Suchergebnisse

Le ratio de la base « élargie » proposé par Davezies est très proche du multiplicateur keynésien des dépenses autonomes (en incluant les dépenses publiques locales et les ressources extérieures). L'évolution opposée de leurs ressources extérieures (exportations, tourisme, transferts et investissements extérieurs) permet d'expliquer l'évolution très divergente du PIB de la Nouvelle-Calédonie et de la Polynésie française de 2002 à 2010 (un écart de 49 % en sept ans). Cependant, le ratio de la base « élargie » aux ressources extérieures n'est pas stable à moyen terme, ce qui rend difficile son application en prévision au-delà d'une courte période.

International audience ; The results pointed out in the note 'The significance of geographic location in island studies' by McElroy & Lucas (2014) suggest that the economic performance of small islands is inversely related to their remoteness from the rest of the world and positively related to their political affiliation to a large country. In this note, I propose some policy implications and review some theoretical explanations for this result. I also present similar results obtained with a gravity model of tourism demand for small islands.

International audience The results pointed out in the note 'The significance of geographic location in island studies' by McElroy & Lucas (2014) suggest that the economic performance of small islands is inversely related to their remoteness from the rest of the world and positively related to their political affiliation to a large country. In this note, I propose some policy implications and review some theoretical explanations for this result. I also present similar results obtained with a gravity model of tourism demand for small islands.

International audience ; The results pointed out in the note 'The significance of geographic location in island studies' by McElroy & Lucas (2014) suggest that the economic performance of small islands is inversely related to their remoteness from the rest of the world and positively related to their political affiliation to a large country. In this note, I propose some policy implications and review some theoretical explanations for this result. I also present similar results obtained with a gravity model of tourism demand for small islands.

International audience ; This article presents a theory of aid as trade. I assume that aid is a payment for an invisible export of strategic services to a large donor country seeking diplomatic goodwill and exclusive strategic use of a small country's territory, oceanic space and airspace. In a formal two countries-two goods model, the strategic service is produced with a higher productivity in the small country/island because of its geographic location (close to a potential enemy of the large country, for example). The other good is a composite manufactured good produced with higher productivity in the large country. There are gains from international trade that can be obtained by both countries, and divided between them. The citizen of both countries are better off: a lower cost for defense of the large industrial country, and a geostrategic rent for the citizen of the small country, enabling them to finance a deficit of the official balance of goods and services.

International audience ; This article presents a theory of aid as trade. I assume that aid is a payment for an invisible export of strategic services to a large donor country seeking diplomatic goodwill and exclusive strategic use of a small country's territory, oceanic space and airspace. In a formal two countries-two goods model, the strategic service is produced with a higher productivity in the small country/island because of its geographic location (close to a potential enemy of the large country, for example). The other good is a composite manufactured good produced with higher productivity in the large country. There are gains from international trade that can be obtained by both countries, and divided between them. The citizen of both countries are better off: a lower cost for defense of the large industrial country, and a geostrategic rent for the citizen of the small country, enabling them to finance a deficit of the official balance of goods and services.