civil wars and expect them to end. The lack of interest in solving internal conflicts during the Cold War was matched among academics by a focus on other security issues and a belief that most civil wars could not be negotiated, although a minority of scholars disagreed. After the Cold War, a new international regime for solving civil wars has emerged, with the active support of a large share of the academic community. However, scholars have also criticised the way Western priorities have shaped liberal peace-making attempts and reflected on the assumptions underlying international conflict resolution. Paradoxically, while the academic community has become increasingly optimistic, the post-Cold War approach has fallen into crisis, due to geopolitical transformations and a change in the nature of contemporary insurgencies. At the end of this article, I suggest new avenues for research in the changing international order.

This paper is in closed access until 01 Sept 2020. ; The literature on peacebuilding has increasingly emphasized the importance of the local level – a trend that has been called the local turn. For some researchers, the local turn can improve international peacebuilding interventions, while for others it is an agenda to promote an emancipatory and legitimate peace. There is however mixed evidence backing the argument that addressing local level issues in peacebuilding can make a substantial difference. The local turn reposes on assumptions that appear particularly problematic in an environment characterised by the lack of an elite-level pact, such as a conflict terminated in a military victory. Looking at the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which terminated in 2011 with the defeat of former president Laurent Gbagbo, this paper highlights how the lack of elite level reconciliation compromises the effectiveness of actions aiming to promote local 'social cohesion'. It also shows how the discourse and practices of the local turn can be appropriated by semi-authoritarian post-conflict governments in order to depoliticize the peacebuilding process. It concludes that the popularity of the 'local turn' among peacebuilders might be due more to the opportunity that it offers to eschew delicate national-level political issues, than to its supposed emancipatory potential.

This paper is closed access until 12 January 2021. ; Of all African regional organizations, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is the one that has most explicitly followed the model of the European Union (EU), emulating key EU institutions and practices. WAEMU's mimicry of the EU is puzzling, considering the economic, political and geographical differences between the European and the West African regional context. This article argues that, in order to understand WAEMU's trajectory, it is necessary to look at two interrelated factors: on the one hand, WAEMU's history of colonial legacies and post-colonial dependence; on the other, WAEMU's drive to mimic institutions seen as embodying standards of modernity and legitimacy. WAEMU's isomorphism has been an outcome of external pressures, but also a response to uncertainty and a result of professionalization. Institutional isomorphism has had a mixed impact on the effectiveness of the organization, helping it to sustain its legitimacy but also stifling endogenous development.

This paper has been made available with kind permission of the publisher. ; Social Cohesion and the paradoxes of building peace from below in Côte d'Ivoire After 2011, the government of Côte d'Ivoire and the international community engaged in actions aimed at supporting peace at the local and community level. These actions appear however problematic in a political environment characterised by the lack of elite-level reconciliation. This article, based on research carried out in Abidjan and in the West of the country, reflects critically on the role that local peacebuilding programmes play within the model of post-conflict reconstruction put forward by the Ouattara government and challenges the assumption that the "local" might constitute a sphere separate from the national level. It highlights how local actors entertain important relationships – material but also symbolic – with national elites.

This paper is closed access until 18 June 2020. ; In 2011, Cote d'Ivoire emerged from a protracted politico-military crisis not through peace negotiations, but thanks to the military defeat of former president Laurent Gbagbo and his associates. Relatively little has been written about the restoration of peace after a decisive military victory and about experiences of post-conflict reconstructions where the international community does not play a leading role. Quantitative scholarship has contended that victory makes restoring peace relatively uncomplicated. In contrast, strategic scholarship has insisted that winning the war does not automatically mean 'winning the peace'. Victors, especially former insurgents, have to maintain cohesion within the winning coalition and to co-opt or repress residual resistance from the vanquished if they want to consolidate their rule. Moreover, former insurgents often struggle to implement their vision of post-conflict governance. In Cote d'Ivoire, the winning coalition showed risks of implosion after 2011, but has been up to now able to contain them. The Ouattara administration has been able to develop its own vision of post conflict reconstruction, drawing from Ivorian political tradition and the president's distinctive personality. However, this political project faces future obstacles, particularly in view of Ouattara's probable retirement from politics in 2020.

Après 2011, le gouvernement de la Côte d'Ivoire et la communauté internationale se sont engagés dans des actions de soutien à la paix au niveau local. Ces actions apparaissent cependant problématiques dans un contexte marqué par l'absence de réconciliation entre les élites nationales. Cet article, basé sur des recherches conduites à Abidjan et dans l'Ouest du pays, offre une réflexion critique sur la place des programmes de soutien à la paix au niveau local dans le modèle de reconstruction post-conflit du gouvernement Ouattara et interroge le grand principe qui les étaye : l'argument selon lequel le « local » constitue une sphère distincte du niveau national, alors même que les acteurs locaux entretiennent des relations importantes – tant matérielles que symboliques – avec les élites nationales.

This is an Open Access Article. It is published by GIGA under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 No Derivative Works Licence (CC BY-ND). Full details of this licence are available at: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ ; © 2016. GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies. All Rights Reserved.The 2015 presidential election in Côte d'Ivoire was seen as an important test for the country given the 2010 post-election crisis. Although the 2015 polls were peaceful, they were affected by problems not new to Côte d'Ivoire: lack of competition due to non-participation of major political actors, low voter turnout, mistrust in electoral institutions. The unpreparedness of the Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI) was also problematic, especially with respect to the revision of the voter list. Due to the boycott of partisans of former president Laurent Gbagbo and because of the support of the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP), President Alassane Ouattara's reelection was essentially a given from the start. With the ruling coalition firmly in control, Côte d'Ivoire appears stable. However, the country's democratic deficit might lead to renewed violence once the RHDP has to pick Ouattara's successor.