Suchergebnisse

Abstract.Can workers' rights and social protections be reconciled with firms' competitiveness and productivity? In contrast to current development policy advice, which emphasizes the "flexibilization" of labour laws, this article contributes to an ongoing debate about styles of inspection by exploring the causal links between different regulatory practices and economic development and compliance outcomes. Findings from subnational comparisons in Brazil challenge established theories about the behaviours of firms and regulatory agencies, and indicate that labour inspectors have been able to promote sustainable compliance (legal and technical solutions linking up workers' rights with firms' performance) by combining punitive and pedagogical inspection practices.

Résumé.Peut‐on concilier les droits des travailleurs et la protection sociale avec la compétitivité et la productivité des entreprises? Se démarquant de la doctrine en vogue, qui prône la déréglementation et la «flexibilisation» de la protection du travail, l'auteur analyse le débat sur les styles réglementaires et suggère que les différentes pratiques d'inspection du travail influent sur les résultats obtenus dans le respect de la législation. Son enquê te permet de constater que les inspecteurs du travail brésiliens ont su élaborer des solutions assurant un respect durable de la réglementation sans nuire à la productivité des entreprises, en utilisant des méthodes faisant appel à la fois aux sanctions et à la pédagogie.

Resumen.¿ Es posible conciliar los derechos de los trabajadores y la protectión social con la competitividad y la productividad de las empresas? Apartándose de la lí‐neapolitica en boga, quepreconiza la desreglamentación y la «flexibilización» de las salvaguardias en favor de los trabajadores, el autor se adentra en el debate acerca de los estilos de ordenación y afirma que los métodos de los inspectores del trabajo in‐fluyen en el grado de cumplimiento de las normas. Indaga en la labor que efectúan a pie de calle los inspectores brasileños, y descubre que han logrado promover soluciones duraderas que apuntalan el cumplimiento de la ley; por ejemplo, para que sean contratados oficialmente los trabajadores rurales temporeros o para fomentar unas condiciones de trabajo mas seguras sin poner en peligro la productividad de la em‐presa. Es decir, conjugan las medidas punitivas con otras de car áeter pedagógico.

Dans cet article, il s'agit de discuter la gestion des risques au travail à travers une analyse centrée sur le travail réalisé par les inspecteurs du travail. Appuyé sur une recherche approfondie sur l'Inspection du Travail au Brésil, on révèle deux modes implicites de production et de justification du travail d'inspection – « la défense fiscale » et « l'ingénierie sociale ». Ces modes médiatisent la transformation des lois abstraites en des cas concrets d'inspection. Ils sont examinés en fonction de leurs propriétés concernant la réduction de l'incertitude et la légitimation des actions d'inspection, et répercussions sur des approches de gestion des risques nettement différenciées – basées sur la durabilité financière du système ou sur le développement d'incitations à la prévention des risques dans les relations locales de production.

Rewarding regulation involves pursuing the complex goal of bringing labor protection and firms' economic performance together. A central element in achieving such goals refers to how regulatory bureaucracies operate. This paper examines the organizational structures, processes, and internal dynamics that allow regulatory bureaucracies to innovate and meet such developmental challenges. It reviews well-established interpretations about state bureaucracies that have emphasized either hierarchical structures and control processes or discretion and disperse individual behaviors. In addition, it suggests alternative analytical paths for combining flexibility and control by examining the relational processes and dynamics within bureaucracies. The analysis of the Brazilian Labor Inspectorate, based on qualitative data and extensive fieldwork, and of other empirical examples from the literature, indicates that internal tensions and conflicts instigate a process of technical vigilance between members of the same bureaucracy, inducing innovation and responsible uses of discretion.

This study explores the implications of different approaches to performance management for inspection work and regulatory outcomes. It assesses to what extent variations in methods for controlling discretion explain why in some cases regulatory inspectors limit themselves to the narrow boundaries of their formal mandate, while in other cases they work collaboratively with inspected firms and other organizations to develop innovative strategies that solve complex regulatory and business problems. After reviewing alternative approaches to the management of discretion, I present a natural experiment that offered an opportunity for controlled comparisons of two current attempts to reconcile bureaucratic performance with accountability: New Public Management and Experimentalist Governance. Case comparisons in the area of labor inspection in Brazil -- involving severance payments, fraudulent cooperatives, and safety in construction -- suggest that these two approaches to the management of regulatory bureaucracies produce considerably different inspection strategies and regulatory outcomes. The different accountability mechanisms and investigation strategies inspired by each of these approaches create different sets of incentives with direct effects on inspectors' motivation and their ability to resolve compliance problems. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWhat happens to a country's system of labor laws when its government embraces market-oriented reforms? In a twist on the prediction that labor regulations will be repealed, researchers find that laws remain in place but are not faithfully enforced, a phenomenon known as de facto flexibility. This article examines the case of Brazil to understand its near-opposite; namely, resilience and renewal in the enforcement of labor regulations. It finds that labor unions have combined the corporatist authority they gained under state control with the autonomy they acquired under democratization to devise new modes of action and to safeguard existing regulations. Meanwhile, labor inspectors and prosecutors rely on existing laws to combat precarious work conditions and promote formal employment relations, which strengthen the unions. This mutually supportive arrangement is neither perfect nor free of tension, but it shows how workers can be protected even when employers are subjected to global competition.