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The paper seeks to examine the phenomenon of populism in connection with the first EP elections in the Czech Republic (CZ). It aspires to answer the question whether the first EP elections can be described as populist and, if yes, then owing to which parties. It gives a basic overview of the electoral system, the actors involved and the voter turnout. It attempts to define populism and distinguish it from euroscepticism. The papers key focal point is then the application of the identified attributes of populism on those political parties that received more than 1 % of the vote. The findings lead to the rejection of the assertion about a populist character of the EP elections in the CZ, and a classification of individual actors is suggested. ; Článek sleduje fenomén populismus v prvních volbách do EP v ČR. Snaží se zjistit, zda je použití tohoto termínu v souvislosti s volbami adekvátní a sleduje které strany ve svých volebních programech akcentovaly populistická témata. ; The paper seeks to examine the phenomenon of populism in connection with the first EP elections in the Czech Republic (CZ). It aspires to answer the question whether the first EP elections can be described as populist and, if yes, then owing to which parties. It gives a basic overview of the electoral system, the actors involved and the voter turnout. It attempts to define populism and distinguish it from euroscepticism. The papers key focal point is then the application of the identified attributes of populism on those political parties that received more than 1 % of the vote. The findings lead to the rejection of the assertion about a populist character of the EP elections in the CZ, and a classification of individual actors is suggested.

The paper tries to show that the East enlargement was realized under partly changed conditions and strategies. It is focused on the enlargement waves formation including the European Commission position. The paper analyzes the classical method of EU enlargement and compares these principles with the undergoing EU expansion. In the end the attention is devoted to the special conditions in common agricultural policy they were offer to the candidate countries as the result of financial costs of the enlargement to the East.

AbstractThe government plays first fiddle in European Union (EU) decision-making processes, but a role in EU governance is also performed by the national parliament, which has gained additional competence to submit reasoned opinions based on the subsidiarity principle and participate in the political dialogue with the European Commission. The authors trace the policy-shaping and policy-taking processes and explore the impact of parliamentary and government involvement in EU policy-making on belated and timely transposition of EU directives in the Czech Republic. This comparative analysis of six directives, of which three were transposed on time and the other three from the same policy areas not, shows that the connection between ex-ante and ex-post stages still seems weak, and thus, greater involvement by parliament in EU affairs does not alone affect the time of transposition. Instead, the capacity of the government, determined partly by the salience of the legislation and its characteristics, is the main explanation for the transposition delays.

Současná regulace lobbingu v EU (EP a EK), v podobě formální dokumentace, vykazuje pohledem projektu mezinárodních standardů nevládních organizací značné rezervy. Systém je dle tohoto projektu nejsilnější z hlediska svého vymezení či transparentnosti, a naopak nejslabší v oblasti kontroly, sankcí a integrity. Zjištěná reflexe zcela odpovídá základním parametrům unijního, dobrovolného a sebe-regulačního systému. Celkové výsledky výzkumu ukazují, že Komise alespoň částečně splňuje více jak polovinu stanovených standardů. Parlament naopak méně než polovinu. Obě instituce tak vykazují velký prostor pro posílení regulace zejména v oblastech integrity, participace a přístupu. Mezi zásadní problémy unijní regulace patří především: neucelenost, dobrovolný rejstřík transparentnosti, nedostatek poskytovaných údajů v rejstříku, absence nezávislého dozorového orgánu a přísnějších sankcí či benevolentního používání instrumentu legislativní stopy.

A common initiative of the European Parliament and the European Commission resulted in the unification of the rules governing lobbyists at EU level in June 2011. The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature as regards evaluation of the new system of the EU Transparency Register using the CPI methodology and to generate a numerical value for the scheme for further comparative purposes. Detailed analysis of relevant documents indicates that the current EU scheme's index is 26, which mirrors its supposed low level of stringency. Thorough comparison with past regulatory schemes of the Parliament and Commission reveals that, surprisingly, it is the European Parliament which has made greater steps in lobby regulation, especially towards enhancing transparency in lobbying. Although the new scheme represents a compromise between both institutional approaches, regarding its individual elements, there is a clear dominance of the Commission's approach, which can be regarded as the true leader of reform.

A common initiative of the European Parliament and the European Commission resulted in the unification of the rules governing lobbyists at EU level in June 2011. The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature as regards evaluation of the new system of the EU Transparency Register using the CPI methodology and to generate a numerical value for the scheme for further comparative purposes. Detailed analysis of relevant documents indicates that the current EU scheme's index is 26, which mirrors its supposed low level of stringency. Thorough comparison with past regulatory schemes of the Parliament and Commission reveals that, surprisingly, it is the European Parliament which has made greater steps in lobby regulation, especially towards enhancing transparency in lobbying. Although the new scheme represents a compromise between both institutional approaches, regarding its individual elements, there is a clear dominance of the Commission's approach, which can be regarded as the true leader of reform. ; A common initiative of the European Parliament and the European Commission resulted in the unification of the rules governing lobbyists at EU level in June 2011. The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature as regards evaluation of the new system of the EU Transparency Register using the CPI methodology and to generate a numerical value for the scheme for further comparative purposes. Detailed analysis of relevant documents indicates that the current EU scheme's index is 26, which mirrors its supposed low level of stringency. Thorough comparison with past regulatory schemes of the Parliament and Commission reveals that, surprisingly, it is the European Parliament which has made greater steps in lobby regulation, especially towards enhancing transparency in lobbying. Although the new scheme represents a compromise between both institutional approaches, regarding its individual elements, there is a clear dominance of the Commission's approach, which can be regarded as the true leader of reform.

The aim of this article is to underline a more broad and complex approach towards the regulation of lobbying. Our objective here is to provide a systematic enumeration of possible regulatory alternatives. This research involves the examination of the most notable and significant cases of lobbying regulation in the western world and is based largely on the textual analysis of relevant regulatory documents. We do not, however, intend to present the detailed mapping of lobbying regulation in all possible arenas, or evaluate these means, or even recommend particular regulatory options or instruments. We therefore suggest an analytical framework highlighting three important points that should be clarified in each regulatory system: 1) the actors involved in lobbying, 2) the form of regulation, and 3) the regulatory means and instruments. The proposed topography of lobbying regulation can serve as a general basis for the further analysis of regulatory schemes and their comparison, but also as a guide for those considering regulatory options.