Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory: A Critique of Giddens, Habermas and Bhaskar
In: Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought
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In: Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 13-33
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractG. A. Cohen is justly acclaimed for his penetrating and searching critique of the commanding Rawlsian liberal paradigm in contemporary political philosophy. He is also well known for his fervent advocacy of a radical view of economic equality, namely, that "justice requires (virtually) unqualified equality itself." This essay focuses on two issues at the heart of Cohen's critique, namely, his argument that economic equality is a moral as well as a political responsibility, and his interrogatory question: "If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich?" I take up critics' objection that Cohen's arguments for what economic egalitarianism requires are overly morally demanding. I also present a puzzle about the critical reception of Cohen's work: Given the amount and quality of engagement with his arguments on what egalitarianism would look like in a future just society, how come there's been such scant attention to his reflections on the predicament of the "rich egalitarian" in current-day unjust society? The essay culminates in a tentative answer to this question.
In: European journal of social theory, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 338-355
ISSN: 1461-7137
A well-worn French proverb pronounces ' tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner' ('to understand all is to forgive all'). Is forgiveness the inevitable consequence of social scientific understanding of the actions and lives of perpetrators of serious wrongdoing? Do social scientific explanations provide excuses or justifications for the perpetrators of the actions that the explanations purport to explain? In this essay, I seek clarification of these intertwined explanatory and moral questions.
In: Contemporary political theory: CPT, Band 20, Heft S3, S. 115-118
ISSN: 1476-9336
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 3-30
ISSN: 1552-7441
The so-called "problem" of structure and agency is clearly related to the philosophical problem of free will and determinism, yet the central philosophical issues are not well understood by theorists of structure and agency in the social sciences. In this article I draw a map of the available stances on the metaphysics of free will and determinism. With the aid of this map the problem of structure and agency will be seen to dissolve. The problem of structure and agency is sustained by a failure to distinguish between metaphysical and empirical senses of the relation between social structure and individual agency. The ramifications of this distinction are illustrated via a case study of competing explanations of perpetrator behavior in Christopher Browning's and Daniel Goldhagen's studies of the German Order Police in the Holocaust.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 48, Heft 1, S. 3-32
ISSN: 1552-7441
In the space of their 16-month posting to Poland, the 500 men of Police Battalion 101 genocidally massacred 38,000 Jews by rifle and pistol fire. Although they were acting as members of a formal security force, these men knew that they could avoid participation in killing operations with impunity, and a substantial minority did so. Why, then, did so many participate in the genocidal killing when they knew they did not have to? Landmark historical studies by Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen proffer contrasting explanatory answers to this troublesome question. This article focuses on a criticism that has often been leveled at the internal coherence of Goldhagen's controversial explanatory theory. Goldhagen's explanation is that the men freely, willingly, and responsibly participated in the genocidal killing because of their beliefs about Jews—beliefs that they were causally determined to hold. Critics charge that this is incoherent: How could perpetrators have been passive recipients of deterministically acquired action-determining beliefs and freely responsible agents of genocidal killing? I defend Goldhagen's explanation against this charge of incoherence, and go on to explore the implications of his account, and Browning's, for the moral culpability of the perpetrators.
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 885-891
ISSN: 1467-9248
Colin Hay's article 'King Canute and the "Problem" of Structure and Agency' aims to: (1) 'gain an interesting political analytical purchase on a seemingly familiar tale', and (2) 'generate a series of valuable and more general insights into our understanding of the structure-agency relationship'. I argue that he fails on both counts.
In: Political studies, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 885-891
ISSN: 0032-3217
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 241-267
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 96-115
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 314-336
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 97-117
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 289-317
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Imprints: egalitarian theory and practice, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 49-78
ISSN: 1363-5964
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 23-45
ISSN: 1502-3923