The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements
In: Journal of public economics, Band 103, S. 29-43
ISSN: 1879-2316
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In: Journal of public economics, Band 103, S. 29-43
ISSN: 1879-2316
In: Finus , M & Pintassilgo , P 2013 , ' The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements ' , Journal of Public Economics , vol. 103 , pp. 29-43 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.003
Transnational externalities (e.g. transboundary pollution, trade, contagious diseases and terror¬ism) warrant coordination and cooperation between governments, but this proves often difficult. One reason for meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems, encouraging free-riding. Another reason one might suspect is uncertainty, surrounding most environmental problems, and in particular climate change. This provides often an excuse for remaining inactive. Paradoxically, some recent papers have concluded just the opposite: the "veil of uncertainty" can be conducive to the success of international environmental co¬operation. In this paper, we explain why and under which conditions this can be true. However, we argue that those conditions are rather the exception than the rule. Most important, we suggest a mech¬anism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooper¬ation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect. Our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities.
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In: FEEM Working Paper No. 79.2010
SSRN
Working paper
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 73, Heft 4, S. 1165-1196
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4589
SSRN
Working paper
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 62, Heft 4, S. 689-709
ISSN: 1573-1502
Game theory studies the strategic interactions between and among decision makers, players, through mathematical models called games. This paper presents an overview on the evolution of the application of game theory to fisheries economics. The first applications emerged in the late 1970s, focussing upon internationally shared fish stocks. This occurred in the context of the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. During the 1980s and early 1990s the application of game theory to fisheries focused mainly on transboundary fish stocks. Thereafter, the applications to straddling fish stocks developed significantly, through the use of coalition games. This was a consequence of the mismanagement of these stocks, and the management regime brought forth in response by the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The application of game theory to the management of national/regional fisheries is a new research frontier, as it is still much underexplored, when compared to international fisheries. This paper also summarizes the main research developments of a set of nine papers selected for this special issue on Game Theory and Fisheries. ; Peer reviewed
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The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values (harvesting profits) and non-consumptive values of the fish stock per se. The results show that accounting for non-consumptive values helps conserve the fish stock in that equilibrium fishing efforts are smaller and fish stock larger than without non-consumptive values under all possible coalition scenarios (full, partial and no cooperation). However, considering non-consumptive values does not affect the outcome of the game in terms of the prospects for cooperation: even with substantial non-consumptive benefits, the outcome is full non-cooperation. Hence, the trap of non-cooperation in international fisheries management cannot be overcome simply by explicitly accounting for non-consumptive values within IFAs. It is suggested that strengthening the role of IFAs and limiting the ability of non-member countries to free-ride be further investigated as measures fostering cooperation. ; Peer reviewed
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 377-402
ISSN: 1573-1502
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. A comprehensive analysis of the economic and biological fundamentals that influence the success of coalition formation is provided. The results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher would be the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.
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In: Marine policy, Band 98, S. 176-186
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Marine policy: the international journal of ocean affairs
ISSN: 0308-597X