This title was first published in 2002. This two volume set collects in a conveniently accessible form the most influential articles by leading authorities in the study of China. It provides an international reference work, combined with an authoritative introduction by the editor.
"Has China become just another capitalist country in a socialist cloak? Will the Chinese Communist Party's rule survive the next ten years of modernization and globalization? Frank Pieke investigates these conundrums in this fascinating account of how government officials are trained for placement in the Chinese Communist Party. Through in-depth interviews with staff members and aspiring trainees, he shows that while the Chinese Communist Party has undergone a radical transformation since the revolutionary years under Mao, it is still incumbent upon cadres, who are selected through a highly rigorous process, to be ideologically and politically committed to the party. It is the lessons learnt through their teachers that shape the political and economic decisions they will make in power. The book offers unique insights into the structure and the ideological culture of the Chinese government, and how it has reinvented itself over the last three decades as a neo-socialist state"--Provided by publisher
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Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Der Autor präsentiert in seiner Studie die Ergebnisse zahlreicher Interviews, die er im Rahmen einer Feldforschung zur Dynamik der jungen chinesischen Marktwirtschaft aus der Perspektive der einfachen Bürger Pekings im Frühsommer 1989 im Umfeld des Gorbatschow-Besuches geführt. Unter dem Eindruck der anhaltenden Studentendemonstrationen auf dem Tiananmen konnten sich die befragten Pekinger kaum zum tiefen Widerspruch zwischen Theorie und Praxis (des chinesischen Sozialismus bzw. der Reformen) und der daraus resultierenden moralischen Krise der chinesischen Gesellschaft äußern, ohne dabei auf die Forderungen und das Schicksal der Demonstranten einzugehen. Neben den ursprünglich untersuchten Problemen des Wandels unter den Reformen - dem "Gewöhnlichen" in der sozialen Struktur der städtischen Gesellschaft in China - wird daher in einem zweiten inhaltlichen Teil auch auf das "Außergewöhnliche" der Protestbewegung eingegangen, die die sozialen Disparitäten als Anlaß zur politischen Aktion nimmt und die zunehmende Frustration der Bürger in konkreten Forderungen artikuliert. Die Analyse von Haltung und Verhalten "normaler" Bewohner Pekings unter den beiden unterschiedlichen Bedingungen der Partizipation am politischen Geschehen im Lande zeigt deutlich auf, wie weit nach zehn Jahren der Reform das ideologische Fundament der chinesischen Führung durch Materialismus und selbstsüchtiges Verhalten ihrer Kader erodiert ist. (DGA-Ktz)
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently in the throes of redefining itself as not just China's ruling party, but also as the dominant political force of global China. Following the path of Chinese globalisation, this project overlaps with – but is different from – China's much maligned strategy of influencing and interfering in the society and politics of other countries. The principal aim of the CCP's global extension is not to meddle in the affairs of other countries, but tying Chinese people, goods, money, business, and institutions that have ventured abroad back into the strategy and domestic system of China and the CCP. The article shows that China's emerging superpower is informed both by China's unique pattern of globalisation and the CCP's own understanding of the nature, aims, and modalities of its rule, which can only partially be compared to those of earlier superpowers. (JCCA / GIGA)
AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party is confronted with a growing gap that separates the rhetoric about socialism and party rule from the individualism and materialism caused by capitalism and opening up to the outside world. In response, the Party has developed strategies that draw on an understanding of the dedication to the Party that is specifically religious, yet does not require belief, conviction, or faith in a doctrine. These strategies revolve around the Leninist concept of 'party spirit', which, paradoxically, has been turned into a commodity that can be produced, supplied, and consumed. Drawing on insights from the anthropology of pilgrimage, tourism, and religion, this article discusses these strategies in the context of party cadre education and so‐called 'red tourism'. The article concludes that the Party is shaping its evolution from an infallible bearer of ideological dogma to a sacred object of worship as part of a new 'communist civil religion'.
If the twenty-first century will be a Chinese one, what will its anthropology bring? The new realities of life in China have fundamentally reshaped the anthropology of modern China. With the disappearance of the planned economy, a whole range of structures, networks, organizations, and practices has emerged at the interface of state and society. Moreover, Chinese society is shaped by globalization, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism to a degree never seen before. What happens under the impact of these changes is new and unique for the People's Republic of China, both recognizably Chinese and generically modern. Anthropological research on these changes will impact the discipline of anthropology as a whole, just as China's rise will change the world order.
AbstractStrengthening the ideological and professional training of cadres is a cornerstone of the socialist modernization of the Chinese party-state. On the basis of long-term field research in Party schools, this article shows that this effort entails much more than the upgrading of existing institutions. The CCP has embarked on a simultaneous marketization, centralization and globalization that has integrated cadre training into the larger market for higher education and training. This new approach privileges China's richer areas. Poorer places such as Yunnan province struggle to meet the ever higher demands of the centre from their local budgets. The article concludes that the gap between rich and poor areas in China is about more than wealth alone. Poorer areas cannot take part in China's new, glossy socialism, and will be not only economically but also politically and administratively left behind.