Constitutional neutrality among economic policies
In: Public choice, Band 152, Heft 3-4, S. 455-459
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 152, Heft 3-4, S. 455-459
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 152, Heft 3, S. 455-460
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 261-289
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractPincione argues that procedural constitutional guarantees of market freedoms best protect individuals from domination. If he is right, Philip Pettit's claim that various forms of state interference with private markets are needed to forestall domination will prove to be unwarranted. Pincione further contends that market freedoms are best protected by procedural rules for political decision-making, as opposed to constitutional guarantees of private property and other substantive rules.Central to his position are claims that the dispersion of economic power precludes domination, and that free entry into markets furthers such dispersion. As against the idea that the state is in a better position to disperse economic power, Pincione argues that the constitutional provisions needed to implement that idea are contestable, and to that extent require interpretive powers that themselves involve domination. Only a constitution that, as a side effect of its procedures for political decision making, generates full private property rights holds out hope of shielding citizens from domination. This is so, because a plurality of suppliers of goods and services is a structural feature of the free market, in a sense of "structural" that matters for measurements of domination based on fairly uncontroversial claims about persons and resources.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 52-66
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
This essay questions the self-sufficiency of abstract, non-consequentialist, principles as a defence of a libertarian regime. The argument focuses on the difficulties involved in attempts to defend the priority of negative rights if an attractive conception of freedom and an agent-relative view about our reasons to respect rights are to be upheld. The paper closes by suggesting how libertarianism could gain support from various, and perhaps mutually irreducible and even conflicting, considerations in a wide consequentialist system.
In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is instrumentally and epistemically rational. This book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets, offering a comprehensive critique of theories of deliberative democracy.
In: The journal of ethics 4,1/2