Suchergebnisse

The territorial state which dominated the industrial era is increasingly becoming obsolete, and is gradually being replaced by new forms of global governance (Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996, 1998; Rosecrance, 1999). Moreover, the pressure from global markets have blurred the ideological differences among political parties not only among developed countries, but particularly in the developing world: to stay competitive in the global marketplace governments of the left and the right alike have become fanatical advocates of the neo-liberal cause (see, among others, Edwards (1995); Williamson (1990); Garrett (2000)). The conclusion is that when dealing with global market forces politics does not matter any more, if it ever did. On the opposing side of the debate we find claims that the incentives and constraints created by global economic forces lead to policy divergence rather than convergence (Tiebout, 1956; Vogel, 1996; Berger and Dore, 1996; Kahler, 1998; Kahler and Lake, 2003). The patterns of divergence are systematic: they depend as much on the preferences of the actors as they react to the constraints and opportunities created by global forces (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997). Scholars ascribing to this tradition argue that governments have ample room to maneuver, and make policy choices that are a clear reflection of their types (Swank, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Swank and Steinmo, 2002). The heated debate on the consequences of globalization, present in politics, journalism and academia, is far from settled. Changes in global production spearheaded by multinational corporations are a central characteristic of the current era of globalization (Bordo et al., 1999).

Two prominent features in current world affairs are the unprecedented level of global economic integration and the growing incidence of intrastate violence. We develop and test a novel argument linking global integration through foreign investment to intrastate armed conflict. The presence of multinational corporations in developing countries can cause market concentration, resulting in high rents. Disputes between governments and would-be challengers over the appropriation of these rents are likely to turn violent, increasing the incidence of armed conflict. State capacity mitigates this positive association between foreign investment and intrastate war. Strong states have the capacity to deter rebellions, address citizens' demands through institutionalized mechanisms, and credibly commit to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Using data from developing countries for over four decades and addressing potential endogeneity and selection biases, we find strong support for our hypotheses. Our findings have important implications for understanding the link between economic interdependence and conflict.

The wage and employment effects of offshoring roil politics in the United States and around the world. Firms that offshore either outsource their activities to unaffiliated businesses, or internalize production by establishing subsidiaries from which they import intrafirm. We argue that the political environment in trade partner countries influences U.S. offshoring patterns in ways that have been ignored in the extant literature. Drawing on the political business cycle literature, we expect higher production costs and lower profits for firms in capital (labor) intensive sectors when the Left (Right) is in power. These partisan cycles, in turn, shape the sectoral composition of exports from the partner to the United States, and the degree to which trade is conducted intrafirm. Under a Left‐ (Right‐) leaning government in a partner country, U.S. intrafirm imports of capital‐ (labor‐) goods increase relative to total imports in these industries. Examining highly disaggregated U.S. import data, we find strong support for our argument. Our results indicate that the effect of partisan governments on offshore outsourcing depends on factor intensities of production, which vary across industries. The degree of internalization in global sourcing is shaped in part by the distributional objectives of partisan governments, and not by economic factors alone.

Electoral incentives affect legislators' responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators' responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed‐list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll‐call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators' trade‐policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, are more likely to motivate legislators to defy their parties. These findings underscore the importance of understanding when and how catering to local constituents can affect politicians' trade policy choices.

This paper explores the existence of partisan cycles in foreign direct investment performance. Our theoretical model predicts that the incumbent government's partisanship should affect foreign investors' decision to flow into different sectors of the host country: pro‐labor governments would encourage the inflow of the type of investment that complements labor in production; pro‐capital governments would promote the entry of investment that substitutes for labor. Empirical evidence from a sample of Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries reveals a pattern of foreign investors' response to partisan cycles consistent with the predictions of the model. First, foreign investment systematically flows into different sectors of the host economy under left‐ and right‐leaning incumbents. Second, we find a positive correlation between foreign investment and changes in average wages under left‐leaning incumbents, but no effect on wages under right‐leaning governments.

The authors present and test a theory about the effects of political competition on the sources of economic growth. Using Mankiw, Romer, and Weil's model of economic growth and data for roughly 80 countries, the authors show that political competition decreases the rate of physical capital accumulation and labor mobilization but increases the rate of human capital accumulation and (less conclusively) the rate of productivity change. The results suggest that political competition systematically affects the sources of growth, but those effects are cross-cutting, explainingwhy democracy itself may be ambiguous. These findingshelp clarify the debate about regime type and economic performance and suggest new avenues for research.