Suchergebnisse

Trends in international human rights law have challenged States globally to rethink involuntary mental health interventions from a non-discrimination perspective. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in particular prohibits laws that discriminate on the basis of disability. However, a key criterion for compulsory mental health treatment under typical mental health legislation is a psychiatric diagnosis (in conjunction with risk of harm and other criteria). Hence, for people with mental health disabilities, rights to liberty and consent in healthcare are held to a different standard compared to other citizens. A prominent law reform option being explored by some governments and commentators for achieving non-discrimination is to replace the diagnostic criterion for triggering involuntary intervention with an assessment of mental capacity. After all, every citizen is subject to restrictions on autonomy where they are deemed to lack mental capacity, such as where concussion necessitates emergency service. However, the use of mental capacity "testing" is seen by diverse commentators as wanting in key respects. A prominent criticism comes from the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which considers mental capacity assessments a form of disability-based discrimination. This article queries the call to replace the diagnostic criterion in mental health law with an assessment of mental capacity in the light of jurisprudence on equality and non-discrimination in international human rights law. Instead, we examine the doctrine of necessity as an area of law, which might help identify specific thresholds for overriding autonomy in emergency circumstances that can be codified in a non-discriminatory way. We also consider the need for deliberative law reform processes to identify such measures, and we suggest interim, short-term measures for creating a "supported decision-making regime" in the mental health context. The article focuses in particular on the Australian context of mental health law reform, though the analysis can be generalised to international trends in mental health law.

Socio-technical systems such as video conferencing, digital care work platforms, and electronic health records are taking an increasing role in mental health-related law, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic. Reflecting on these experiments can help navigate an increasingly digital future for mental health services and the laws that govern them. This chapter looks to England and Wales, where an explicit policy aim to 'digitise the Mental Health Act' has seen three key developments: (1) remote medical assessments of persons facing involuntary intervention, (2) the remote operation of tribunals that authorise involuntary interventions, and (3) and the rise of digital platforms for Mental Health Act assessment setup. The chapter argues that although courts appear responsive to the issues posed by the first two developments, there appear to be less obvious oversight of digital platforms used to setup mental health crisis work. The chapter considers legal issues raised by 'digitising mental health legislation' and draws in a political economy perspective to reflect on the role of the private sector in emerging configurations of digitised health and social services. It recommends attention to safeguards in both the procurement and commissioning of private sector practices concerning mental health crisis work and in the proliferation of digital platforms in health and social care services.

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) has generated new ideas and standards in healthcare and disability law and policy. In the mental health context, the CRPD directs governments to ensure people with mental impairments are treated equally before the law, including ensuring people have access to the resources necessary to enjoy their rights. But what this means in practice remains unclear. In addition, current domestic laws that authorise involuntary psychiatric interventions stand at cross-purposes with the CRPD, which requires respect for the 'will, preference and rights' of persons with disabilities 'on an equal basis with others'. This book explores the implications of the CRPD for law, policy and practice that responds to the complex issues raised by mental health impairment and disability. It argues that the support framework of the CRPD holds potential to address persistent shortcomings in mental health law and policy

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) has generated new ideas and standards in healthcare and disability law and policy. In the mental health context, the CRPD directs governments to ensure people with mental impairments are treated equally before the law, including ensuring people have access to the resources necessary to enjoy their rights. But what this means in practice remains unclear. In addition, current domestic laws that authorise involuntary psychiatric interventions stand at cross-purposes with the CRPD, which requires respect for the 'will, preference and rights' of persons with disabilities 'on an equal basis with others'. This book explores the implications of the CRPD for law, policy and practice that responds to the complex issues raised by mental health impairment and disability. It argues that the support framework of the CRPD holds potential to address persistent shortcomings in mental health law and policy

This review will consider recent United Nations activity on article 19 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) concerning the right to live independently and be included in the community. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted its 'General Comment' No. 5 in August 2017, which offers guidance to governments on art 19 implementation. This review critically examines content relevant to mental health and capacity law, policy and practice. It considers the strengths and potential limitations of the General Comment with reference to key issues in the field. Gaps include commentary on the rising marketisation of disability services globally and a focus on low and middle-income countries. Yet overall, the General Comment offers useful guidance on implementing this unusual right, including concepts that may help resolve controversies about the role of coercion in mental health and capacity law.