Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis study aimed to offer an in-depth insight into intellectual dilemmas associated with a comprehensive approach to national defence using Estonia as an example to demonstrate that comprehensive approach in itself may not be enough to feel safe and secure. The authors focused on two specific theoretical questions. First, how security threats are determined in Estonia, including the impact of such a phenomenon as macro-securitization? Second, how various levels of comprehensive approach relate to each other in the way that a shared security culture will be created? In this way, the aim of this article was not only to shake the foundations of national defence in Estonia but also to contribute to the improvement of the current model to ensure that it actually works in practice.

Abstract
The current study focuses on the Estonian perceptions of security and on the defence situation both globally and locally. The dynamic results of the public opinion surveys on security risks conducted in Estonia over the last 10 years (2006-2016) will be presented. In addition, to understand whether some of the security risks could be over- or underestimated in Estonia, these results will be compared with the views expressed recently by the World Economic Forum, particularly the Global Risks Report 2016. Also, the arguments why some topics have played or are currently playing key role in the Estonian security perception will be presented and discussed.

This study addresses the challenges and opportunities that small European states face when weighing their defence industrial policy options. The article builds on a technology–based small state industry governance model by adding a defence industry–specific layer. This model is used to analyse how defence industries of small states could contribute to the European Union common defence industrial policy, and how the latter could likewise be beneficial to small member states. The paper discusses defence industrial policy challenges and opportunities both from the wider European Union and small state perspective. Global and regional geopolitical trends are explored among other specific topics, as are aspects of regional and domestic governance like the market structure, procurement, and R&D. The article concludes that small European states could both win and lose with the establishment of a common defence market, depending on the market design. Ideally, it should be combined with the simultaneous creation of an EU defence industrial policy that enables smaller, and especially less developed, member states to maintain and advance their own industries, preferably participating within the value chains of defence industries of the larger countries.

The Russian federation uses several tools to allow it to place pressure on the western world in an asymmetric manner, among them being cyber-attacks, economic tools, and information-influence campaigns. These instruments are especially strongly felt in Estonia. This article uses Estonia's example in order to delve into Russia's political goals and strategic conduct. Specifically, analysis is provided in regard to the political context, instruments which form part of the 'information war', and any effective counter-measures, with all of this being carried out within the theoretical framework of constructivism. As will be argued, the shift from European to Eurasian power and Russia's carefully crafted management process of not exceeding red lines, as well as its process of exploiting the socio-economic weaknesses of the west all play a relevant role in understanding the political context. As for instruments, Russia has developed tools which can be analysed in terms of strategic conspiracy narratives, while it has likewise used several channels which lie next to the usual media tools, along with policy tools such as Pax Russica and the compatriot policy.

Abstract
The Russian Federation has developed a large number of instruments to put pressure on the West using non-conventional means such as cyber attacks, economic tools and information warfare. Using modern IT technologies in its hybrid activities, Russia, much like China or other authoritarian powers, is trying to challenge the current world order. These instruments are particularly evident in the Baltic States. This article uses Estonia as a case study to inquire into the political goals and strategic conduct of Russia. Specifically, the focus is on the political context, instruments of information war, and available countermeasures. As argued in the current study, the shift from European to Eurasian power, Russia's careful management and success in avoiding crossing the "red lines" of its adversaries, as well as in exploiting the socioeconomic weaknesses and openness of the West, all play a relevant role in understanding the political context. As for instruments, Russia has developed strategic narratives and conspiracy theories, plus several channels next to media channels, and policy tools such as Pax Russica and the compatriot policy. These are deployed in its neighborhood and aimed at unintegrated segments of the Russophone populations.

The problems with national airlines in small peripheral member states indicate that the effects of strict competition policy and state aid rules of the European Union (EU) may not be equally useful for all member states and their citizens. Measures that are considered efficient from the perspective of one EU member state may not necessarily improve the welfare at the EU level and vice versa. While common competition policy rules are often justified by referring to the core values of European integration and the Single Market, the values themselves prioritize different aspects of the ideals of free market, European solidarity, and institutional stability. Curiously, as a result, the EU practical regulations are often imposing significant costs on a local peripheral consumer while even unable of meeting the proclaimed European values. By using the case study of the Estonian national flag carrier Estonian Air the current study focuses on the question whether the EU state aid regulation is simultaneously rational and sufficiently flexible to take into account the joint values of the European single market and specific needs of peripheral member states.