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On the Ratchet Effect with Product Market Competition
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Forthcoming
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Efficient Vertical Merger Waves with Heterogenous Suppliers
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Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 127, Heft 606, S. 2504-2524
ISSN: 1468-0297
Merchant guilds, taxation and social capital
In: European economic review: EER, Band 83, S. 90-110
ISSN: 1873-572X
Vertical Separation with Private Contracts
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 122, Heft 559, S. 173-207
ISSN: 1468-0297
Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers' Collusion
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Colluding through suppliers
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 492-513
ISSN: 1756-2171
This article investigates downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.
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Merging Laggards
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Vertical Control Change and Platform Organization under Network Externalities
In: TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2022-017
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Optimal pricing, private information and search for an outside offer
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 52, Heft 4, S. 758-777
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractA buyer can either buy a good at a local monopolist or search for it in the market. The more intensely the buyer searches, the more likely he will find the good in the market; if his search fails, he can still buy it from the local monopolist. We show that a buyer with a higher willingness to pay searches (weakly) more intensely. This skews the distribution of types buying at the local monopolist toward lower valuations and exerts pressure on the local monopolist to reduce his price. Despite this effect, offering the monopoly price remains weakly optimal in equilibrium.
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Working paper