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Tommie Shelby articulates a nonideal theory of black US ghettos that casts them as consequences of an intolerably unjust institutional structure. I argue that, despite some of its significant merits, Shelby's theory is weakened by his rejection of integration as a principle for reforming disadvantaged ghettos and correcting structural injustices in the US. In particular, I argue that Shelby unwarrantedly downplays the socio-economic efficiency of integrationist policies and fails to consider some of the ways in which integration might count as a duty of (corrective) justice.

Résumé Cette introduction remplit trois fonctions. Premièrement, je précise le contenu de l'idée de tournant institutionnel vers la justice restaurative. Deuxièmement, j'identifie trois positions centrales partagées par les auteurs qui écrivent pour ce numéro collectif. Ces positions sont les suivantes : celle du convergentisme (entre l'idéal de la restauration et la pratique pénale), celle de l'optimisme (concernant l'efficience institutionnelle de l'idéal de la justice restaurative) et celle du comparativisme (entre différentes manières de traiter le problème du crime). Troisièmement, j'interprète l'orientation générale de notre justification du tournant institutionnel vers la justice restaurative dans les termes de la théorie politique activiste.

AbstractThis paper argues that lay jurors should be given a more extensive position in making decisions about misdemeanour cases. The paper constitutes a qualified defense of the 2011 judicial French reform. This reform associates two extra jurors to the already existing three magistrates in charge of misdemeanour cases. Two arguments are presented in favour of this measure. The first argument is that increasing the number of decision‐makers improves the accuracy of verdicts. I call this the argument from quantity. The second argument is that fostering more identity diversity between decision‐makers tends to improve the quality of group decisions. I call this the argument from diversity. The argument from quantity and the argument from diversity are supported by the more general idea that one of the chief rationales of any judicial system is that of ensuring the defendants' equality of protection.

AbstractCurrently, almost all polities that allow for jury trials deprive people with felony convictions of their right to serve as jurors on criminal trials. Against these exclusionary practices, we contend that there are epistemic and political reasons to enable (and not merely allow) convicted felony defendants to serve as jurors. These reasons are derived from the ideal of peer judgment, which we take to be deeply ingrained in and relevant for ensuring fair jury‐judgment practices. In this article, we construct an account of peer judgment understood as equal subjection to coercive law, spell out the epistemic dimension of this account, and use it to argue that there are stronger reasons for having people with felony convictions serve as jurors, as compared to average, noncriminalized citizens. Our peer‐judgment argument is meant to both weaken and outweigh current justifications for excluding people with felony convictions from jury service.

Are there any prima facie reasons that democracies might have for disenfranchising older citizens? This question reflects increasingly salient, but often incompletely theorized complaints that members of democratic publics advance about older citizens' electoral influence. Rather than rejecting these complaints out of hand, we explore whether, suitably reconstructed, they withstand democratic scrutiny. More specifically, we examine whether the account of political equality that seems to most fittingly capture the logic of these complaints – namely, equal opportunity of political influence over electoral outcomes – can justify disenfranchising older citizens. We conclude that equal opportunity of influence cannot ground a blanket disenfranchisement of older people and that, taken in conjunction with other general considerations that apply to all sound electoral policies, partial disenfranchisement proposals (i.e. proposals for reducing the electoral influence of older citizens via age-weighted voting) are both quasi-inapplicable and practically unrobust across a relevant range of political contexts.

Is criminal disenfranchisement compatible with a democratic political order? This article considers this question in light of a recently developed view that criminal disenfranchisement is justified because it expresses our commitment to democratic values. We call this view expressive disenfranchisement and refer to the general conception in which it is grounded as democratic expressivism. Contra supporters of expressive disenfranchisement, we argue that democratic expressivism does not offer a sound justification of criminal disenfranchisement. Additionally, we argue that, insofar as one really cares about answering serious criminal wrongs via an expression of democratic values, criminal disenfranchisement should be abandoned and replaced with a policy that temporarily obliges the relevant criminals to vote. Democratic expressivists should, in other words, move from supporting the disenfranchisement of serious offenders to endorsing a policy of compulsory criminal voting for a finite period of time.

Is criminal disenfranchisement compatible with a democratic political order? This article considers this question in light of a recently developed view that criminal disenfranchisement is justified because it expresses our commitment to democratic values. We call this view expressive disenfranchisement and refer to the general conception in which it is grounded as democratic expressivism. Contra supporters of expressive disenfranchisement, we argue that democratic expressivism does not offer a sound justification of criminal disenfranchisement. Additionally, we argue that, insofar as one really cares about answering serious criminal wrongs via an expression of democratic values, criminal disenfranchisement should be abandoned and replaced with a policy that temporarily obliges the relevant criminals to vote. Democratic expressivists should, in other words, move from supporting the disenfranchisement of serious offenders to endorsing a policy of compulsory criminal voting for a finite period of time.