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Abstract
Should digital gatekeepers be allowed to gather data from users and combine data from different sources? That is one of the key substantive questions of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). It is currently addressed in Art. 5(a) of the draft DMA. There are two problems with the current wording: first, it is not specific enough to work as a self-executable provision; secondly, it could happen that users are nudged into giving consent easily so that the gatekeepers can continue to expand their sets of personal data, without users having a 'real' say and with third parties losing out in competition. In this contribution, I analyse this problem. My suggestion is to resort to a 'rating solution': qualified entities, e.g. trusted data intermediaries, should rate, certify or label the data options offered by the gatekeepers and serve as 'data guides' for consumers. I also look at other policy options.

Zusammenfassung
Ökonomische Forschung zu rechtlichen Themen ist häufig stark an den Auswirkungen einer materiell-rechtlichen Regel oder dem Verteilungsergebnis eines Rechtsstreits orientiert. Das wird dem Untersuchungsgegenstand nicht gerecht, da für das Recht der Weg zur Generierung eines solchen materiellen Ergebnisses konstitutiv ist. Interdisziplinäre Forschung muss sich daher auf Verfahren, Form und Durchsetzung ebenso einlassen wie auf materielle Regelungen. Für die Ordnung der Wirtschaft sind dabei die bislang vernachlässigten privatrechtlichen (nicht öffentlich-rechtlichen) Mechanismen besonders interessant: Privatrechtliche Institutionen ordnen das Zusammenleben in ähnlicher Form wie Märkte Angebot und Nachfrage koordinieren. Werden die Eigenrationalitäten des (Verfahrens-)Rechts respektiert, von denen einige im Beitrag vorgestellt werden, kann ökonomische Forschung einen Beitrag zur Lösung zentraler rechtspolitischer Debatten leisten, etwa zur Aufladung privatrechtlicher Mechanismen mit öffentlichen Ordnungsansprüchen zur Verfahrensdauer und zum Zugang zum Recht.

In the 2015 case Huawei/ZTE, the Court of Justice of the European Union took one of its rare opportunities to rule on the interface of antitrust and patent law. The question before the Court was whether the holder of a standard-essential patent abuses a dominant position by seeking an injunction against a potential licensee. Regarding a previous line of cases under European law, the Court took a surprisingly easy solution by forcing the companies to get back to the negotiation table. This may be attributed to a new methodological balancing approach of the Court. While acknowledging the problem of patent thickets, the Court restrains the role of antitrust authorities in this field.

Market definition is highly relevant in European case practice in competition law. Yet the tools and also the concepts are far from being very sophisticated. The critique of market definition by Richard Markovits is far-reaching: not only is market definition arbitrary, but current approaches also have an in-built bias towards a static snapshot understanding of the economy. Yet it would be wrong to give up this important step in antitrust analysis, since otherwise antitrust loses its function as the fundamental set of governing rules for markets. Instead, it is necessary to develop a more evolutionary concept of markets.